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The critical reception of Gaskell as a writer whose work falls
into the two opposing categories of the 'condition of England' novel
and the 'feminine novel' has evaded a central issue in her work:
the relation of the individual to language. Her Unitarian background
provides a conception of language that is 'performative' in nature,
and which posits the individual as the autonomous, 'intending', site
of meaning or 'truth.
This conception of language has been subjected to a Derridean
deconstruction in its present-day manifestation of Speech Act theory.
Gaskell's texts can be similarly deconstructed to expose their ideological
assumptions. The deconstruction yields a notion of a 'social contract'
which, guaranteeing 'shared meaning', promotes 'communication' between
individuals. That contract however is seen to evade the issue of
gender. An analysis of Gaskell's novels which focuses on the inter-
. action between gender, the autonomous speaking subject and language,
exposes the male bias in what those texts posit as 'meaning' or truth.
This thesis analyses both the gradual surfacing of these concerns
in Gaskell's texts, and the texts' attempts to 'solve' the ideological
contradictions upon which they are based.
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Preface
My aim in this thesis has not been to uncover a unifying theme
in Gaskell's works, nor settle the question of her status as 'condition
of England' novelist or 'feminine' novelist once and for all. I
have attempted to explore the impact of two ideological determinants,
gender and Unitarian conceptions of language, on Gaskell's texts.
Accordingly my thesis is arranged chronologically to reflect what
I see as the gradual surfacing of these determinants in the novels.
The analyses in Part One therefore reflect the decentred status of
issues which become in Part Two central concerns in the novels.
I have chosen Cranford as the turning point for one primary reason.
As the text most often cited as 'proof' of Gaskell's 'feminine'
skills, it seemed crucial to look closely at its ideological sub-
structure. The resulting analysis, departing as it does from traditional
readings of the text, raises the issue of the 'site of meaning',
the individual's relation to language, which increasingly troubles
the succeeding novels.
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Chapter One
i) Introduction
The primary emphasis, in literary criticism, on Elizabeth Gaskell
as a 'condition of England' novelist has often led to an unbalanced
and complacent view of her writing. Whilst one agrees that Gaskell
does "give utterance to unfamiliar points of view"  and perhaps that
she writes with " the quiet assumption that to know is to understand,
to forgive, and even to respect", 2
 such comments are ultimately un-
satisfying. More recent criticism is similarly limited. Recognition
that Gaskell "sees perfectly clearly . . . that women have needs
and desires which no one state can wholly satisfy" 3 is a welcome
departure from the more typical 'social novelist' criticism. Nevertheless,
Gaskell criticism, past and present, has thus far failed to investigate
the impetus behind her novel writing and the 'utterance' it gives
to unfamiliar points of view. The gap can be partially filled by
an examination into Gaskell's Unitarian background - a dissenting
religion which also recognised, or at least attempted to understand,
the needs and desires of women. Unitarianism is singular both in
its articulation of non-conventional viewpoints and in the absence
of comprehensive, authoritative writings and commentaries on its
history and social influence. Indeed, Unitarianism has only recently
come into its own as an area worthy of research. Its influence on
the lives and works of those who called themselves Unitarian, Gaskell
amongst them, has yet to be investigated thoroughly. What follows
1
2here is an overview comprising a brief history of Unitarianism; an
outline of its philosophical origins; a look at the most signficant
Unitarian doctrines and beliefs; a sketch of Unitarian contributions
to the English society of Gaskell's day; a a brief profile of a
Unitarian congregation.
ii) Unitarianism
In the broadest possible terms, Unitarianism can be said to
have originated in the English Renaissance. During this time, the
concept of the individual's right to think for her/himself even when
in opposit'ion to the state first formed itself. It is upon this
fundamental belief in the integrity of the individual that Unitarianism's
distinctive theology is based. As Cook (an historian writing at
the turn of the century for the American Unitarian Association) outlines
the origins of Unitarianism, the basic belief in the right of the
individual "developed clearly [into] the idea that he may become
the transmitter of valid revelations of spiritual truth. [T]hat God
may speak through individual intuition and reason, and that this
inward revelation may be of the highest authority and worth." 4 The
principle of individuality can be attributed to Protestantism as
a whole. Where Unitarianism differs in in its added insistence on
the importance of man's reason in establishing the individual's relation-
ship to God, and in investigating religion in general.
Insistence on the capacity of human reason to examine God and
religion was obviously unpopular. Unitarians were excluded from
the benefits of the 1689 Toleration Act, 5 and were not off ically
3welcomed in society until 1813 when they attained the legal right
to exist. 6 Until that time, the Occasional Conformity Act of 1711
effectively disallowed Unitarians from holding any government office
by imposing a penalty on any elected officers who attended a non-
Church of England religious meeting during their time in office.7
Similarly, the Schism Act of 1714 necessitated the administration
of the sacrament, according to Church of England practice, before
the opening of a school, or teaching, could take place.
Even in 1813 when Unitarianism was declared legal, the welcome
was limited and constrained. Unitarians were still unable to hold
the office of mayor, town-clerk, member of council, office of magistry,
or any position of trust which pertained to the government of cities.
These positions remained closed to them by the continued administration
of the Corporation Acts of 1661, and the eighteenth-century acts
outlined above, which demanded adherence to the Sacrament of the
Lord's Supper - a rite opposed by Unitarians. Not until 1828, when
the acts were repealed, were any of these offices held by Unitarians. 8
The Municipal Corporations Act further facilitated the holding of
office by Unitarians. Up until the passing of this act in 1835,
the strongholds of Unitarianism (Manchester, Liverpool, Birmingham)
had no municipal government. With its passing, Unitarians were elected
to civic posts in some of the most important English towns, such
as the mayorships in Manchester and Liverpool. 9
Once finally given such rights, Unitarians appear to have had
a great impact on local government, social reform, and social life
in general. The first Statistical Society and the Sanitary Association
in Manchester, for example, were founded by Unitarians. A list of
4of Unitarians reveals their widespread prominence most succinctly:
1Jeremy Bentham, Charles Booth (surveyor of social conditions in London)1,
James Stansfeld, MP, who petitioned for the abolition of the Contagious
Diseases Act, 12 Florence Nightingale, James Martineau, W.R. Greg,
Samuel Rogers, Josiah Wedgwood, and of course Elizabeth Gaskell,
are but a few.
One expects, after becoming acquainted with these few historical
facts, to find in Unitarianism the articulation of an extreme, radical
faith. A modern reader with such expectations may well be disappointed.
But once Unitarianism is placed within an historical context, and
its doctrines are compared to other, more conventional, Protestant
dissenting sects, then its uniqueness achieves definition.
The most important Unitarian doctrine, and the belief from which
all of the ensuing doctrines originate, is the all-pervasive Unitarian
emphasis on the use of reason in matters of religion. The faculty
of reason was to be exercised upon the Bible itself, and it is from
the results of such scriptural criticism that Unitarians derived
their faith. At this point, it is useful to look at the philosophical
origins of Unitarianism since they help to elucidate the Unitarian
emphasis on reason. The metaphysical base of Unitarianism was the
school of Scottish Coulon Sense philosophy. This school itself was
a reaction or response to Hume's skeptical ontological theories.13
With Hume positing that humankind "could know nothing about ultimate
reality", 14
 the Scottish philosophers, primarily Thomas Reid (1710-
1796) and his disciples, George Campbell (1719-1796), James Beattie
(1735-1803), Dugald Stewart (1753-1828) and James Oswald (1715-1769),
set out to re-establish ontological realism. If Hume suggested that
5the individual can 'know' only his/her own sense perceptions and
that everything else, including one's knowledge of God, is in a sense
'fiction', then Reid and his followers determined "to reassure modern
man that . . . he could still rely on reason and common sense for
objective knowledge." 15
 They asserted that "God had implanted common
sense in the human mind . . . [in order to] enabl[e] man to trust
his perceptions and, through them, to apprehend God's ways." 16
In a sense, Scottish Common Sense philosophy was a way of re-establishing
confidence in the empirical methodology of contemporary science and
its essential compatibility with a belief in Christianity. Whilst
realising that there was no logical way of proving the validity of
the individual's sense impressions, the common sense philosophers
asserted that since every individual does believe in his/her existence
and in the existence of the physical world, then it is because human-
kind was 'made' in such a way as to make the conviction of existence
a matter of intuition. 17 In other words, humankind must trust and
accept as authoritative the senses and perceptions which God has
chosen to give.
This Scottish common sense emphasis on sense perception or sensory
evidence initiated yet another important facet of Unitarian theology:
the importance of testimony, or witness. The common sense school
divided 'evidence' into three categories. The first was 'intuitive
evidence,' or evidence which is accepted on the basis of common sense,
such as the belief in the validity of one's own senses as outlined
above. The old a priori problem of proving the existence of one's
sense perception was resolved by the assertion of the necessity of
a basic trust in the structure of one's God-created mind. The
second kind of evidence was 'demonstrative'. This category encompassed
6evidence which was derived from logical deductions made from accepted
premises. If for example one can touch a table, one deduces that
it exists. The third type of evidence which is primary to Unitarian
theology is 'moral evidence' - or as it was understood by contemporaries
of the Scottish school, 'empirical' or sensory evidence. This last
category itself was divided into three sections: induction, analogy,
and reasoning on facts. The firsttwo types of 'moral' evidence seem
self-explanatory. The last is most crucial in Unitarianism. 'Reason-
ing on facts' is the basis for belief in events supported only by
'testimony'. In these instances (eg. the work of an historian) such
considerations as the credibility of the witness, his/her opportunities
for observation, and the degree to which s/he was disinterested
or interested in the events recorded, are all used in order to assess
the degree of validity to be accorded to the events described. 18
Since for Unitarians, "Religious faith . . . was grounded upon testimony,
and differed from sensory knowledge only in not being first-hand " 19
such a mode of verifying evidence is crucial. In the words of
one Unitarian minister, "the Holy Spirit did not so guide the Apostles
as to suspend the peculiarities of their minds, [therefore] .
a knowledge of their feelings, and of the influences under which
they were placed is one of the preparations for understanding their
writings." 20 Similarly, one must recognise and make allowance "for
the tendency of the older writers [ie. early translators and inter-
pretors of scripture] to surround great men with a supernatural halo,
and to ascribe to them supernatural powers." 21 The Bible, in effect,
was to be scutinised as carefully as any other text. It is "a book
written for men in the language of men, and . . . its meaning is
to be sought in the same manner as that of other books." 22 Indeed,
7as a text the Bible required the most fastidious literary examination.
Channing, outlining his precepts for biblical interpretations, reminds
us that since biblical rhetoric is "singularly glowing, bold, and
figurative, [it] demand[s] more frequent departures from the literal
sense than that of our own age and country, and consequently demand[s]
more continual exercise of judgement" 23 in order that we do not "extend
to all times and places what was of temporary and local application." 24
Stemming from this emphasis on reason and its application to
Biblical scripture, are a number of significant Unitarian tenets.
One of the most important beliefs, inherent in the emphasis on reason,
, is the belief in the fundamental dignify of man. Unitarians rejected
completely the doctrine of original sin or innate depravity. Unlike
Hobbes or Mandeville who maintained that all of man's actions stemmed
from self-regard Unitarians believed that man was capable of altruistic
acts. The basis for the belief is the Unitarian assertion that humankind
is not innately depraved, but that its soul is fundamentally divine.
"[T]here are," says Channing, "traces of infinity in the human mind,
• • . it bears a likeness to God." Indeed,
the divine attributes are first developed
in ourselves and thence transferred to
our Creator. The idea of God, sublime
and awful as it is, is the idea of
our own spiritual nature, purified and
enlarged to infinity. 26
Accordingly, 'sin' was not implicit in human nature. Rather, sin
pointed to "an abnormal state of disorder" 27 in which the individual's
reason, its most divine attribute, has been super5eded by a lower,
baser faculty.
Complementing the doctrine of the dignity of man, is a rejection
of baptism as it is most often defined. Since humankind was not
8innately sinful, there was no need for a baptism, or a cleansing
of an already untainted soul. The Unitarians substituted an 'act
of dedication' which took the form of public declaration or acknow-
ledgement of the parents' commitment to the religious education of
their child.
The rite of Holy Communion was also rejected by Unitarian followers.
The grounds for their rejection is threefold. Firstly, the idea
of transubstantiation itself was regarded as a barbaric superstition
not to be believed by rational man. Secondly, they considered that
the 'saving' or cleansing properties of the coliEmnion service negatively
influenced a person's daily activity. With the prospect of being
'cleansed' through Holy Communion, stress is laid upon the importance
of 'ritual' rather than an actively good daily life. Since Unitarians
believed in the freedom of man's will 28
 ( a belief based also on
Scottish common sense philosophy), 29
 any ritual such as Holy Communion
which detracted from the active pursuit of goodness was rejected.
Thirdly, the long-continued use of the rite by the state as a text
for government office made it, quite understandably considering the
barring from civic service it imposed on Unitarians, a symbol of
political oppression and compromise. 30
Unitarianism also rejected the doctrine of the Trinity. For
Unitarians, God was
one being, one mind, one person, one
intelligent agent, and one only, to
whom underived and infinite perfection
and dominion belong.31
In their theology, therefore, Christ is not 'divine' if by such a
term one declares that he is the physical embodiment of one aspect
of God. Rather, in Unitarian theology, Christ is 'divine' in that
9he is a messenger sent by God. His exalted status obtains from the
perfection of his character, or the complete fulfilment of his human
.	 32potential.	 Part of the reasoning behind the 'lower' status attributed
to Christ is the belief that the Trinity, as it is normally embraced,
undermines the affection the individual gives to God. Within the
Trinity, Christ is the most appealing entity. Since Unitarians recognise
the anthropomorphic tendency in human nature, the Trinity for them
facilitated, indeed encouraged, an idolatrous propensity in mankind
which they found repellent. 33
Stemming from both this alteration in Christ's usual status
within the Trinity and the Unitarian rejection of original sin, is
the repudiation of the doctrine of atonement, and a consequent de-
emphasizing of the importance of Christ's crucifixion. For Unitarians,
the essentially Calvinist insistence on the importance of the crucifixion
and Christ's atonement for humankind's sins is abhorrent, and a fitting
belief only for pagans. 34 Such a belief is based on the principle
that
man, having sinned against an
Infinite Being, has contracted infinite
Guilt, and is consequently exposed
to an infinite penalty.35
The physical body being unable to withstand infinite penalty, this
doctrine demands a substitute to endure the necessary penalty, that
substitute being Christ. Unitarians, rejecting original sin, and
thus effectively abolishing the Calvinist premise, claim "the obvious
maxim that the guilt of a being must be proportioned to his nature
and powers". 36 Christ, without the context of original sin within
which to operate, becomes important as an exemplary teacher, a fosterer
10
of virtue, and a restorer of the soul. 37
Christ's importance as a teacher itself presupposes a distinctive
conception of the structure of man's conscience. Unitarians viewed
the conscience as operating upon three axiomatic principles: the
necessary, the intuitive, and the fixed or absolute. 38
 'Necessary
conscience' is the capacity in the individual which enables him/her
to distinguish between 'right' and 'wrong'. Unitarians firmly maintained
that each person possessed the faculties necessary to make the distinctions
between the two concepts. 39
 The second principle of conscience,
the intuitive, is akin to the process by which the individual initially
trusts the validity of his/her senses. Just as the individual is
constructed so as to trust intuitively the evidence of his/her senses,
so the knowledge of what constitutes the concepts of 'right' and
'wrong' is intuititive. For Unitarians, the definition of 'right'
was one which everyone understood without exception. 40
 It did not
presuppose a knowledge of God gleaned from scripture, but was a faculty
possessed by Christians and non-believers alike. 41
 The third principle
of conscience, the fixed or absolute, is the idea that the obligation
to do right is implicit in man's grasp of the idea of 'right'. These
principles of conscience humankind shared with God. By means of
conscience, or moral sense, each individual had the capacity "to
perceive the eternal truths of morality as readily as God himself
did . . . [and so] participate in the divine homage to virtue." 42
At the same time, the Unitarians also viewed the conscience
as a bipartite structure, comprised of the cognitive and the volitional.
The cognitive element was operated by the principles outlined above.
The volitional element is the means by which Unitarians accounted
for the performance of 'wrong'. Whilst asserting that the individual
11
had the potential ability to make moral judgements, Unitarians recognised
that "all men did not avail themselves of their moral capabilities." 43
It is in this sense that 'sin' or performing 'wrong' is disharmonious.
Having the capacity to choose 'right' the sinner avoids utilising
it and thus sins.
With a belief in this type of conscience, or moral sense, Unit-
arianism necessarily placed great emphasis on the importance of education
and teaching. If humankind's moral sense was not automatically nor
universally utilised ( to which the existence of 'wrong' attested),
then a method of encouraging the use of the conscience was necessary.
William Stevenson (Gaskell's father) in a discussion of the merits
and demerits of a classical education, posits the following 'goals'
or aims of education. Firstly, education should foster a knowledge
of nature's laws that may enable an individual to aid humankind or
prevent injuries. Secondly, education should promote the habitual
consideration and comprehension of the consequences of action which
is the foundation of duty. Thirdly, education should facilitate
a knowledge of the meaning and power of language so that ideas and
information can be both communicated and understood. 44
It is the second aim that is most relevant to the issue of conscience.
Unitarians believed strongly in each individual's right of access
to information. If one is to be able to grasp the consequences of
all actions and so perform one's duty, then one must be aware of
all of the causes of actions. Only with such 'complete' knowledge
can humankind's reason operate effectively, thus allowing the individual
to perform his/her duty.
At the same time, education must encourage the exercising of
individual judgement. If the scriptures themselves must be minutely
12
scrutinised in order to take account of an individual author's peculiar-
ities and biases, then 'information' or 'facts' must be approached
in the same way. It is for this reason that Stevenson laments the
ubiquity of the classical education system. According to Stevenson,
the system encourages an uninformed reliance on the veracity of 'authority',
that is on the information disseminated under the aegis of ancient
names.
45
 Instead of fostering judgement, a classical education promoted
the implicitly uncritical capacity of memory, thereby ensuring the
perpetuation of old errors and prejudices. 46 A preferable method
of education would produce individuals capable of discovering the
basis for every proposition to which they assented or of which they
disapproved, as well as individuals able to discern the motives and
influences of their own actions.
This ability to distil 'pure' information or knowledge uninfluenced
by individual circumstance and bias, is crucial to Unitarianism.
Whilst recognising that humankind errs, Unitarians were reluctant
to cast doubts on the faculties given to humans by God, or the know-
ledge which these faculties allowed them to deduce. 47 Since knowledge
forms the basis of individual actions ( one does 'right' increas-
ingly in proportion to one's growing perception of which acts con-
stitute 'right'), the individual must trust his/her ability to distinguish
the truth and falsehood contained in the information s/he is given. 48
Once an individual is capable of exerting his/her reason .in
this analytic manner, s/he would have no difficulties in performing
the 'right' acts which the moral sense defines for him/her. S/he
would possess not only an abstract knowledge of what is right, but
an "emotional relish" 49 for right. Through the correct utilisation
of knowledge and judgement, each individual recognises that it is
13
by the development of a Christian character ( or the performance
of duty) that real happiness is achieved. Just as Christ the teacher
embodied the complete fulfilment of human potential, so the individual
by means of education and the exercising of judgement, can progress
through the various stages of the formation of a Christian character
until s/he ultimately attains a Christ-like and finally a God-like
nature. 50 In other words, though such progress was not considered
easy to achieve, Unitarianism did maintain that by diligent self-
improvement one not only attained happiness, but lived a true Christian
religious life. 51
All of this emphasis on reason and the precise analysis of 'infor-
mation' led to a charge of over-intellectualism being laid against
Unitarian theology. Unitarians admitted that they laid "no stress
on strong excitements" 52 . Nevertheless, they were adamant that Unit-
arianism did not exclude warmth from religion. For them, Christianity
"is intended to act powerfully on our whole nature, on the heart
as well as the understanding and the conscience." 53 Certainly,
the case of the Reverend Hutton, a popular London Unitarian minister
at Carter Lane Chapel, whose "inability to control his feelings;
and . . . tenderness. . . of heart" 54 seemed rather to threaten the
continuation of his sermons, suggests that Unitarianism was not all
rigorous intellectual enquiry. Unitarians were adverse, not to emotions,
but emotionalism. An appeal to the emotions was considered to be
suspect primarily because Unitarians feared its capacity to undermine
individual opinion and judgement. The Crucifixion is the prime example.
Its emotive symbolism and the doctrine of atonement was not only
repugnant but destructive. Any emphasis on such an emotive icon
detracted from the Unitarian stress 	 on individual effort whilst
bolstering a complacency in its power to cleanse.
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iii) Unitarian contributions to social reform
Holt reports that "Towards the middle of the nineteenth century
[Unitarians] thought of themselves as 'the Vanguard of the Age.'"55
Glancing at a list of Unitarian achievements and social contributions,
the communal self-esteem that such a title suggests is neither surpris-
ing nor overly self-congratulatory. Elizabeth Gaskell, born in 1810.
could look back on an impressive Unitarian heritage. Such people
as Thomas Butterworth Bayley (1774-1802), an early prison reformer; 56
William Smith, MP, involved in the abolition of slavery movement
with Wilberforce and Clarkson; 57 John Fielden, factory owner and
a leader of the agitation for the 1803 Factory Acts; 58 T.H. Porter,
involved in the Union and Emancipation Society which supported the
North in the American Civil War; 59 each of these men was a Unitarian.
The 'Tate' in Tate Gallery, London; 60 the establishment in 1774
of the first Humane Society in the country in London by Howes and
Gogan 61 - these too were Unitarian achievements. The late eighteenth-
century and Victorian Unitarians were pioneers of a sort: life insurance
began with Richard Price; 62 Thomas Potter was one of the promoters
of the first Manchester Joint Stock Bank in 1848; 63 the first cotton
mill was built by Unitarian Daniel Brown, in Leominster, Herefordshire; 64
and Thomas Henry (1734-1816) devised a number of improvements in
the dyeing and bleaching of materia1. 65 In Gaskell's own day, the
Gregs (a family she knew well) were well-respected as industrial
innovators who built houses for their workers, and who treated their
poorhouse apprentices humanely. 66
 Indeed, Unitarian industrialists
were generally regarded as positive exceptions to the usual character
of northern 'captains of industry. , 67
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Reading about these innovations, one is struck by the sheer
diversity of the achievements. For such a small body of dissenters,
the achievements seem disproportionately numerous. But perhaps,
as Holt suggests, it is the very fact of their dissent which accounts
for the Unitarians' abundant innovative activity. Since their theology
demanded freedom from reliance on external authority, and such freedom
was attained through the exercising of the rational faculty, innovation
and pioneering seem the inevitable results. 68 Certainly the Unitarian
contribution to Victorian journalism tallies with their theological
stance. With a firm belief in the individual's right of access to
information, and belief that the structure of government should
be derived from an educated public opinion, it is almost to be expected
that Unitarians were responsible for establishing The Manchester 
Guardian, a paper renowned in that day for its liberalism; 69 that
its first editor, J.E. Taylor, was both its primary financial bene-
factor and a Unitarian: 70 and that H. Crabb Robinson, a Unitarian
was foreign editor at The Times. 71 The Unitarian support of the
growing co-operative movement 72 also accords with its philosophy
since the movements encouraged active self-help and promoted independ-
ence from established authority.
Unitarian contributions to education can also be seen as stemming
directly from their stress on the necessity of personal judgement
and freedom from external authority. They were involved in promoting
all kinds of educational opportunities, from adult education and
women's education (unfortunately then considered separate categories)
to unsectarian education. 73
 Holt suggests that, because of existing
prejudices, Unitarians were unable to spread their educational ideals
widely, and that as a result their work in the education field, as
16
elsewhere, was primarily of a pioneering nature. 74
 Though that might
well be the case, their 'pioneering' work has certainly had a lasting
effect. Many of today's older redbrick universities - Manchester,
Leeds, Liverpool, Birmingham - have Unitarian foundations. The Unit-
arian dissenting academy at Warrington, for example, went through
several metamorphoses, from Manchester Academy to Manchester College
(with teachers such as James Martineau, Francis William Newman, and
J.J.Taylar) and finally to Manchester College, Oxford. 75 Similarly,
Liverpool University grew from the (Unitarian) Royal Institute, established
in 1817 by William Roscoe, which housed the developing School of
Medicine from 1834 to 1844. 76 When Liverpool University's first
college, University College, opened, a Unitarian 7 Rev. Charles Beard/
who was chairman of the Committee of the Association for the Promotion
of Higher Education in Liverpool, was instrumental in its establish-
ment. 77
But, aside from helping to establish such centres for higher
education, these places of study also embodied the modern idea of
the university. Institutes such as Manchester College (est. 1840)
were free from religious testing long before either Oxford or Cambridge
were. They provided the opportunity for college education for laymen,
as well as educating minsters for radical dissenters, without asking
for adherence to any particular religious creed. 78 In the same spirit
of education for all, the Mechanics' Institutes (such as the one
in Manchester where W. Gaskell lectured in English) offered working
men the chance of an education which took into account their working
hours and interest. 79 W. Gaskell's own lecture on the dialects of
the Manchester area ( published as an appendix to the 1854 edition
17
of Mary Barton) illustrates admirably the principle of tailoring
education to the individual's needs and interests.
Accompanying their advocation of education for all, Unitarians
were strong supporters of the idea of public libraries. After the
passing of the Free Libraries Act, Manchester in 1852 opened the
first public library in the country. 80 The Portico Library or Manchester
Subscription Library was established and administered by Unitarians,
and became Manchester's public library. W. Gaskell himself was its
chairman ( before the Free Libraries Act) from 1849-1884, well after
it became a public library. 81 Unitarians were also anti-Sabbatarians.
They campaigned for parks and libraries to remain open on Sundays. 82
Gaskell's own experience (discussing Walter Scott on a Sunday brought
acrimony on her head from a fellow Unitarian) 83 suggests that the
degree of anti-Sabbatarianism varied from one individual to another.
Nevertheless, Unitarians as a body did campaign for the Sunday opening
of certain recreational and educational facdlities.
iv) The Victorian Unitarian Congregation: a profile
All of these contributions to social reform and development.
bespeak the Unitarian concern with the exercise of reason and the
use of personal judgement. At the same time, they hint at a problem-
atic aspect of Unitarianism which concerned its followers deeply.
If a list of who's who in Unitarian society often resembles a list
of who's who in Victorian society, then the similarity did not exist
without its drawbacks. Despite their radical views and reformism,
Unitarians very much constituted a social elite, 84 a body of individuals
18
very much concerned with respectability. 85
 Obviously, the Unitarian
emphasis on reason and education necessitates a well-educated, intell-
ectual body of followers. Holt futher suggests that Unitarian 'resp-
ectability' was a reaction to the isolation imposed upon them because
of religious prejudice, as well as being a response to the 'enthusiast-
ic" or more emotional types of dissent. If Unitarianism was suspect
because of its radical theological and social views, at least its
followers did not rant, shake, or quake.
Unitarianism's respectability and social elitism, however, can
also be attributed to more concrete, more easily delineated, causes.
Victorian Unitarian congregations were able to trace their history
from the early Puritan establishments: the Presbyterians, the Independ-
ents, and the General Baptists. 86 A sketch or profile of one of
these earlier dissenting congregations illustrates the historical
basis for Unitarianism's social elitism. Of the six hundred members
of the dissenting congregation at Banbury (est. 1717 by Dr. J. Evans),
seventy were county voters ( and therefore substantial property holders);
thirty-five were gentlemen, and the rest were tradesmen or farmers. 87
The first dissenting congregation at Bristol represented an estimated
value of £400,000. 88 Similarly, the long lines of carriages which
gathered each Sunday outside of the Corn St. Chapel, Manchester,
and Upper Chapel, Sheffield, attest to the wealth of the members
of the congregation within. 89
 Cross St. Chapel, Manchester, where
W. Gaskell was minister, was established in the late eighteenth-
century by Presbyterians. Its trustees in the 1770's and 80's were
established Manchester textile merchants, and the chapel itself was
the oldest and most opulent in Manchester. 90
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It was from this type of congregation that Unitarianism develop-
ed. Families in Unitarian chapels could trace their membership back
generations, often to before the chapel adopted Unitarian views. 91
Not surprisingly, the Victorian Unitarian congregation was not a
working-class body. The majority of its memberswere people with
a moderate amount of education and property: shopkeepers, artisans,
clerks, and schoolmasters. 92 The occupations of the trustees of
Cross St. Chapel ( W. Gaskell's chapel at a later date) in 1828 suggest
the typical make-up of the Unitarian congregation. Of the trustees,
twenty-four were merchants; two bankers; three manufacturers; two
gentlemen; two solicitors; one doctor; one wine merchant; one warehouse-
man; one actuary; and one chandler. 93 Admittedly, trustees constitute
the elite of the congregation, but as the main body of the membership
consisted of shopkeepers, clerical workers, small manufacturers,
with a third part composed of bankers, merchants and industrial employ-
ers, with only a small handful of weavers, 94 the predominantly monied,
middle-class character of the Victorian Unitarian congregation is
clearly defined. Indeed, in many respects, it was this very social
elitism which ensured Unitarianism's survival in Victorian England.
When Unitarians were threatened with the loss of their oldest chapels
because of theological change, the history to which many members
of the congregation could point, and the local influence which often
accompanied such long-standing presence in the community, helped
with the passing of the 1844 Dissenters' Chapel Act. 95
Along with this high social standing, the concentration of
Unitarian congregations in industrial areas was a legacy of the
dissenting movement in general. By the 1858 Religious Census figures,
Lancashire had thirty-five Unitarian congregations (the highest per
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county in the country), and of these thirty-five, ten congregations
had more than two-hundred-and-fifty members each, Gaskell's Cross
St. Chapel amonst them. 96 When one couples this concentration of
Unitarians with the close links often established during an academy
education, where laymen and future ministers were educated together,
and the frequent inter-marrying between Unitarian families, 97 one
realises how close-knit and homogenous a group Unitarians were.
Isolation through religious prejudice further banded Unitarians together,
and resulted in a very tightly-knit,chapel-oriented community. 98
Such insularity and inter-dependence is true of all extreme
dissenting sects, of course, but it is particularly significant for
Unitarianism. Because of their wealth and social influence, their
political power (there were approximately twelve Unitarian MP's after
the 1832 parliamentary reform); the fact that their rationalistic
ideology was closely connected to the contemporary ideologies of
political economy and utilitarianism; and the Unitarian emphasis
on active reform. 99 the Unitarians of Victorian England were a powerful,
though small, section of society.
Yet as important and useful a tool, politically, as their middle-
class social profile was, it did counter-act one of Unitarianism's
most integral doctrine - the exercise of personal judgement. If
such judgement had to be based on 'information', then how, with a
still largely uneducated general populace, was the vital information
to be circulated? More importantly, since the means by which this
belief was formed involved an intense, intellectual effort (ie. a
scrutinous 'sifting' of the Bible), how can the validity of personal
judgement, even reason itself, be 'proven' and circulated amongst
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an uneducated audience? Unitarians recognised the block which their
intellectualism constituted as long as education remained primarily
a privilege for the upper classes, and attempted to popularise their
religion. The Unitarian Fund was established which promoted a new
'type' of minister and a plainer, more familiar method of preaching
was attempted in order to illustrate the Unitarian theology, and
thus gain a congregation's rational or intellectual agreement to
100Unitarian propositions.
Earlier attempts at popularisation had been made. Richard
Wright, a Unitarian missionary, walked between the years 1810-1822
approximately 3,000 miles annually, spreading Unitarianism. His
preaching had some success in establishing small pockets of Unit-
arianism which were then put in touch with other Unitarian sympath-
isers. 101 By the 1820's, in fact, working-class congregations comprised
of weavers, colliers, etc., were in existence in Rochdale, Newchurch,
Padiham, Oldham, Rawenstall, Middleton, Swinton, Todmorden, Hollinwood,
Astley, Blackburn, and Leigh. 102 Indeed, John Fielden , the manufact-
urer and MP mentioned earlier as leader of the agitation for the
1803 Factory Acts, was himself converted by Richard Wright, and went
on to found the Unitarian congregation at Todmorden. 103
All in all, however, this early nineteenth-century push for
poularisation was not successful. The small congregation at Rochdale
and the pockets of Unitarians in South and East Yorkshire were the
only notable additions to early nineteenth-century Uhitarianism.104
The lack of success can be attributed to the fact that Unitarianism
still appealed primarily to those with " a measure of social indep-
endence and a moral culture that was individualist " 105 - in other
words the artisans, shopkeepers and craftsmen of society. In the
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rural areas, Unitarianism was stopped effectively before it could
start by the resistance of long-established local Anglican landowners
and clergy, 106 while the Unitarian reputation of intellectualism
and tight, closed social communities aided its defeat amongst the
working-classes. 107
A second, later attempt seems to have been more successful.
The Unitarian Domestic Mission ( est. 1833), and the Unitarian Home
Missionary Board (1854) which trained the missionaries, aimed "to
preach the Gospel to the poor in their homes as a friend, and through
personal affection and influence [to] awaken the spirit of religion," 108
Holt praises the initiative" not only as indicating the emergence
of a new spirit and for the value of the work [Unitarians] did, but
[because it brought] Unitarians into closer contact with the actual
conditions under which people were living." 109 The preaching was
combined with other activities such as evening classes, allotments,
and libraries.
This mission was not however fully supported by the Unitarian
ministry. Few ministers actually ventured into the homes of the
poor (leaving that to the trained missionaries) though, importantly,
Gaskell's husband was one of the few who did. 110 Unitarians believed
primarily that it is the individual's conduct in life, and the disp-
osition or character of his/her mind which affects his/her future,
hence the stress on personal judgement. The idea of converting or
altering an individual's opinions to Unitarian opinions, in such
a context would not gain complete support as a matter of first
importance. 111 The converts too appear to have been ostracised
from the Unitarian social 'elite' in some areas. Seed quotes from
a diary (admittedly published in 1832, one year before the mission
officially began work) which indicated how a convert to Unit-
23
arianism may have been treated. Edward Hereford, of Mosley St. Chapel,
Manchester, writes,
in our soi-dissant pure-Christianity
chapels no one ever thinks of opening
the door of his pew to a stranger
(especially if he happens not to have
a good coat on his back) as they
universally do in the churches of
the establishment and other
dissenting chapels. 112
The word 'universally' suggests that perhaps Hereford is nct quite
as informed as he should be of the etiquette and social customs of
members of the Church of England. It seems equally as likely that
a Church of England 'gentleman' would not welcome the poor worshipper
as a gentleman of any other professed creed. Perhaps Hereford's
remarks should be considered accordingly. In any case, whilst the
continued intellectualism of Unitarian sermons (stemming perhaps
as Seed suggests from "distrust of the anti-intellectualism of
evangelical strategies to gain popular attention") 113
 does suggest
that some working-class converts may well have felt alienated, the
changes wrought in the Unitarian congregation's structure suggests
that the Domestic Mission did have a positive impact. With the new
zeal and democracy of the converts, the congregation changed from
one administered by an elite of trustees and supported by high pew
rates and subscriptions, to one administered by a committee represent-
ing all of the membership, and supported by a collection from all
of the members. 114
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Chapter Two
i) Unitarian Conceptions of Language: performative utterances
"A man . . . is so in the way in the house!"1
In The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations, Gaskell is represented
by seven quotations. Six of those seven are taken from Cranford,
the one above topping the list. Whilst such representation might
seem incidental, it does in fact point to one of the more limiting
approaches to Gaskell's work. The quaint, genteel spirit of Cranford 
dominates the critical appraisal of Gaskell's fiction. From the
time of her writing to the present date, Gaskell is often viewed
as an 'authoress' who wrote charmingly light, feminine pieces of
fiction; whose heroines could "depress one like an old acquaintaince" 2
with their lack of passion and inability to surprise. An authoress
in other words whose novels were a 'pleasure' rather than a challenge
to read because she neither questioned nor upset the status quo.
At the same time, the last of the seven quotations listed in
the ODQ points complacently in the direction of the dominant strain
of Gaskell criticism. The quote, "That kind of patriotism which
consists in hating all other nations," 3 is from Sylvia's Lovers,
and implictly refers to the writer who dramatises and remarks upon
the 'condition of England' question. Whilst an improvement upon
the 'genteel writer' label, the category of social novelist limits
our apprehension of Gaskell's fiction to much the same extent.
Wright's seminal Mrs Gaskell: The Basis of Reassessment is a case
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in point. In his attempt to find "some line of development in Mrs
Gaskell's work, some evidence of maturing as a novelist and an observer
. . . or the slow discovery of an essential direction for her thoughts
4
and powers, Wright convincingly argues that Gaskell "develops her
central interest in observing and analyzing the various aspects of
individual emotion and behaviour, as controlled by social custom
and belief, that combine to form a unified or disorganised society." 5
But something remains undiscussed. Both approaches focus primarily
on the overt 'themes' of Gaskell's work: her pleas for social reform,
her analysis of country and city life.
In the context of Gaskell's Unitarian background, such a consensus
of judgement may not seem extraordinary. As has been discussed,
socially and politically the Unitarians appeared to be a prosperous,
respectable and influential section of society; a body of individuals
in which it seems quite reasonable to find a writer of 'light' social
fiction. Accordingly any criticism of Gaskell's work which takes
into account her Unitarianism tends to focus on those aspects of
her faith which collude with the two prevailing critical approaches
to Gaskell's work. Lansbury for example, notes that Gaskell was
"released from much of the prejudice and oppression enjoined upon
other women"6 because of her Unitarianism, and goes on to discuss
its impact on her fiction. Nevertheless, this impact to Lansbury
is still primarily thematic. Because Gaskell is "dedicated to the
principle of individual independence and yet determined to ameliorate
society," 7 as all Unitarians were, her novels are read for their
analysis of particular social issues. Lansbury's chapter titles
indicate the direction in which Gaskell's Unitarianism has taken
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her. "Mary Barton: the condition of the working class in Manchester;"
"Ruth: moral depravity and capital gain;" "North and South: civilising
capitalism;" "Wives and Daughters: the economic landscape;" each
title reflects the social novelist emphasis. Duthie too in the more
recent The Themes of Elizabeth Gaskell, uses the biographical fact
of Unitarianism as support for yet another reading of Gaskell's fiction
which focuses on the social issues with which Unitarianism is here
identified.
As valid and enlightening as such analyses of Gaskell's work
can be, Unitarianism provides more than simply the biographical 'reason'
for Gaskell's choice of subject matter. In a sense, to limit Gaskell's
Unitarianism to the one application is to collude with the commonly
held notion that Gaskell is an 'artless writer' of compassion and
sincerity, for whom structure and language took second place to social
issues, if they took any place at all. It is to assume that whilst
being at the centre of the stimulating, intellectual circle which
the Unitarians in Manchester formed, Gaskell was simply a passive
receptacle for the 'content' of Unitarian interests, and so is primarily
a "social historian of unusual prescience using fiction as her
analytical method." 8 But Unitarianism is more than the now respectably
liberal sum to which its social concerns appear to add up. It had
its methodology, its philology, which were the radical foundations
for its often ostracized place in Victorian society, and these attributes
provide an alternative approach to Gaskell's work.
Unitarianism is built firmly on the basis of its rational criticism
of the Bible. Since Unitarians believed that "only what was rationally
plausible could be accepted in religious faith," 9 the Bible was
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subjected to intense critical investigation. Channing, discussing
the uniqueness of Unitarian Christianity, asserts that "the Bible
is a book written for men, in the language of men, and that its
meaning is to be sought in the same manner as that of other books." 10
Such investigation of course presupposes a faith in human reason
itself. Unitarians, believing it "impossible that a teacher of infinite
wisdom should expose those whom he would teach to error," 11 were
confident that a rational criticism of the Holy Scriptures would
reveal God's Word.
At this point it is imperative to recognise that Unitarians
distinguished between 'Holy Scripture' and 'God's Word'. The
scriptures were "the records of God's successive revelations to
mankind," 12 not the actual revelations, or God's Words, themselves.
As 'records', the reading of scripture had to be the applied practice
of the theory of what can be called "reasoning on facts," 13 an anal-
ytic method employed in those instances when events or ideas were
to be believed on the basis of testimony. The method was applied
primarily to written and oral testimonies, the Holy Scriptures being
the most prestigious example. The process involved an evaluation
of the witness which assessed credibility, the opportunities for
observing the events which are attested to, disinterestodness and
the idiom of the language used. 14 Channing states the Unitarian
perspective on scripture matter-of-factly:
the Holy Spirit did not so guide the
Apostles as to suspend the peculiaries
of their minds, . . . a knowledge
of their feelings, and of the influences
under which they were placed, is one
of the preparations for understanding
their writings. 15
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Unitarians were particularly concerned not to "extend[] to all times
and places what was of temporary and local application" 16 in the
scriptures. Misapplication could easily occur if a reader was over-
hasty or 'subjective' in his/her criticism. Because the scriptural
style "nowhere affects the precision of science or the accuracy of
definition," 17
 literal translations could lead to the anathema of
misreading. The impulse "to surround great men with a supernatural
halo" 18 had to be perceived and excoriated from both the text and
its reader.
The distinction between scripture and God's Word however gives
rise to more than the concept of 'witnessing' and the means by which
to assess the resultant testimony. It also generates two separate
models of the structure of language, both of which can be used to
illuminate Gaskell's fiction. It is perhaps best to look first at
the language model which the concept of 'God's word' generates.
Channing states that "The word of God bears the stamp of the same
hand which we see in his works, It has infinite connections and
dependences." 19 More simply, "God's works and God's word are no
way at variance, but in true and beautiful harmony." 20 The two
statements speak of 'connections' and 'harmonies', but this is in
actual fact misleading. What Charming is attempting to describe
is the Unitarian conception of God's language as 'performative
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utterance'. The term is Austin's 	 and it is used to describe those
utterances when the actual uttering of words constitutes an action.
To be specific, Austin defines 'performative utterances' by four
main characteristics: they are utterances which are not nonsense;
which do not describe, report or constate anything; which are not
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nonsense; which are not true or false; and which, in their utterance,
are or constitute a part of, doing an action. 22 The utterance 'I
do', in the course of the marriage ceremony, is an example. By uttering
'I do', one performs the act of marrying. Austen realises, of course,
the contextual nature of performative utterances or 'performatives'.
If I say 'I do' when purchasing a pint of milk, I should be surprised
to find myself married. Accordingly, Austen introduces the condition
that "the circumstances in which the words are uttered should be
in some way, or ways, appropriate." 23 In the above example, the
words 'I do' would need to be said12z someone not already married;
to someone not already married; and in front of someone invested
with the authority to marry. If the circumstances are 'apt', the
performative is what Austen calls "felicitous" 24 . If circumstances
are not apt, the performative becomes an 'unhappy', 'void', or 'infelicitous'
.	 25performative. This last category is most important. Performatives
uttered in the wrong circumstances do not become mere false statements.
If I say 'I promise", but fail to fulfil the promise, the utterance
itself does not cease to be performative; to say 'I promise' is
still to promise, even if I have no intention of ever fulfilling
it. Its essential status is not altered because of a subsequent
failure to act out the thing promised - it becomes merely a different
degree of performative ( in this instance, an 'insincere performative'),
not a different kind of utterance.
Because of the contextual nature of performatives, it is difficult
to posit the existence of a 'pure performative', that is an utterance
which would remain felicitous under any circumstances. The closest
Austen can get to the 'pure performative' is what he calls 'explicit
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performatives.' 26 He defines these performatives as ones which begin
with or include some highly significant or unambiguous expression,
'I bet' for example. But even in this instance, the performative
can be abortive. If I say 'I bet X wins,' but you do not say 'Agreed',
then my performative has been misexecuted, and is therefore infelicitous.
One cannot 'bet' without someone or something to bet against.
To return to Channing, God's language is what, in Austin's terminology,
can be called 'pure performative.' The Genesis text, "And God said,
'Let there by light'; and there was light." illustrates the concept
under discussion. It is God's Word (God said) that is God's action:
God saying 'Light' is light - a pure performative utterance, to say
is to do. No context or set of circumstances declares it void or
infelicitous. In a sense, a pure performative utterance can be viewed
as a type of 'primal sign' in which the word, or sign, 'Light' is
the signified 'Light.' There is no distinction or gap between the
two; the saying or uttering of the sign is the signified itself.
At the same time, the text "And God said, 'Let there be light';
and there was light' points to that other model of the structure
of language. If God's language is 'pure performative utterance',
what is human language? The structure of the above text tells us.
Note that in attempting to transcribe God's Word, the scriptural
passage ( remember that scripture is not God's Word but a record
of it) assumes a linear structure. This linear structure tells us
that human language is, at best, made up of a combination of felicitous
and infelicitous performatives. Put another way, our words do not
always correspond to our 'performance', our actions, and so are incapable
of describing, or embodying, a type of language that is always 'pure
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performative.' Instead, the closest to pure performative that human
language can get is the word (eg. 'light') followed immediately by
the act performed, or the thing itself (eg. 'Light'). We can have
'felicitous performatives' or performatives made valid by ensuing
circumstances ( eg. by the fulfilment of a promise); or we can have
infelicitous performatives which are made so because of circumstances
or contexts which 'get in' the gap of the linear 'x, and there was
x.' rendering the performative unfulfilled and so infelicitous.
Perhaps at this point it would be useful to set up a series of equations
which would explicate the differences between 'types' of performatives
clearly and succinctly. If the equations are modelled on the text
'And God said, 'Let there be light'; and there was light,' the equations
would look something like this:
A felicitous performative - 'x, and there was x.'
An infelicitous performative - 'x, and there was
[circumstances intervene] y
A pure performative - 'X'
At this point it is vital to take into account one other aspect
of the performative. The above quotations reveal that, in the first
two instances, it is 'circumstances' or 'context' which determines
the degree of felicity which can be attributed to any performative.
The importance of 'circumstance' is indeed something which AustLn
argues stems from the 'contractual nature' of all performatives. 27
Austen illustrates the contract by drawing up a list of 'conditions'
that are implicit in the idea of a performative and which, depending
upon the degree to which they are observed or ignored, determines
the felicity/infelicity of any performative. AustLn's conditions
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are best presented in full, and are as follows:
A i) an accepted conventional procedure having
a certain conventional effect; that procedure
to include the uttering of certain words by
certain persons in certain circumstances.
ii) particular persons and circumstances in a
given case must be appropriate for the
invocation of the particular procedure involved.
B i) the procedure must be executed by all
participants correctly and
ii)	 completely.
C i) where a procedure is designed for use by
persons having certain thoughts/feelings
or as an inauguration of certain consequential
conduct on the part of any participant, then the
participant(s) must have the requisite thoughts/
feelings, and the participant(s) must intend to
conduct themselves and
ii) must actually conduct themselves accordingly. 28
Conditions A i and B i and ii most concern us here. These
conditions assert that both the speaker of the performative, and
the person(s) to whom that performative is addressed, are aware of
a contract which is implicit in the concept of a performative. If
either speaker or addressee/audience refuses to fulfil the conditions
of that contract, for whatever reason, then the performative is rendered
infelicitous - whether through misexecution or abuse. For example,
to illustrate conditions A i and ii, Austin posits the situation
in which a person is 'picking' a team, perhaps for sport. The conditions
which obtain to the performative 'I pick' are as follows: 'I pick'
is only in order when the object of the verb is a 'player', and a
command is in order only when the subject of the verb is a 'commander',
or an 'authority.' 29
 In other words I cannot 'pick' a passing pedestrian
to be a member of my team; my performative, 'I pick', will be infelicitous
because the pedestrian is not the appropriate audience/listener.
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Similarly, if I am the passing pedestrian I cannot 'pick' as members
of my team, individuals from the group posited above; my performative
'I pick' is infelicitous because the addresses have not agreed to
participate in the 'social contract' which is implied in my performative.
Of course, if I, the passing pedestrian, agree to be picked when
chosen, or if the group agrees to respond to the passing pedestrian,
then both performatives are felicitous. As Austta points out, there
needs to be some sort of social contract ( whether verbal, written,
or tacit) fulfilled by all participants, for a performative to be
felicitous. 3
Conditions B i and ii similarly imply a social contract, an
agreement, which determines the felicity/infelicity of any performative.
Again, Austiln's illustration is useful. He asks the question as
to when a performative can be considered to be complete; his example
is the giving of a gift. 31 If I say 'I give this gift' and the addressee/
audience of my performative accepts the gift, then the performative
'I give' can be considered as felicitous. If however, the addressee/
audience of my performative refuses the gift, then my performative
is rendered infelicitous by misexecution. One half of the participants
in the social contract has declined to fulfil the conditions.
The main point here is that performatives do not occur in a
vacuum. They are dependent upon a listener who, in turn, "depends
upon an understanding of meaning and force of an utterance," 32 that
is depends upon the existence and fulfilme.nt: of a social contract
in order to be considered either felicitous or infelicitous. It
is perhaps useful at this stage to outline the assumptions which,
in turn, underline the social contract of a performative. Again
Austen's outline of these assumptions ( what he terms the 'implications'
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of a performative utterance) will be given in full. Aust 'Ln presents
the implications with reference to the performative 'I apologise':
Implication
i) it is true that I am doing (have done)
something (eg. apologise).
ii) it is true that certain conditions
do obtain (cf. conditions Ai and Aii above).
iii) it is true that conditions Ci and ii obtain
(ie. that I have the appropriate thoughts/feelings.)
iv) it is true that I am committed to doing
something subsequently.33
Once again, it is the degree to which these 'implications' of the
social contract of a performative are upheld or abused which constitutes
the felicity or infelicity of a performative. For example, if I
apologise without feeling apologetic, I flout the condition which
states that individuals can assume that those speakers who apologise
are sincere in their apologies. This notion of insincerity is important.
Saying 'I apologise' without the appropriate feelings is not to utter
a false statement, but an infelicitous performative. Insincerity
is in fact for Austtn the element (resulting from the nonfulfilmervL
of Implication iii) which distinguishes lying from merely saying
what is false. 34
Finally, it is important to recogise the 'individuality' of
the performative social contract. AustLn states that "any utterance
which is in fact a performative should be reducible, or expandible,
or analysable into a form, or reducible in a form, with a verb in
the first-person singular present indicative active." 35 The 'I'
behind each performative must be discernible. Written utterances,
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for example, may end with a signature - reference to the 'I' who
is doing the uttering. Austin illustrates the individual 'I' which
is implicit in a warning sign. If we encounter a sign stating, "This
bull is dangerous," Austin considers it to be a performative. He
suggests that inherent in the warning sign is the statement, 'You
are warned,' which in turn implies, 'I [the person who recognises
the hazard] warn you that this bull is dangerous.' 36 We, the addressee/
audience, infer a speaker to whom we are bound by the contractual
nature of the performative. As with the example of the gift, our
subsequent response to the performative renders it felicitous or
infelicitous. In the same way, the 'speaker' who places a 'warning'
sign where there is no hazard does not fulfil his/her side of the
social contract, whilst the 'speaker' who places a warning sign at
a point of danger has fulfilled one half of the social contract,
thus contributing towards its felicitousness.
Ultimately, the distinguishing characteristics of the 'performative'
necessitate that language itself be considered performative in essence.
All of our words, not just explicit performatives such as 'I pick',
'I apologise', are rendered felicitous or infelicitous depending
upon the circumstances which follow. Our words assume a listener
(even if only ourselves); they assume the possibility of communication.
Indeed, Austin proceeds in his book on performatives to posit that
language is 'performative', that is that each utterance constitutes
an act (ie. the act of uttering), a performative. The concept of
the 'performative utterance', with its initial focus on explicit
performatives, develops into a theory of speech/act. Though more
about this theory, and its applicability to Gaskell's work, will
follow, at this point the basic assumptions of speech/act theory
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can be briefly outlined. Austin states that to say anything is:
A. always to perform the act of uttering a certain
noises (a phonetic act), and that utterance
is a phone.
B. always to perform the act of uttering
certain vocables or words, ie. noises of certain
types belonging to, and as belonging to a
certain vocabulary in a certain construction.
This is a 'phatic act'; and the utterance
which is uttered is a 'pheme.'
C. generally to perform the act of using
a 'pheme' or its constituents with a
certain more or less definite 'sense and
a more or less definite reference which
together are equivalent to 'meaning.'
This is a l rhetic' act; and the utterance
which is uttered is 'the rheme.' 37
Condition 'C' is the point from which the performative can be determined
felicitous or infelicitous. Under condition 'C', we can place the
conditions A (i) to C (ii) and Implications (i) to (iv) as outlined
previously. Obviously, a 'noise' in isolation (condition A above)
cannot be either felicitous or infelicitous since it will be nonsensical.
Not until condition 'C', which introduces meaning and the accompanying
sense of commnication, does the contractual, hence felicitous or
infelicitous, nature of language emerge.
The performative nature of human language, that is the degree
to which it is made felicitous or infelicitous by circumstance
(the fulfill-riele_ or non-fulfil-w-nt of the contract) explains why
Channing earlier is unsuccessful in describing God's language. He
speaks of 'connections' and 'harmonies' precisely because, writing
as he is with the 'human' language available to him, he has only
those linear structures to work with. It is impossible for him to
describe a purely performative language structure in a language which
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can only get close to pure performative itself. The question must
arise therefore, if no human can describe a pure performative language
structure, where there is the authority for a Unitarian conception
of God'51anguage as a pure performative utterance? The obvious starting
point is the structure of the very language which Unitarians believed
to be the closest to God's word: biblical scripture. For the sake
of convenience let us refer to the Genesis text quoted above: 'And
God said, 'Let there by Light,' and there was light.' As I have
pointed out, the structure of the quotation is linear or to be more
precise causal. At the same time, however, note the attempt to render
in linguistic terms a simultaneity of action. The two main clauses
of the sentence, 'God said' and 'there was' share the same tense
to suggest simultaneity, a fusion of word and act. It is only the
word 'and' which makes the text linear and causal in structure.
Such structure is implicit not in the word/act referred to, but in
the very language available for use.
Besides the authoritative stature which Unitarians attributed
to the 'most felicitous' performatives available in human language
(ie. biblical scripture), the sheer cumulative weight of 'speech/act'
references in Unitarian literature point to a conception of God's
language as pure performative. Of course, as in Channing's statements,
the references are necessarily expressed in language incapable of
pure performative. Nevertheless, the attempt to reach toward a 'pure
performative' is clear enough. The very common technique, in Unitarian
sermons, of depicting an honoured Unitarian chapel member as a 'speaking
example' is a case in point.
The term 'speaking example' itself encapsulates the main distinctions
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of a performative. Firstly, 'example' implies an act, something
tangible, in that it can be imitated. Secondly, 'speaking' suggests
that the effect of such an act is eloquent, that is that an act can
'speak' or communicate in much the same way as language does. Thirdly,
both terms imply an 'addressee' or audience to whom the communication
(the example) is directed, which in turn intimates the social, contractual
nature of the speaking example.
At the same time, the term 'speaking example' also refers to
the concept of words-as-actions. If we read 'speaking, not as an
adjective describing example, but as a deverbal noun, then the term
reads, 'Words [speaking] as actions [examples].' As with an eloquent
act, the idea of a speaking example - words which are actions that
can be imitated - implies the existence of an audience/addressee
and thus reinforces the contractual nature of a performative.
The need for two successive definitions of the single term requires
comment itself. It is because of the linearity of language that
we read causally. Our first reading of the term defines 'speaking'
in adjectival relationship to 'example'; only then can we reverse
the order of the words. But such linear readings are essentially
false. The point of the term 'speaking example' is that it indicates
the simultaneity of action-as-words/words-as-actions, despite our
automatic response to read differently. The simultaneity of the
term is crucial. Whereas reading in a linear fashion allows us to
determine whether a speaking example is felicitous or infelicitous,
reading 'speaking example' so that the double definition is recognised
simultaneously leads us closer to the concept of pure performative
which Unitarians posited as a possibility.
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Since 'speaking example' possesses the distinguishing characteristics
of the performative outlined above, and hence can be determined to
be felicitous, infelicitous or pure, the Unitarian use of 'speaking
example' resonates with significance. If we analyse the startling
opening to a 'funeral discourse' ("Refreshing indeed is the recollection
of departed excellence.") 38 in terms of the performative nature
of the speaking example, its significance begins to emerge. Firstly,
the actions/behaviour of the dead man are considered eloquent; they
'speak' of benevolence, justice and mercy. In this instance, Gilman
seems to be stressing the 'actions-as-words' reading of 'speaking
example', and presenting these actions as felicitous performances
addressed to the audience which is listening to his sermon. At the
same time, the notion of pure performaive is implied. Gilman notes
that the dead man, the speaking example, is now "beyond accident," 39 or
circumstances, and so is "unalterable. . . fixed. . . [and] imperishable." 40
The words are important because they suggest that Gilman can present
this speaking example as a pure performative. Whereas, when alive,
the dead man's speech/acts are rendered felicitous or not by circumstance
the speaking example is now beyond such alteration by the speaker.
The words and actions which constitute the speaking example can
no longer be affected bysubsequent words or actions. They are, in
in essence, timeless; hence they no longer function in the realm
of the causal and linear, but in the realm of the pure performative.
But of course the other half of the contract which underlines any
performative, the listener, is still capable of rendering the speaking
example infelicitous. The audience of this sermon for example could
simply refuse to listen to the speaking example completely.
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William Gaskell's sermon, "A Sermon on the Occasion of the Death
of the Rev. John Gooch Robberds," 41
 illustrates a different performative
aspect of the 'speaking example.' On one level, the sermon elucidates
the 'words-as-actions' characteristic of the speaking example. The
dead man is remembered not only because his deeds matched his words,
thus making his words felicitous. But, also because his words themselves
constituted effective actions, or performatives. The plethora of
positive references to Robberd's sermons, lectures, biblical scholar-
ship, prose style and voice, indicate the validity of language as
action. But more importantly, Gaskell's sermon underlines the contractual
nature of the speaking example. He chooses the text, "He Being Dead
Yet Speaketh," as the focus for his sermon. His choice indicates
his decision to emphasise the role of the audience (listening to
his sermon) in a 'speaking example.' Robberd's words continue to
be 'speaking examples' because the audience who reads them continues
to make them either felicitous or infelicitous by their subsequent
response. The choice of emphasis is doubly appropriate: not only
is Gaskell addressing an audience, exhorting them to continue making
Robberd's performatives felicitous, but Robberds himself was a minister.
His role was to use words/actions in such a way as to initiate a
response from his audience/congregation that would make the contract
which bound them together one which yielded as many felicitous per-
formatives as possible.
In the same way, the especial attention given in sermons to
the language used points to the performative concept. Ellis, in
his sermon on the death of Dr. Channing, takes care to point out
42the inappropriateness of "the language of panegyric," and the use
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of epithets commonly applies to "men of high renown" 43 when speaking
of Channing, one of the most influential Unitarian ministers of his
day. "Ordinary language" 44 simply cannot for Ellis sufficiently
delineate the "high testimony" 45 which constitutes Channing's importance.
Ellis's concern here is more than the eulogist's concern to speak
positively of his subject. He is concerned that the language of
the sermon on Channing is true to Channing's use of language as it
is possible to be. It is the last phrase, 'high testimony', which
comes nearest to encapsulating the performative notion. Channing's
words, his sermons, lectures and conversations for which he is remember-
ed and mourned, are testimonies (the connotation of active witnessing
is important), are his actions, and so are performatives.
Importantly, Ellis's sermons itself ends with a quotation from
Channing's last public sermon. 46 The quote is not simply a 'tribute'
to the power of Channing's language. It is an attempt to make the
sermon itself a felicitous performative (by as it were using proven
felicitous performatives), and so to exhort the sermon's listeners
to fulfil their side of the performative contract, thus making it,
through their responding words/actions, felicitous.
Interestingly, Ellis himself notes one of the main determinants
of a pure performative. He states that "In Europe the death of Dr.
Channing will be felt more deeply as a public calamity than hare
[in the U.S.A.]"47 His reason for this assertion is that Europc
lacked the "long familiarity and frequent opportunity"48 for	 contact
to which Channing's local chapel members had access. Instca::, 7uropcans
had only Channing's words. The assertion, on a first reading, seems
perverse. One expects the familiarity of a lost poison to be a prime
component of grief. Nevertheless, the assertion is not perverse
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and can be explicated in terms of 'pure performatives.' Those who
had the advantage of 'long familiarity' had also, one assumes, the
opportunity to witness those instances (they may have been few in
number) when Channing's performatives were infelicitous or void (Ellis
carefully tells his congregation that Channing did have his faults).
They were aware of and could witness the circumstances which intervene
to make performatives infelicitous or felicitous. In contrast, the
Europeans were acquainted only with Channing's words, his performatives.
They were not privy to the circumstances and contexts which rendered
them either felicitous or infelicitous.
One might be tempted to explain the Europeans' greater grief
by attributing it to a feeling of lost opportunity. Europeans, having
never met Charming, have lost that chance forever by his death.
On the other hand, Channing's status in the Victorian Unitarian community
(indeed in the nineteenth-century Boston Unitarian community) suggests
an alternative reading. Charming was widely held as one of the most
prestigious, enlightened, and valuable ministers of the Unitarian
movement. His works were massively popular amongst American Unitarians,
and were widely read in Britain. 49 As such a figure, Channing's
performatives were to his European audience not just the highly felicitous
performatives they were to his Boston community. His performatives
had, perhaps, assumed a level of almost pure performative to the
European community lacking circumstantial or personal knowledge of
Channing. At this point it is important to remember that words themselves
constitute actions which are only then subsequently labelled felicitous
or infelicitous according to circumstance. In Channing's instance,
because of his status as minister, and the contractual nature of
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the performatives which the role of minister serves to emphasize,
his performatives can be rendered felicitous/infelicitous in two
ways. Firstly, when he is alive, they can be made felicitous or
infelicitous through his own actions. Secondly, and equally important,
his performative (eg. sermons) can be rendered felicitous/infelicitous
by the degree to which his audience/addressees fulfil their half
of the performative contract. Even when dead, Channing's performatives
function in the latter way. Audiences still read and respond to
his words: other ministers like Ellis use them to exhort felicitous
performatives from their congregations. Finally, and equally valid,
Channing's performatives have become 'pure' in the same way as the
performatives of the subject of Gilman's sermon above has become
pure. On an individual level, Channing's performatives are pure:
his words can no longer be affected by his subsequent circumstances.
They too have become, again on the individual level, essentially
timeless, and no longer operate within the causal/linear structures
by which they were previously governed.
Finally, the 'proof' of a Unitarian conception of God's language
as pure performative can be gleaned from the manner in which Unit-
arians envisage the possibility of movement from human language
with its felicitous/infelicitous performatives, to God's pure perform-
ative language. If one has a method of getting from A (felicitous/
infelicitous language) to B (pure performative), one is assuming B exists.
Despite the apparently unbridgeable gap between the two, God's pure
language and humankind's performatives are not irrevocably divided.
The duty of each Unitarian is 'to become what s/he praises', to aspire
to become a user of language according to the divine model. One
way is through biblical criticism. Though God's word itself has
not been 'read' by humankind, the scriptures represent the translation
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of Cod's pure performatives into the most felicitous human language
possible, hence the great importance of assessing witnesses. Once
a section of scripture has been scrutinised, with the circumstances,
prejudices and idiom of the writer taken into account, what the Unitarians
were left with is what they believed to be the closest approximation,
in felicitous performatives, to God's pure performatives.
But the act of biblical criticism does not only point to the
'seeds' of pure performatives in Scripture. The discerning Unitarian
reader cannot rest content with an ability to 'recognise' the evidence
of pure performance when s/he confronts its. More importantly, the
investigation of biblical language reveals 'language' itself to be
the link between humankind and God. Channing asserts words (eg.
wisdom, goodness, benevolence) used to describe God are meaningless
if they do not share an affinity with those same words when describing
humankind. 50 They would, he says, "signify nothing." 51 Instead,
words reveal to the individual his/her potential for perfection.
If a reader is able to grasp the 'meaning' of a word, such as 'benevolent,'
commonly attributed to God, then his/her understanding implicitly
suggests for Unitarians an ability to 'be' the attribute. Recognition
of a word or form leads to a synthesis of form and meaning. Channing
illustrates the process with reference to one'sability to name another
person's attributes. Although one individual's mind is invisible
to another, in the same way that God's 'mind' is invisible to human-
kind in general, individuals feel confident in their ability to name
each other's attributes. Their ability to do so stems, Channing
states, from a recognition of a quality in another which they them-
selves possess. 52 Since Unitarians believe that man is capable of
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perfection, of being God-like, and that "an attribute by becoming
perfect does not part with its essence," 53 the same process allows
humankind to 'know' God. An individual recognises God's attributes
as they are related in Scripture, at a rate in direct proportion
to the unfolding of those attributes in him/herself. The true under-
standing of a linguistic term as it is encountered in authorised
scripture is not simply entwined with performance - the two occur
simultaneously.
If we translate this process into equations, it becomes clearer.
Because Unitarians posit the perfectability of humankind, they also
posit three possible uses of language: the infelicitous, felicitous
and pure. In a quick overview, the individual can use language infelicitously;
saying 'x' and performing 'y.' Individuals can also use language
felicitously; saying 'x' and performing 'x'. Finally because each
individual has the potential for perfection, they also have the potential
to use language purely, as God does. Such usage involves, as Charming
points out, true understanding. In this circumstance, saying 'x'
equals understanding 'x' equals being 'x'. Though the equation has
to be rendered in linear terms here, if it were possible to present
the equation three-dimensionally, the x's would pile up on top of
each other - x as it were - rather than appear in the apparently
causal line-up which an equation represents. In other words, just
as God saying 'light' is "Light", so a human being, having reached
the level of true understanding, saying/understanding 'x' is 'x'.
The importance and the workings of this process can be seen
more clearly if we compare the models of felicitous, infelicitous
and pure performatives, and the process of moving from one to another,
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with the Unitarian conception of conscience discussed earlier. Hove
offers a clear-cut model of the Unitarian conscience. In summary
it is comprised of two components: the cognitive and the volitional.
The cognitive conscience, which is innate in all individuals, is
the ability to recognise, to understand, the concept of 'right.'
The volitional component involves the individual's motivation to
perform the 'right' which s/he recognises. 54 If we translate the
process into felicitous and infelicitous categories, than an ind-
ividual who recognises 'right' (x) but fails to perform it (performs
'y' instead) uses the conscience infelicitously. An individual who
recognises 'right' (x) and is motivated to perform it (x), uses the
conscience felicitously. In either case, the functioning of the
conscience is determined to be felicitous/infelicitous in a linear
fashion. One recognises 'x', and then either performs it or not.
But there is another possible functioning of the conscience,
one which abandons linearity and achieves the simultaneity of the
pure performative. The Unitarian conscience can function in a way
that meshes the cognitive and the volitional. In this process,
the cognitive component (the ability to grasp 'x') occurs simultan-
eously with the performance of that which is grasped. The process
is a 'conscience equivalent' to the individual's potential to use
language purely, as God does. Indeed, the process does have a ling-
uistic basis. In the equation, 'Each individual has the ability
to recognise 'x', 'x' is often the linguistic representation of an
idea/concept which each individual performs felicitously or infelicitously
or, in instances of true understanding, purely. The purely functioning
Unitarian conscience fuses what is said (cognitive) with what is,
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what is performed (volitional). When Unitarians assert that the
voice of conscience is the voice of God, 55
 the assertion carries
more than its usual resonance. It does not simply refer to the Unitarian
belief that each individual carries the seeds of perfection (the
voice of God) within her/himself. The term 'voice' must be stresseC;
it intimates that it is through language, and an understanding of
how it functions, that an individual begins the ascent to perfection.
In this context, the concept of sin as "a breakdown in the inter-
nal harmony" 56 of the conscience enlightens the use of 'sin' to describe
a mis-use of language. 57 The two are the same. Similarly, the Unit-
arian exhortation to 'speak', to testify to the beliefs which have
sprung from their "conscientious study of [God's] word" 58 is not
only an encouragement to 'spread the word.' It is an indication
that only by 'speaking' can a Unitarian actually "become what [s/he]
praise[s]" 59 - the two are irrevocably entwined. When we read of
the "highly self-conscious efforts [that Unitarians] made to cultivate
a Christian character - elaborate schedules of projects, conscientious
resolutions, and records of how many pages of worthy books they read
each day," 60 two things should strike us: firstly, the combination
of 'acts' (projects) and language-based activities (resolutions,
reading) which make up their endeavours to become Christian; and,
secondly, the self-consciousness of these exercises which intimate
an awareness of the important and necessary part which language plays
in the attainment of a God-like Christianity.
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ii) Speech Act Theory and approaching the text.
With a background like this, in which language plays such a
crucial role, it is blinkered to consider Gaskell an 'artless' writer
for whom language is significant only because it is her chosen mode
of communication. A look at the diary which Gaskell kept concerning
the education of her daughter Marianne reveals that language, and
a self-conscious attitude to its use, was a part of Gaskell's daily
life. She comments twice on the importance of language:
I have never allowed [my daughter Marianne]
to be told anyone was going to do anything for
her unless they really were, and have tried
to speak as truly to her as ever I could.61
Similarly,
I am not aware that any promise has
been made to her that has not been
strictly fulfilled. And the consequence
is, she has a firm reliance on our word,
and a pretty good idea of giving up a
present pleasure to secure a future one,
feeling sure that the promise will be performed.62
The cultivation of a working Unitarian conscience in her daughter
by example illustrates clearly enough both the Unitarian conscience's
linguistic foundation (ie. the awareness of language can be used
infelicitously/felicitously, and the need to make her own language
and the language of those who come into contact with her daughter
as felicitous as possible. Saying 'x' only if 'x' is to follow)
and its linguistic technique, that is through speaking, using language
felicitously that the working Unitarian conscience was developed.
To move from this to Gaskell's fiction itself does not require
a 'leap of faith'. There is ample evidence that Gaskell is both
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aware of and concerned to explore the language systems that I have
termed 'human language' (ie. felicitous/infelicitous), and the divine
or pure language. The move however does require a theoretical bridging.
It is necessary to establish the validity of applying AustLn's categories
of speech to Gaskell's written discourse. Earlier I briefly outlined
the way in which AustLn's idea of a 'performative utterance' developed
from that of explicit performatives ('I promise', 'I do') to speech-
act theory which, in summary, stated that to 'say' anything was always
to perform certain acts: the phonetic act, the phatic act, and the
rhetic act. This idea of the speech act has been developed by several
linguists since AustLn. But its importance to us is that is retains
the basic notion of a 'social contract' which underlies language
use. A speech-act depends upon a listener, and speech-act theory
itself "proceeds within a causality that suggests that meaning or
communication intent is the cause of language use." 63
Before exploring the ideological assumptions behind this 'communicative'
model of language, it might be useful to outline speech-act theory
at more length. One version of the 'social contract' underlying
language use has been developed by the linguist H.P. Grice. He terms
it the 'Co-operative principle', and it both extends Austn's 'conditions'
which render performatives felicitous/infelicitous, and applies to
all speech acts or verbal discourse. The Co-operative principle
can be outlined as follows:
Make your conversational contribution such
as is required, at the stage at which it
occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction
of the talk-exchange in which you are
engaged. 64
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This in turn is specified in what Grice calls 'Four Maxims.' They
are
1 The Maxims of Quantity.
i) Make the contribution as informative
as is required (for the correct purposes
of the exchange).
ii) Do not make your contribution more
informative than is required.
2. Maxims of Quality
i) Make your contribution one that is true.
ii) Do not say what you believe to be false.
iii) Do not say that for which you lack adequate
evidence.
3. Maxim of Relation.
i) Be relevant.
4. Maxims of Manner
i) Be perspicuous.
ii) Avoid obscurity of expression.
iii) Avoid ambiguity.
iv) Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).
v) Be orderly.65
These maxims are adapted according to the purpose of a 'talk-exchange.'
Conversations/speech acts do not always have the exchange of information
as their prime motivation, but can simply be the exchange of 'tellable'
subject matter. 66 An example is perhaps helpful. If in the course
of a conversation on deviant behaviour, I say, "I bought some milk
today," it could be assumed that I have ignored the maxim of relation
by offering irrelevant information . If however it is known that
I rarely if ever purchase milk because of an allergy to that liquid,
my 'speech act' places itself under the category of 'tellable speech'
[in this instance, deviant behaviour] and I cannot be accused of
straying from the relevant.
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The example above points to another important aspect of the co-operative
principle. Not only do I undertake to maintain the principle in
my speech acts, but my 'audience' assumes that I undertake to fulfil
the principle in the same way that I assume that other speakers are
adhering to the principle. As a result, "the hearer, in decoding
the speaker's utterance, will make all the deductions and inferences
necessary to maintain the assumption that the speaker is observing
the [Co-operative principle]." 67 In the example above, my listeners
assume that my speech-act is 'relevant' to the discourse on deviant
behaviour before suspecting that I am ignoring the co-operative principle.
My subsequent speech will, of course, either confirm or deny their
supposition. If I explain my allergy, the co-operative principle
is seen to be upheld, and my speech act is 'felicitous'. If I do
not explain my allergy then the suspicion that I am ignoring the co-
operative principle, and am performing an infelicitous speech act,
will arise.
All of this still seems a far cry from Gaskell's written discourse.
But speech act theory itself has been extended into the domain of
the written. Mary L. Pratt's Towards a Speech Act Theory of Literary 
Discourse, is an attempt to bring 'literary' or written discourse
into the jurisdiction of speech-act theory. But before the actual
application of the theory, Pratt needs toeradicate, to prove untenable,
the traditional split between 'ordinary language' and 'poetic' or
literary discourse, the belief that "literature is formally and functionally
distinct from other kinds of utterance . . . [and the] concomitant
belief that literature is linguistically autonomous." 68 She traces
the origins and subsequent bolstering of the traditional split through
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to Saussurean ideas of langue and parole. Ultimately, Pratt asserts
that the split between ordinary language and literary discourse thrives
because of a simple manoeuvre: linguistic theories of language are
never applied to literary works except from a standpoint which
presumes a distinction. The distinction itself, Pratt asserts, is
never tested. 69 Pratt offers an example using Saussure's categories
of langue and parole. In the same way that langue [the rules of
a grammar of a given language] is opposed to parole [speech derived
from lanque], so the literary canon [rules which determine which
works are accepted into it] is opposed to the individual work [the
work derived from the rules]. A further structuralist opposition
can be posited between the individual work and the individual readings
that can be derived from the work which is similar to the langue/parole 
opposition. Pratt argues an alternative concept of literature:
literary discourse can be seen as parole in relation to the langue 
[the grammar] of any language. There is no need to postulate two
lanques of any language - one for written discourse and one for speech.
To suggest "a separate grammar of poetry which is related analogically
to the grammar of language very easily obscures the real relation
that holds between poetic utterances and the grammar of the language
in which they are written, namely that of parole to langue, the relation
that all utterances in a given language hold with respect to the
grammar." 70
From this standpoint, Pratt then compares written discourse
to an accepted linguistic category of speech: the natural narrative.
The comparison is lengths and not all of its details are necessary
to our discussion. In summary, Pratt points out "that all the problems
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of coherence, chronology, causality, foregrounding, plausibility,
selection of detail, tense, point of view, and emotional intensity
exist for the natural narrator just as they do for the novelist,
and they are confronted and solved (with greater or lesser success)
by speakers of the language every day. These are not rhetorical
problems that literary narrators have had to solve by inventing a
poetic language; they are the problems whose solutions can readily
be adapted from spoken to written discourse." 7
With the obliteration of the ordinary/literary language distinction,
speech act theory is then applied to literary discourse by Pratt.
The underlying assumption of a 'social contract' between speakers
and listeners is also applied. In the literary discourse situation,
the readers assume the listener's position and the 'author' assumes
the position of the speaker. Pratt outlines some of the assumptions
on the reader's part which form part of the 'literary' social contract.
They are:
i) that the book was published and was intended
to be so.
ii) that the book was composed in writing and is
'definitive' - that is that the author had time to
plan and prepare, to correct and improve the
utterance before the audience saw it.
iii) that the author considers it a satisfactory version.
iv) that it has been 'selected' by publishers, librarians
(if in a library) etc. And that the name of the
publisher (author), collection, count as 'credentials'
as do cover design, price etc.
v) that within its genre/subgenre, the book is recommended.
vi) that the book's 'relevance' is itellability1.72
The 'speaker' of the literary discourse, similarly, undertakes "to
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know and reveal the whole story and . . . [to] enable [the audience]
to understand the sequence of events and to adopt the desired attitude
towards them." 73
At the same time, certain adjustments to the co-operative principle
between speaker and audience need to be made when it is applied to
literary discourse. Pratt outlines the ways in which individuals
can violate the co-operative principle. They can,
i) quietly violate the maxim, hence mislead
ii) declare an inability to co-operate
eg. 'I cannot say more.'
iii) can be unable to fulfill all the maxims
of the co-operative principle.
iv) blatantly fail to fulfill a maxim, or
deliberately flout the co-operative principle.74
Pratt states that only the last method of non-fulfilTnent of the
co-operative principle (iv-above) is possible in the literary speech
situation.
We [readers] know the violations in [literary
works] are intentional because of what we
know about the circumstances under which literary
works are composed, edited, selected, published, and
distributed. 75
When approaching a literary text, the reader assumes that the range
of 'real' mistakes is smaller than in spoken discourse because of
the amount of 'revision' and deliberation which is built into the
category of 'literary texts. Furthermore, and most importantly,
we also assume that despite the flouting of the co-operative principle
maxims, the co-operative principle is working at its highest level.
That is, we as readers are expected to recognise and resolve any
violations of the Co-operative Principle.
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The other methods of opting out of the co-operative principle
do not apply to literary texts. Because literary works are "volunteer-
ed utterances", 76 the speaker of the work cannot declare an inability
to co-operate. Nor would the speaker volunteer an utterance which
s/he knows in advance s/he is unable to accomplish. Nor can the
speaker of a literary text 'mislead'. At this point, of course,
one must distinguish between the 'speaker of the text' - or the fictional
speaker/narrator - and the 'author'. Whilst it is possible that
a fictional speaker's discourse/text is full of violations of the
co-operative principle [eg. s/he can be naive/ignorant/deliberately
misleading], speech act theory posits that the author's text - what
is called the display text - can only 'flout' or blatantly fail to
fulfil a maxim. Pratt states,
In order to co-operate as the literary
speech situation requires, the reader
confronting a violated maxim in a
literary work must interpret the violation as
being in accord with the 'accepted purpose
or direction of the exchange' in which
he and the author are engaged. The reader must
assume that regardless of what the fictional
speaker [omniscient, first-person etc.] is doing
the author is observing the [co-operative
principle] as defined for display texts;
and he must calculate all the implications
necessary to maintain this assumption.77
Pratt's example of Tristram Shandy is a useful exposition. Where
Tristram, reputedly writing within the genre of the autobiography,
deliberately opts out of the co-operative principle rules for autobiography,
Sterne is flouting the co-operative principle maxims for the novel
and the autobiography. 78
 His violations are deliberate and therefore
constitute flouting. In such an instance, the reader can be said
to read, in effect, twice. On one level, s/he notes where Tristram
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co-operates/opts out of the Co-operative Principle; on another,s/he
constructs a set of 'implicatures' which make sense of the author's
utterance, and maintains the Co-operative Principle because of his/her
awareness of the flouting.
The application of speech act theory to literature as Pratt
outlines it does have its difficulties. In the distinction between
author and fictional speaker above, the theory side-steps the issue
of the 'identity of the author.' Pratt does not seem to posit a
distinction between an 'omniscient narrator' and the 'author' (though
she does distinguish between other narrators and 'author'), primarily
because she equates the omniscient narrator's 'text' with the historical
author's 'display text.' At the same time, the theory itself does
allow for a distinction: the process of selection, production, publish-
ing, the cover, the choice of genre, the price, which the theory
points out as important elements in reading, are all aspects of the
'author's display text. Nevertheless, it is perhaps more satisfactory
to use Todorov's terms, the 'subject of the enunciation' and the
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'subjects of the enonce;' 	 in which the former parallels Pratt's
author, and the latter refers to Pratt's 'fictional speakers' - be
they first person/omniscient narrators or characters in the text.
More important5	however, is the issue of the 'site of meaning'
which complicates both speech act theory and Unitarian conceptions
of language. Speech act theory posits the 'individual' as the site
of meaning. Its stress on intention, or illocutionary force, suggests
an individual whose 'sincerity' in language will ensure that his/her
'meaning' prevails. Derrida finds in this stress "a classic restate-
ment of the philosophic stance that privileges 'speech' at the expense
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of 'writing" and which equates 'truth' with the 'presence' of
the speaker. Where speech act theory equates the 'truth' or 'felicitousness'
with the 'sincerity,' and implicitly the 'presence' of the speaker,
Derrida points to the quality of 'iterability' which makes language
possible. As he comments, speech acts "derive their operative meaning
from the fact that they embody conventional forms and tokens of utte-
ance which are always already in existence before the speaker comes
to use them". 81
	Speech act theory does appear to recognise
at some deep level, both the autonomy of language and the impotence
of the individual in language. Its stress on contracts, appropriate
conditions, and principles of co-operation, points to the need for
communal accord, for rules and maxims, if any meaning is to be establish-
ed as orthodox, and implies a recognition that meaning is, in its
terms, dangerously multiple and unstable.
As a modern articulation of nineteen-century Unitarian conceptions
of language, speech act theory and its philosophical assumptions
provide an interesting basis from which to explore Gaskell's fiction
and its assumptions. On the one hand, speech act theory allows aspects
of Gaskell's fiction which have hitherto lain dormant to achieve
definition. The 'lie'that runs throughout her novels - John Barton's
concealment of his identity as Carson's murderer; Margaret Hale's
lie to the police officer as to her presence at the railway station;
Philip Hepburn's silence as to the reason for Charlie Kinraid's disappear-
ance; Holdsworth's avowed but unfulfilled love for Phillis; the Benson's
lie about Ruth's marital status; Cynthia's concealment of her past
involvement with Preston - each lie needs to be considered not just
as pivotal elements of plot, but as aspects of Gaskell's examination
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of the importance and the impossibilities of the individual's use
of language. If a lie is, in Austinian terms, distinct from a mere
false statement, the status of the lie and the disavowal of the social
contract which it involves, needs to be reassessed in Gaskell's fiction.
Mcre complexly, Gaskell's awareness of speech act language struct-
ures necessitates that we investigate her explorations of how such
structures operate. As a Unitarian and as a woman, Gaskell confronted
the adverse effects of language every day. Her Unitarian background
provided her not only with a comprehension of linguistic structures,
but with an image of 'woman' which meant she was expected, as an
individual, to attempt to attain the 'perfection' which linguistic
awareness made possible. Knowledge of the process which could lead
to the attainment of perfection, indeed knowledge and perfection
were not withheld from women in the Unitarian ideology.
At the same time, Victorian society as a whole thrust an image
of 'woman' upon her which contradicted the Unitarian one. Whilst
expected to be the preserver of morals (in a sense to be perfect),
Victorian 'woman' was denied access to the knowledge, the experience
upon which morality is based, and upon which Unitarianism based its
system of beliefs. Gaskell had to contend with a social system which
generated images of women (as moral protector, as angel-in-the-house)
that directly opposed those generated by the Unitarianism to which
she was allied, and which nevertheless effectively constrained her.
One has only to consider the general reception of Ruth to understand
the conflict. On the one hand, Unitarianism requires that an expos
of how the denial of access to knowledge can undermine women must
be attempted. It is her duty as an individual to 'speak' what she
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has reason to believe is true. 'Literature', writing a novel, in
Unitarian theology is not a sphere of discourse separate from 'ordinary
language. It is one of the 'human' languages available which differs
from others only because of the greater degree of permanency with
which its 'appearance' on paper seems to endow it. As with any other
form of speech, a Unitarian has the obligation to make his/her written
discourse as felicitous as possible, since the speech act social
contract obtains as completely here as with any other mode of discourse.
On the other hand, the Victorian t audience t v/h\chreceives Gaskell's
speech act approaches the text with a very different 'social contract'
in mind. Firstly, the category of 'literature' itself constitutes
a sphere of 'influence' separate from other modes of discourse.
Not only is literature imbued with permanency, it could be apprehended
as an elevated, lofty discourse, different in kind from 'ordinary'
discourse. Though in the hierarchy of literature the novel form is
not as exalted as poetry, nevertheless it is conceived as a discourse
distinct from and more powerful than everyday speech. Secondly,
the general Victorian audience's conception of women is markedly
different from the image of woman as individual advocated by Unitarian
theology. Complementing the opposition between ordinary/literary
discourse, is the opposition between man and woman, which in turn
generates a series of binary opposites that, privileging man, define
and constrain woman. Cixous's oppositions map out the general geography
of such a phallocentric system: if man/woman, then, activity/passivity,
culture/nature, head/heart, intelligent/sensitive. 82 We can add
by implication, knowledge/ignorance.
Within this system, Gaskell's Ruth is doubly subversive. The
existence of a woman writer immediately upsets the oppositions.
She has entered into the privileged domain of activity, culture,
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and intelligence which the binary opposites are constructed to deny
her. Secondly, the choice of a 'taboo' subject - the fallen woman
suggests access to the privileged half of the binary oposite which,
in a sense, generates all others. It indicates access to knowledge,
to power, rather than to the ignorance and weakness that is allowed
to women, 83
 and thus it threatens to subvert the whole structure.
As a result, Ruth is received with shock and disgust; shock that
it is written by a woman (women are not 'capable' of participating
in culture), and disgust that it tackles a subject which women should
not be aware of.
That the shock and disgust was shared by some members of William
Gaskell's own congregation further complicates the conflict. Other
Unitarians, living in the very Victorian society which alienates
them, can express horror at a written document which embodies their
(supposedly) own beliefs. What this response reveals is the apparent
absence of a gender 'variable' in the Unitarian conception of perform-
atives, or speech acts. Where Unitarianism offers a model of 'human
language' within which each individual's speech acts are either felicitous
or not, with a potential posited for pure performatives, Victorian
society offers only a phallocentric model of language which, by implication,
renders each woman's speech acts non-existent, or at best void in
that they merely support the phallocentricity which defines them.
Gaskell, offering novels as 'specimens' of human language in a phallocentric
system which does not recognise such a category, strides directly
into the circle of controversy: gender. Necessarily her novels
need to be re-approached within the context of such a clash.
The approach requires a modification to the concept of speech
x = dominant group (male)
y = muted group (female) 86
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act. Like its Unitarian predecessor, modern speech act theory lacks
a gender variable. Both Aust ucn's performatives and the speech act
theory which Pratt adapts for literary discourse, in no way account
for the alteration in impact which the gender of the speaker of any
speech act will occasion. This is a direct result of both theorists'
(and it would seem speech act theorists in general) assumption that
'language' constitutes a neutral system by which humans express themselves
through 'intention', a system unaffected by gender. A more persuasive
alternative views language in terms of 'dominant' and 'muted' groups.
In such an approach, the dominant group "control[s] the forms cf
structures in which consciousness can be articulated;" 84
 whilst the
muted groups "must mediate their beliefs through the allowable forms
of dominant structures." 85 At the same time, the concept of dominant
and muted groups within any given culture also points to the possibility
of some form of expression for the beliefs of the muted groups, despite
the control of articulation by a dominant group. Showalter illustrates
the possibility of expression of these beliefs in her essay, "Feminist
Criticism in the Wilderness." Her dominant and muted groups are
arranged thus:
In this way, "the boundaries of the [muted group's] culture and reality
overlap but are not wholly contained by the dominant (male) group." 87
Women (the muted group) have what she terms a 'wild zone' of experience,
68
alien to the dominant group, within which some of their beliefs are
expressed, whilst also filtering beliefs through the accepted structures
of the dominant group. Because of this duality of expression, Showalter
terms women's writing (and we must, I think, add speech) "a double-
voiced discourse"; one "that always embodies the social, literary,
and cultural heritages of both the muted and the dominant." 88
With this gendered concept of language grafted on to it, speech
act theory becomes more comprehensive. If we recognise that language
reflects the values and concerns of the dominant group, then what
constitutes felicitous and infelicitous performatives, indeed the
status of the speech act, requires re-definition. Gaskell writes
from a tradition which, theoretically at least, posits the existence
of a neutral, non-gendered human language. What she encounters is
a phallocentric language which does not recognise such neutrality.
In a sense, the relationship of Unitarianism (in its theoretical
support for non-gendered language) to phallocentric Victorian society
mimics the relationship of Showalter's muted group to the dominant
group. In Showalter's terms,
x = dominant (Victorian society)
y = muted (Unitarian)
z = muted (Victorian society)
The comparison is valid in three ways. Firstly, it explains the
response of Gaskell's congregation to some of Gaskell's fiction.
As with any muted group, Unitarianism participates to some degree
in the dominant structure. At the same time, the comparison pinpoints
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the origination of the concept of a 'human' language; it is in that
part of the muted group which is, in effect, autonomous from the
dominant in that it can formulate dissenting language systems. Thirdly,
the comparison unveils the arena in which Gaskell's novels must stake
their place - as novels they are constructs of the dominant group
whilst Gaskell herself, as a Unitarian, must 'air', must speak her
'truths', in the public forum where the dominant group reigns.
This last point is vital. Gaskell does 'air' her views in the
public forum. Having encountered two opposing language systems,
Gaskell does not cease writing novels. The dominant group's taboo
on women writers does not so affect her as to finish her career.
Nor, I would suggest does Gaskell collude with the dominant group's
phallocentric system once she experiences conflict. Instead, what
we find is Gaskell directly confronting and exploring the phallocentric
system. Novels such as Ruth, Cranford, North and South, Cousin Phillis,
have at their centre the examination of the phallocentric categories
of, respectively, the fallen woman, the amazon, and the spirited
heroine. In effect, Gaskell is working "within 'male' discourse
. . [while] work[ing] ceaselessly to deconstruct it" 89 through
exposure. Indeed, the gradual disappearance of biblical quotations
from her texts suggests a growing awareness on Gaskell's part of
the phallocentricity of a language that has hitherto been considered
the 'most felicitous' of human languages. Perhaps she comes to view
the Bible, in modern terms, as "a masculinist assertion, a canny
political statement, and a myth used to impose male ownership upon
a complex realm of human experience," 90
 and thus finds the biblical
text inadequate for, if not contradictory to, her purposes.
At the same time, we can see Gaskell exploring the whole idea
of the performative, of the speech act, as it operates within a phallocentric
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system. She investigates 'performatives' which are gender-dependent,
which are performatives only from within the phallocentric system.
For example, the phrase 'I love you', spoken by a man to a woman.
In the Victorian phallocentric system, the phrase has two statuses.
The phrase is 'performative' for the Victorian man only in the sense
that he has performed the act of uttering. For the Victorian woman,
however, operating within the phallocentric system of binary opposites,
the phrase is equivalent to the explicit performative ['I do' l of
the marriage ceremony. Underlying it, to the listening woman is
a different 'social contract' to the one underlying the man's utterance,
and they are deemed to be felicitous/infelicitous in different ways.
A Victorian woman can of course exercise the option of refusal in
such a situation. But a declaration of love, spoken by the phallocentrically
defined Victorian woman is equal to a promise of marriage: only
the ensuing marriage ceremony can make the performative felicitous,
fulfils the social contract in her eyes. For the Victorian man,
however, the explicit performative (ie. the ceremony) is not implicit
in his spoken declaration of love. Though the woman's response can
render the performative felicitous/infelicitous, it is not automatically
explicit upon utterance. Whilst both men and women operate within
the phallocentric system, what is an explicit performative in the
muted group's discourse is not one in the dominant group's discourse.
Whilst exploring the effects and constraints which phallocentric
language places upon women, Gaskell also reaches towards the expression
of a non-gendered language which is based on the individual as non-
gendered, as neutrally 'human'. Several key incidents in her fiction
revolve around situations in which characters are asked to make a
performative utterance that is felicitous in society's phallocentric
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terms, but false to the idea of a human performative language. These
incidents often have a legal context - that is they are situated
within the dominant group's most articulated, regimented, and defined
rules of social reality, where the contractual nature of speech is
most formally manifested. Mary Barton's appearance in court; Margaret
Hale's lie to the police officer; Sylvia Robson's non-fulfil-
ment of the marriage contract; Robson's attack on the government's
press-gang; each of these are instances in which the demands of the
phallocentric group clash with the demands of a Unitarian concept
of 'human' speech acts.
Ultimately, Gaskell's examination of gendered speech acts leads
to an examination of the very premise of speech act theory and Unit-
arianism itself: the concept of the autonomous, willing, speaking
subject. On the one hand, her novels can be seen as attempting the
transition from phallocentricism to a human-centred language, thereby
laying the foundation for a potential leap to the 'pure performative'
which Unitarianism posits. But, what her novels work to suppress,
and yet ceaselessly disclose, is the impossibility of such a
transition within a system which collapses the very distinctions
between the two points. The resulting complexities and contradictions
in the depiction of women in Gaskell's novels are the issu= m,s which
this thesis aims to explore.
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PART ONE 
Chapter Three: Mary Barton (1848)
The critical debate surrounding Mary Barton has been defined,
and to a great extent, limited by the labels commonly attached to
the novel. Mary Barton is either a 'social problem novel,' a 'condition
of England novel,' or an 'industrial novel,' with a resulting focus
of critical attention on Mary Barton's 'industrial' subject matter,
that is, its exploration of class relations, and the economic and
political forces which shape them. Not surprisingly, such labelling
yields an almost unanimous critical decision: Mary Barton is a carefully
and sympathetically observed, detailed description of life amongst
the industrial working classes in Manchester during the 'hungry'
1840's. 1 A novel too whose major weaknesses are generally agreed
to be two in number. Firstly, Gaskell's middle-class perspective
compromises her analysis of class relations and trade unions. Secondly,
the novel is irrevocably split into two distinct parts, the second
of which can be dismissed as conventional, and essentially unrelated
to the first.2
Mary Barton can however be viewed from a different critical
angle, one which, rather than determining the genre to which the
text belongs and the ways in which it upholds or transgresses that
genre's definition, seeks to see in Mary Barton both the issues,
and seeds of issues, which become the objects of Gaskell's attention
in her later pieces of fiction, and the methods of analysis which
she brings to bear on these issues. In other words, instead of focusing
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on 'defining' Mary Barton, it is also possible to see the novel as
a blueprint for Gaskell's future concerns; a blueprint whose undeniably
bi-partite structure points to submerged, contentious issues, and
is not simply or primarily an indication that Gaskell, uncomfortable
with the issues she consciously raises, reverts to the conventional
love story which "she knows will be acceptable to a novel-reading
public." 3 Gaskell's Unitarian background, in particular speech act
concerns, illuminate the blueprint and provide the necessary tools
for exploration.
The opening chapters of the novel contain the nucleus of Gaskell's
most important method of portraying and assessing the class relations
which are the overt subjects of her scrutiny. Almost immediately,
the reader is aware of two opposing groups: the master within whose
4power it is to grant holidays and the workers who may or may not
'seize' those holidays to which they feel entitled (40). The two
verbs indicate the discrepancy of power between the two groups, and
indeed encapsulate the issues which are at the very heart of the
novel: the inter-relation between groups of people, the possible
interpretations of nature of that relationship, and the way in which
such relations are rooted in, and revealed by, language or discourse.
If the masters 'grant' holidays it is because they envisage their
position as one of authority over the workers; a request or supplication
has been conceded. In opposition, the workers 'seize' holidays,
that is they take what they construe is rightfully theirs from someone
who wrongfully with-holds it.
From this microcosm of what is going to be her major area of
investigation, Gaskell immediately presents the reader with a detailed
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picture of the positive model of such inter-relation, or discourse,
by focusing on a working-class group of people. The discourse between
the Bartons and the Wilsons, unlike that between masters and men
hinted at earlier, rests on a shared definition of their relation
to each other, a definition which is revealed in their instant recognition
and comprehension of each others acts and sayings. Mr and Mrs Wilson,
invited to tea at the Bartons, know the necessity for ignoring all
of the financial transactions which necessarily precede the partakir-g
of tea. They know "full well, that it all related to the preparations
for hospitality" (50) because similar preparations would be required
if the situations were reversed. That they refrain from conmenting
on the straitened pecuniary circumstances of their hosts indicates
not a nicety of manners, but an understanding and sympathy of the
Barton's financial situation. For the Wilson's to comment would
indicate a false, but no less estranging, difference in circumstances
between themselves and the Bartons - a different conception of the
relationship between them.
Other details surrounding the tea episode emphasize the 'unity'
which characterises the type of discourse which operates amongst
working-class people. Alice Wilson, also invited to the Barton's
home, accepts the offer of tea with thanks, and immediately recipro
cates with an offer of simples which she has collected for a spring
drink. The exchange points to the assumed, and accepted, equality
of status between the members of the exchange. The simples are not,
in the language of the masters and workers' relationship, a supplicant's
response to a favour 'granted' or extended; they are a gesture of
thanks made possible, indeed required, by the terms of the equality
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which obtain amongst the working classes. In a similar way, Mrs
Barton's responseto Alice Wilson's unintentionally "unlucky toast"(53)
indicates a willingness to maintain the unity required by equality.
When Alice's toast causes upset, Mrs Barton does not condemn her.
Such an act of judgement carries implicitly with it the seeds of
inequality. Mrs Barton's immediate reassurance of Alice however
recognises that Alice "didn't mean any harm"(54); neither feels judged
nor in the position to judge.
The entire scene demonstrates what can be termed the 'social
contract' 5 which exists between members of the working classes, a
contract which is based on the equal status of its members and is
illustrated by the type of communication, the rules of discourse,
which exist between them. 6 Time and time again, Gaskell depicts
the contract as one typified by a spirit of 'exchange' which presumes
equality, and a consideration for the rights of others. When, as
so often happens, a neighbour is immediately ready to visit, to chat
with another neighbour, the motive is not prying nosiness nor gossipy
interest, but a genuine concern for the other person's well being,
a concern that can acted upon because of the assured equality of
those involved. Job Legh's decision to "put a book and his pipe
in his pocket and just step round the corner to fetch his grandchild,
ready for a talk if he found Barton in; ready to pull out pipe and
book if the girls [Mary and Margaret] wanted him to wait"(79) epitomises
the easy equality of working class discourse. The same sense of
equality, and sincere interest in a fellow man's life, motivates
Job, upon hearing of John Barton's return after a long absence, to
offer a visit. The offer is immediately made, and it is a mark of
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the importance attached to such instantaneous hospitality that Job,
halted from his visit by Mary's concern for her father, begins "muttering
away in high dudgeon"(424), greatly offended by the refusal. Similarly,
Mary's experience of procuring a boat to pursue Will in the John
Cropper, illustrates the equality amongst speakers which characterises
the working-class's 'social contract.' Though the episode is a minor
one, Gaskell is careful to point out the manner in which the incident
is conducted. The boatmen who agree to take Mary down the Mersey
require a steersman. The man they single out is not simply asked
nor is he ordered to render his services. Instead, an explanation
is given as to the urgency of the request(356). The point here is
quite simple, although perhaps not immediately obvious. That an
explanation is given indicates not that the boatmen feel it most
likely to persuade the steersman to agree (though this may partly
be true), but that those involved in the transaction are equals.
Just as the boatmen knew the urgency of Mary's request and so agreed
to transport her, so the prospective steersman has the right, as
an equal, to that same information before he makes his decision.
The parley itself, which is not reported, takes up less than a paragraph
of the narrative, yet behind it lie the concepts of equality and
the rules of discourse, which combine to form the working class social
contract.
The linguistic basis of this contract is repeatedly revealed
in subtle references to the importance of discourse and a shared
set of definitions. When John Barton says of Alice, "She's a 0002
woman, and can feel for the poor"(46), he is pointing to a shared
experience between Alice and others which allows Alice to understand
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their plight. Significantly, Alice's 'understanding' is often depicted
as based in discourse or communication. Even when deaf, Alice, living
with Jane Wilson after the death of Jane's husband, has a 'communi-
cative' importance. She states, "I think I'm a comfort to Jane,
if I'm only someone to scold now and then . . . It takes off her
thoughts from her sore losses when she can scold a bit. "(167).
The comment points to Alice's recognition of the value and therapeutic
potential of a discourse which is rooted in shared definitions and
experiences. Alice's deafness does not nullify her understanding
of loss. Like Jane, she too has experienced a change in family circumstance.
In a more complex way the episode concerning the Davenport family
explores and dramatises the nature of the working class social contract.
When John Barton hears of the distress of the Davenports, he immediately
wraps up his own few pieces of food to take to the family(97). The
action might seem well-meaning but ineffective on the surface. John
Barton's own poverty appears to rule out the possibility of his involvement
in any effective remedy to the Davenport's situation. His response
however indicates the degree to which working class inter-relations
stem from shared definitions. Mr Carson's own response to the Davenports
illustrates the nature of the working class social contract admirably.
Carson, upon being informed of Davenport's situation, issues an out-
patient's order (109). His son donates five shillings from his own
pocket. Both responses are in the nature of a reflex. To Carson,
the millowner, there are only two methods of dealing with distress
amongst his workers. The first, an in-patient's order for a stay
in the Infirmary, is reserved for accidents (109), presumably sustained
in his factory. The second, the out-patient's order he issues for
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Davenport, covers all other forms of distress. Similarly, the younger
Carson, with no Infirmary orders at his disposal, responds to distress
with financial aid. Neither know the utter uselessness of both responses
in Davenport's case.
In contrast, Barton's response to the news given him indicates
his understanding, based on shared experience, of the types of distresses
undergone by the working classes. Unlike Carson, Barton does not
limit his actions to one of several pre-formulated responses. He
wraps up his food; but does not hand it over to Wilson, the messenger,
and then stay put, sure of the validity and efficacy of his response
to the news. Instead, he immediately sets off for the Davenport's
to investigate their situation, the better to respond as adequately
as he is able to within his means. Barton, being poor himself, knows
of degrees of poverty which Carson's definition of 'poor' cannot
accommodate. Where Carson sees distress as precisely twofold in
structure - requiring either an in-patient or out-patient infirmary
order - Barton is aware of a whole spectrum of definitions within
each of Carson's two categories. Gaskell's description of the Davenports'
distress provides both a detailed description of the Davenport's
cellar [" the damp, nay wet, brick floor, through which stagnant
moisture of the street oozed up"(100)], and a jolting recognition
that even by Barton's and Wilson's poverty-stricken standards, such
an abode is „appalling. If people who live in a court with an open
drain running down its centre are almost knocked over by the foetid
smell (98) of the Davenport's home, then Carson's definition of distress
is alarmingly inadequate. The effect is of course to highlight the
inadequacy of Carson's response and his conception of distress.
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But more importantly, the episode underlies the necessity for shared
definitions/experience if responses to situations are to be adequate.
John Barton purchases food, light, and warmth (99) because he knows
the type of distress the Davenports are suffering; he has defined
the degree of povertyaccurately since, unlike Carson, he has seen
and investigated it himself.
The shared definitions and experiences which form the nucleus
of the working-class contract and which allow them to interact with
each other as equals pervades Mary Barton not just in episodes like
the ones described above, but more overtly in the songs (eg. 72-3,138),
poems (154-5), and dialect words by which Gaskell dramatises the
world of the working classes. As Gaskell herself indicates in reference
to "The Oldham Weaver" which Margaret sings, the songs and poems
of a people signify, and are made potent by, shared experiences and
definitions. 7 Whilst "The Oldham Weaver" may seem humorous to- those
who are happily ignorant of the way of life it describes, the song
is "powerfully pathetic"(73) to those who have lived it. In microcosmic
form, the diversity of possible responses to the Oldham Weaver (humour,
identification) indicates the existence of differing sets of shared
experiences and the linguistic expression of those experiences.
In much the same way, Gaskell's decision to transcribe the language
of her working-class characters in dialect points to her determination
to unveil the linguistic element in the unifying, working-class social
contract. If the working classes share the horrific experiences
which Gaskell presents with such minute detail, they also literally
present a linguistically-unified group by the very appearance and
shape of their language on paper.
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But perhaps the most significant episode in Mary Barton which dramatises
both the linguistic element of the social contract and the concept
of equality that characterises it, is Job's recounting of his trip
to London. The narrative takes up several pages and, on an initial
reading, can appear to be nothing more than an entertaining digression.
Considered as a species of discourse however, Job's narrative assumes
a different signification. The context of Job's narrative is important:
John Barton has returned from his journey to London as part of the
Chartist delegation of working-class men. Discouraged and embittered
by Parliament's lack of response to the delegation, John begins to
recount his experiences there, only to break off with a curse and
a refusal to continue speaking (145). At this point, Job intervenes
with his narrative. If we consider his intervention from the viewpoint
of the speech-act notion of narrative, its illustration of the working-
class social contract begins to emerge. If, as Pratt outlines, story
telling itself represents an agreement, a contract, between speakers
and listeners, Job's offer to recount a tale binds him to the articles
of that contract. Furthermore, a close look at the type of narrative
he offers reveals particulars of the nature of the contract which
obtains in the situation presented here. Significantly, Job's choice
and manner of narration suggest that the 'narrative contract' is
closely allied, indeed a part of, the 'social contract' which operates
amongst the members of the working classes. Job selects his narrative
on the principle of what Pratt terms 'being relevant.' He "thought
of a subject, neither sufficiently disonant from the last to jar
on the full heart, nor too much the same to cherish the continuance
of the gloomy train of thought."(145) In other words, Job as John
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Barton's equal chooses a topic which makes no attempt to 'judge'
John's bitterness by evoking a moral, nor trivialises John's feelings
by completely changing the focus of the conversation. His narrative
contains elements sympathetic to John's experience: a man's need
to leave Manchester for London in an attempt to improve his lot (145)
and the strangeness of London (147). At the same time Job's tale
indicates the unity amongstthe poor working classes which John Barton,
in his disheartened state, has forgotten. It is a chambermaid (149)
and a countrywoman (153) who help Job care for the infant Margaret.
But as well as sympathetic content, Job's manner of narration indicates
that he is operating from a belief in the equal status of both listeners
and speakers. He is careful to "not be long over ending"(150) his
story, and his response to Mary's falling asleep during his recitation
["don't look so gloppened because thou'st fallen asleep while an
oud chap like me was talking on oud times"(154)] indicates that he
does not view his status as speaker or narrator of the tale to have
higher claims than those of his listeners. Significantly too, Job's
decision to recite a poem of Bamford's at the close of his tale emphasizes
the unity generated by a social contract based on equality. The
scene ends with John Barton no longer feeling estranged and isolated
by his experiences in London, but aware of others who share the knowledge
of distress amongst the poor, and asking Mary to copy down the lines
of Bamford's poem so that he possesses a permanent record of that
shared knowledge.
In contrast to the shared definitions which characterises the
working class social contract, the 'contract' which operates between
the classes is distinguished by the extreme gap between the two groups
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that generates a lack of communication, shared definitions and, as
a result, unity. Again Gaskell illustrates the contract with reference
to the species of discourse, the type of speech acts, which exist
between them. The meeting between the striking men and the master
of the mills encapsulates the type of social contract which operates
between them. When analysed in terms of the 'speech act' situation,
the meeting reveals the inequality and lack of communication which
form its dominant structure. Importantly, Gaskell prefaces the encounter
with a depiction of a 'social contract' which stresses communication.
Although the masters are divided as to the extent of conciliation
with the men they envisage, that division does not sow discord.
Meeting at the public room chosen for the interview, the masters
first amicably discuss the weather, and then fall to "talking about
the business which brought them together."(231) Their decorous obser-
vation of what Grice calls the co-operative principle, whilst it
does not settle the question of the amount of capitulation to be
accorded to the striking men, engenders a unified front on the most
central element in the interview: their conception of the workers.
Each master is like his fellow in refusing to consider the workmen
"as brethren and friends"(232), with the result that the "wild beasts"(232)
are never approached as reasonable men and certainly not as equals.
The workers' delegates similarly present a unified, communicative
group. They bring with them "the operatives' statement of the case"(233),
a document presumably formulated by discussion and debate.
Other than this shared characteristic however, the two groups
are markedly different in their attitude to the 'speech' situation
in which they find themselves engaged. The whole concept of a meeting
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between two groups presupposes an equality of status, an agreement
to discuss on equal terms the issues which make the meeting necessary.
Such a definition accommodates disagreement, but any disagreement
is not seen to be determining 'right' or 'wrong' factions, or the
shifting status of speakers. The discussion between masters prior
to the arrival of the delegates is a case in point. A look at the
episode in question, however, reveals that the two groups have two
separate definitions of the nature of the meeting. The working men
approach the meeting with a definition similar to that outlined above.
Their spirit is one of co-operation, based on the assumption that
both groups are present in order to discuss a situation by which
both are affected. Accordingly, the workers maintain what can be
termed the co-operative principle, or the rules of discourse, which
obtains in such a meeting. However much the specific details of
their discourse can be seen as extravagant or inflammatory, the delegates
state their case (the list of grievances and demands) at their appointed
turns (233-4), withdrawing and re-entering the discourse when the
rules of the meeting render it necessary.
In contrast, the conduct of the masters suggest that their definition
of the type of meeting taking place is strikingly different. Once
the delegates refuse the masters' offer, it is clear that the masters
are operating within a definition of 'meeting' which incorporates
an assumption of authority and superiority. Carson, upon hearing
the refusal, suggests changes to the masters' offer. The changes
themselves are essentially unimportant. The significance of Carson's
speech lies in the fact that he makes the suggestions in front of
the delegates, uncaring that his actions indicate his assumption
90
of authority. To the workers, Carson is 'flouting' the rules of
of the discourse in which they are involved, rules which outline
that Carson should propose any new changes when the delegates had
withdrawn. For Carson and the other masters, Carson's actions are
not 'flouting' any rules at all. Indeed his actions serve primarily
to unify further the masters' definition of the meeting. Assuming
as they do, their superiority over the delegates before them, Carson's
aggressive resolutions and assessment of the workmen's conduct in
the strike are not insulting transgressions of the meeting's rules,
but a re-affirmation of their authority over the workers. Accordingly,
the masters' listen to Carson's proposals, vote, and pass the resolution,
all in the presence of the 'inferior' delegates.(234-5).
Despite such provocation, the workers' delegation maintain the
rules of the 'meeting.' Though they listen with "glaring eyes"(234),
the one attempt to speak 'out of turn' is checked "in obedience to
the stern glance and pressure . . . received from the leader."(234)
The delegates hear the resolution, and leave the room. It is only
when they uncover unmistakeable proof of the masters' attitude to
the meeting that they rebel. They find the caricature which the
young Harry Carson has drawn of them, looking "lank, ragged, dispirited,
and, famine-stricken"(235), and Carson is murdered for it. Such
a response needs to be examined carefully. As one of the workers
says, "I could laugh at a gist as well as e'er the best on 'em, though
it tell again myself"(238) - the humorous potential of a caricature
is not debated. Rather it is as an emblem of an attitude that the
caricature is reviled. That Harry Carson could compose such a drawing
indicates his ignorance of the workers' situation it is true - but
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more importantly, it indicates a general disinclination to discover
the facts, and a reliance on pre-formulated notions. Carson's caricature
is possible because he is unquestioning as to the 'definition' of
the meeting he is attending. He assumes his superiority to the workers
in front of him, and can therefore utilise their appearance to a
comic purpose. Like both Carsons' response to Davenport's illness,
Harry Carson's response here indicates a limited and pre-formulated
definition of the issue presented to him. To the Carsons and the
other masters, a 'worker' is nothing more than a 'function', to be
made use of or not. The definition has no room for the idea of 'exchange'
or 'communication' which, for the workers at least, is the defining
characteristic of a meeting. Essentially Carson's caricature is
not a caricature at all. Far from exaggerating the subject before
him, Carson's drawing neatly encapsulates his definition of the working
men: alien objects of interest whose essence can be composedly translated
onto paper. A caricature by definition identifies a ruling, predominant
characteristic. For Carson, a caricature is the equivalent of a
carefully-wrought portrait of his definition of the working-class
delegates.
Each time the two classes meet, this clash of definition and
expected modes of discourse reverberates. Previous to the meeting
between masters and delegates, the encounter between Jem Wilson and
Harry Carson represents a similar interchange undermined by differing
rules of discourse, and definitions of the meeting. Jem proceeds
within the rules of discourse which govern meetings between individuals
with a mutual interest. Accordingly, he approaches Carson with
respect (226), stating the reason for his appearance, and expecting
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answers to his queries (228). Carson's definition of this meeting
is however substantially different. Accordingly he does not answer
Jem's questions (228), nor does he proceed within the same set of
rules for discourse. Where Jem openly declares his interests and
requirements, Carson never divulges his. Rather he manipulates Jem's
speech in an effort to glean the information he desires. He wants
to "ascertain . . . the man's relation to [Mary]"(228), but because
of his rules of discourse, he does not simply ask the question as
Jem, in the same situation, is doing. Their differing definitions
are most neatly seen in Harry's expectations of Jem's response.
Carson does not answer Jem's forthright questions; nevertheless he
both desires and expects "a distinct answer"(229) to his own questions.
Similarly, once Carson has discovered the item of information he
does require, then the discourse is to him closed (229). That Jem's
questions have not been similarly answered, reveals Carson's differing
definition of their respective status, and accompanying rights, in
the discourse.
The effect of such division in the rules of discourse can be
seen in the efforts of the Carsons"nurse' to inform the family
of young Carson's murder. Though Parker, as the children's former
nurse, benefits from a manner "less haughty"(257) than the one usually
accorded to domestics, the rules of discourse which pertain between
the masters, their families and the working classes (whether operatives
or domestics) make the disclosure of personal, intimate information
impossible. Parker enters the drawing room where the three Carson
girls sit waiting for tea. Her blanched face, had it belonged to
one other than a servant, would have been noted immediately. But
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because Parker is a domestic, her very entrance is not noted (257).
The girls continue "arranging their various articles of employ-
ment"(257). Gaskell carefully outlines Parker's difficulty in conveying
information which the rules of discourse between classes render impossible.
She "want[s] them to look up. She want[s] them to read something
in her face - her face so full of woe, of horror"(257). But the
girls go "on without taking any notice"(257). For them, Parker's
entrance into the room is confined to one definition: she usually
"came into the drawing-room to look for things belonging to their
father or mother"(257) so they neither look for nor expect the revel-
ation of personal, important information.
The 'solution' to these discordant rules of discourse is not
easily found. Gaskell does not find it in that supposedly objective,
disinterested body: the legal system. On the contrary, the legal
system is seen to embody the masters' perceptions and definitions
to be a translation of those definitions into a literal system of
rules and contracts enforced by appointed officials. From very early
in the novel, the police are seen to be separate to the world of
the working classes. A series of references, significant in their
very casualness, their lack of an atypical context, suggest that
the attitude they reveal is typical of the discourse between the
legal system and the working classes. Policemen can be good men,
but are not spoken to because of their position (46); they are the
first threat thrown at the working class child who bumps into a middle-
class one (438), and they seem unmoved by working class distress
(144). More importantly, the legal system is seen to support actively
the social contract which alienates class from class. In the
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altercation between Jem Wilson and Harry Carson, the policeman's
instant offer to arrest Jem (230) betrays his sympathies. Having
observed the "violent discussion"(230) between the two men, the police
officer presumably also saw that Carson struck Jem first. Even when
Carson admits to provoking the scuffle, it is Jem who receives the
warning of law not Carson.
It is the progression of the trial which most clearly indicates
the alignment of the legal system with the masters' rules of discourse,
and their definition of the social contract existing between classes.
Carson's desire for a "speedy conviction, a speedy execution"(274)
is seen to be unimpeded by the processes of law. The circumstantial
nature of the evidence against Jem and Carson's desire for a quick
conclusion may be deemed "injudicious"(344), but it is never really
opposed. If Carson's earlier response to such issues as Davenport's
illness betray a dependence on pre-formulated responses and rigid
definitions, the court itself is a three dimensional version which
operates on identical terms. Gaskell neatly pinpoints the parallel
in her depiction of the jury's and Carson's response to the revelation
of Jem's innocence. Carson, "having once defined an object,"(396)
responsible for his son's murder, is overwhelmed with frustration
exact in kind (though differing in degree) to the frustration of
the jury who are dismayed to discover that their 'opinion' (396)
needs reshaping. The legal system's dependence on pre-formulated
definitions is further illustrated in its instant acceptance of Will
Wilson's testimony in defense of Jem once an "accredited pilot, appointed
by Trinity House"(397) is brought in to testify. Trinity House pilots
are "known to be above suspicion"(397). It is a sign of the power
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of such pre-formulated definitions that Carson sinks down in "sickening
despair"(398) when it is brought before court.
If the legal system so uncompromisingly reflects an alienating
social contract, the communication breakdown between classes appears
permanent. The gap could be reduced by conditions which fostered
shared rules of discourse, and a mutually defined social contract,
though it is first necessary that the knowledge and experience which
lead to such unified definitions is held in common. But even this
avenue of action seems closed. The failure of the Chartist delegation
to London is a case in point. The workers cannot believe that Parliament
knows the misery of their situation: it "had still to be revealed
in all its depths"(127). Their supposition is accurate, however,
in a way they do not foresee. Trusting that adequate knowledge will
engender an adequate response, as it does amongst themselves, the
delegation aims to convey the 'adequate information' in the form
of their own testimony to the body of officials empowered to respond
to their situation. Parliament however shares their belief in knowledge
equalling adequate response all too completely. It "refuse[s] to
listen to the working-men, when they petitioned with all the force
of their rough, untutored words"(141) precisely because listening
entails response. By refusing to hear the testimony, Parliament
simultaneously short-circuits and upholds the equation.
But the gulf between classes so efficiently regulated by the
rules of discourse and the social contract which operates between
them, is not as unbridgeable as the behaviour of Parliament and the
machinations of the court room suggest. If the Carson girls need
excessive prodding to look at Parker (she stands before them an inordinate
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length of time), they do eventually look, and when they do they can
read the "glimpse of some terrible truth"(257) that disturbs Parker's
face and renders her inarticulate. It is in the subject of the sorrow
that the possibility for communication between estranged social classes
is glimpsed. Gaskell finds the answer to differing class contracts
in what can be termed the 'familial contract.' In other words, it.
is the recognition of shared familial bonds that unites separate
classes. Not until John Barton recognises that he has killed a brother
and succumbed to "perverted reasonings"(436) which made him place
trade union obligations over and above his obligations to the concept
of 'family', can he be forgiven. In murdering the young Harry Carson
John Barton forcibly points to the common area of experience between
himself and the older Carson: each are parents, and each have now
lost a child (435). Barton forces himself to realise that he is
as guilty of the crime of rigid definition as Carson is himself.
No longer is Carson simply a representative of a class "desirous
to obtain the greatest quantity of work for the lowest wages"(436):
no longer one "eternally placed in antagonistic attitude" (435).
Barton, like Carson, learns the necessity of flexible definition.
The solution may seem facile or, at best, optimistic. But Gaskell
is adamant about its efficacy. The death bed scene which dramatises
the reconciliation of Barton and Carson is conventional in many ways.
But one of its most superficially conventional elements - the biblical
text chosen in prayer - points to the tumultuous experience of re-
defining social contracts undergone by Barton and Carson. The text,
"God be merciful to us sinners"(441), emphasizes the essential unity
of persons of substantially different social classes - a unity which
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is based and expressed in language. More significantly, the subsequent
and final meeting between different social groups illustrates the
changed social contract, as manifested in rules of discourse, between
them. Carson, after Barton's death, invites Job Legh and Jem to
discuss the circumstances of his son's death. The invitation reveals
Carson's progression from a reliance on rigid definitions to al . areness of .
the need for flexibility in definition. Though Carson's first speech
indicates his initial adherence to the 'old' rules of class discourse
[he assumes that Job and Jem have a different attitude towards speaking
the truth than his own], he immediately retracts the statement which
indicates this (453). The rest of the episode is a model of communication:
questions are asked and answeredbyboth sides. Carson's careful
attention to maintaining a social contract based on equality and
unity is seen in his immediate retraction of the adjective "unfortunate"(455)
which he is about to apply to his son's involvement with Mary Barton.
The adjective implies a discrepancy between Jem and Carson's son
which he wants to avoid. Importantly, the three men retain their
differences as to the "power, or want of power in masters, to remedy
the evils the men complain of"(458), but these differences are not
depicted as inevitably leading to judgement and estrangement.
Despite the apparent neatness of Gaskell's solution, the concept
of the 'familial contract' is problematic in a way not linked with
its optimistic simplicity. Though, in the novel's terms, it paves
the way for a social contract between individuals which transcends
those shaped by class and economics, the 'familial contract' contains
within it a more insidious contract than the class one. It is a
contract which operates on the very terms of rigid definition and
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and pre-formulation which Gaskell isolates and criticises as the
impetus behind the estranging class social contract, and yet it is
never subjected to the same scrutiny. The complexity of this submerged
contract is attested to by the fact that it is the root cause of
what has hitherto been dismissed as primarily 'bad'writing: the
bi-partite structure of Mary Barton.
In order to maintain that Mary Barton is inexplicably flawed,
one must assert that Gaskell is primarily and solely interested in
the influence which economics has on communication. Such a contention
necessitates that John Barton, the trade union and the resolution
of class conflict is at the centre of the novel, and that when that
concern is evidently evaded (at the point of Carson's murder), Gaskell
is consciously and cowardly refusing to deal with the issues she
has raised. 8 There is however an alternative approach to Mary Barton
which proposes that Gaskell's apparent 'switch' in narrative focus
from John Barton to Mary Barton is not a retreat into a romantic
love plot, 9 but the inevitable consequence of issues which she unconsciously
raises. 10
It is perhaps best to begin at the end with a look at the section
of the novel which is emblematic of the submerged 'contract' which
dictates the novel's structure: Mary Barton's testimony in the Liverpool
Assizes. On one level, Mary's testimony is an integral element
in Gaskell's attempt to undermine the stereotypes which perpetuate
class division. Mary's intention to exculpate Jem whilst not exposing
her father as the murderer is a narrator-approved elevation of the
familial contract over the requirements of the law. It is a statement
of the individual's filial bonds made potent by its articulation
in a situation which embodies the public, social contract. Nevertheless,
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though Mary's statement is radical in its challenge to the claims
of a public social contract, it is unabashedly conformist in a way
which can only be exposed by a revision of what is at the center
of Mary Barton. That centre, where the overt focal point of divisive
class contracts buckles under pressure, can be pinpointed to the
discovery of Harry's murder, and the initially undiscovered evidence
of the murderer's identity: the paper wadding.
When Esther produces the wadding which she discovers in a hedge
bordering the scene of Carson's murder, she places in Mary's possession
a microcosmic image of the structure of Mary Barton: the paper is
part of the sheet, torn from a Valentine sent to Mary by Jem, which
Mary had used to copy down the lines of Bamford's poem on the distress
of poverty. In other words, the paper represents two aspects of
Mary's life ( her economic position as a member of Manchester's industrial
working class, and her sexual position as a female member of that
class), and the two motives posited for Harry's murder: the actual
economic motive of Barton's, and the alleged sexual motive of Jem
Wilson. More importantly, the necessity for the paper's discovery
leads us directly to the submerged contract dictating the structure
of Mary Barton.
It is vital to note that up until Esther presents her with the
gun wadding, Mary is resolutely certain that Jem is guilty of Carson's
murder. Her immediate response to the news that Jem is to be tried
for murder is one of conviction. Though she does not blame him,
"she doubted not his guilt"(282). More puzzling than this instant-
aneous judgement of Jem, is Mary's immediate involvement in his guilt.
Not only is Jem the murderer,but she instantly recognises "how much
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cause"(282) she has given Jem for murder. She condemns herself as
"guilty"(282) with a rapidity identical with her adverse judgement
of Jem.
One is tempted to accuse Mary of a strange desire to implicate
herself in the 'glory' of crime by whatever means of illogical reasoning.
But the text refuses to allow such an explanation: the entire cast
of characters is as resolutely convinced of Mary's guilt and involvement
as she is. Each and every one assumes that not only is Jem the murderer
but that Mary is to blame. Job Legh considers that Jem has been
"Mused and - jilted"(305), and that Mary's "light conduct"(305)
has led directly to the "fatal consequences"(305) of murder. Margaret
considers Mary to be "a girl devoid of the modest proprieties of
her sex"(306), and is "surprised and disappointed by the disclosure
of Mary's conduct"(306) whilst never once denouncing Jem whom she
believes to be a murderer. Jane Wilson too, though refusing to consider
Jem guilty, is equally sure that Mary's "arts and . . . profligacy"(281)
render her guilty.
In a novel which has hitherto detailed economic duress with
painful accuracy, this immediate privileging of a sexual motive over
an economic one is both illogical and inexplicable. Even more inexplicable,
is Mary's continued sense of guilt once she is aware of her father's
culpability. Mary, faced with the judging silence of Margaret's
presence,"knew herself to blame, felt her errors in every fibre of
her heart"(316) even though she knows of the economic motive for
the crime. Finally, in a novel which so powerfully delineates the
dangers of presumptive judgement and limited definitions, Mary's
belief that Margaret has a "right to judge"(319) her conduct is a
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puzzling contradiction. Under what contract does Mary place herself?
What rules of discourse and behaviour render Mary guilty of a crime
apparently as odious as murder itself?
In order to answer these questions thoroughly it is necessary
to return to the point when Mary first learns that Jem is accused
of Carson's murder. Her first impulse is to return to "the ominous,
prophetic words"(282) which Jem had last spoken to her: "you'll
maybe hear of me as a drunkard, and may be as a thief, and maybe
as a murderer. Remember! when all are speaking ill of me, you will
have no right to blame me, for it's your cruelty that will have made
me what I feel I shall become.'"(175) When Jem's words were first
spoken they seemed to be nothing more than the overwrought response
of a spurned lover. But their significance extends beyond that.
Far from being solely Jem's response to Mary's lack of interest in
him, the words form part of what can be termed the 'pastoral contract'
whose rules of discourse and definitions govern the relationshiop
between the sexes. The term 'pastoral contract' is appropriate because
what the reader encounters in the progression of Jem and Mary's relationship
mimics the situation normally encountered in the pastoral lyric.11
In order to establish the nature of the pastoral contract, it
is useful to turn to an analysis of that contract as it appears in
other literatures. Adrienne Munich, in her essay "Notorious signs,
feminist criticism and literary tradition," 12 conducts one such analysis.
She takes as her subject the story of Marcella, an episode in Cervantes'
Don Quixote. In summary, the story concerns Marcella, a beautiful
heiress who decides to become a shepherd in an attempt to escape
the numerous suitors that pursue her. But as Munich points out,
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the world of the pastoral provides no escape from the patriarchal
definitions of women which had previously doomed Marcella to the
perpetual annoyance of suitors aiming to capture her beauty and virtues.
On the contrary, the pastoral scene generates yet another definition
of 'woman' which Marcella finds equally constraining: she becomes
"the conventional object of shepherds' laments."
During the scene Munich outlines, Marcella is reviled as the
'murderer' of one of the shepherds, Chrysostom, who has apparently
died of a broken heart - the result of Marcella's refusal to favour
his attentions. Marcella attempts to defend herself from the accusation
of murder: she asserts that she clearly told Chrysostom of her indifference,
and that she does not feel obligated to love a man simply because
he loves her. But as Munich points out, Marcella's honest speaking
is ineffective. In the pastoral world, it is Marcella as 'woman',
and the language of her body, that is privileged above her words
or individual discourse. 11. Precisely put, Marcella's "body contradicts
(speaks against) her words". 15
In opposition, the depiction of the relationship between man,
his body, and his language stresses congruence. The dead Chrysostom's
body, in front of which the accusing shepherds are gathered, is proof 
of his love for Marcella in precisely the same way that his love
poetry about Marcella 'proved' his love for her. Where Marcella
represents a dislocation of word and body, Chrysostom's body and
language are unified; each expresses his emotional state. 16
If Cervantes seems too distant to be relevant to Gaskell, Rousseau's
Emile (1762) attests to the durability of the pastoral contract and
its definition of women. Rousseau, describing the ideal wife for
Emile and outlining the type of education which forms a 'Sophy-like'
103
creatures, presents a definition of 'woman' which is in complete
accord with the pastoral contract. His definition is worth presenting
at length. The two most salient aspects of Rousseau's women are
the fluency with which their bodies speak, and the responsibility
they hold with regard to stimulating male passion. The first is
something to which Rousseau returns again and again. In an effort
to aid Emile in his pursuit of Sophy, Rousseau suggests that Sophy's
words are immaterial:
Why do you consult their words when it is
not their mouths that speak? Consult their
eyes, their colour, their breathing . . .
that is the language that nature gave
them for your answer.17
So powerful is a woman's physical presence that it not only over-
rides any linguistic message, it is also capable of speaking when
the woman herself is silent. When Sophy says nothing in response
to Emile's request for permission to visit, Rousseau tells us that
her "blush is an answer." 18 Presumably, Sophy's silence allows the
signals of her physical presence to be read all the more clearly.
Rousseau also recognises that if physical presence is the eternal
female language, it is sadly apt to decay. Whilst the "male is only
a male now and again" 19 because his reason can disarm his sexuality,
"the female is always a female, or at least all her youth." 20 Rousseau's
qualifier reveals the 'grammar' that is physical presence to the
male reader. A young woman is always 'female', ie. a sexual creature;
an old woman's body needs re-defining. She is still defined by her
physical presence but, no longer sexually desirable, she becomes
in effect a cypher.
Women's responsibility for arousing male passion is the inevitable
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consequence of the 'power' of their physical presence. Not surprisingly,
Rousseau's vocabulary reflects man's feelings of helplessness before
the unrelenting signals of the female presence. Rousseau speaks
of "draughts of poison" 21 and intoxication, of weapons, 22 and mesmerism
by the 'charm' that is the female body 23 - each term transfers
the responsibility for a man's sexual arousal onto a woman's shoulders
(or arms, or breasts, or hair).
Lurking below these two aspects of woman is, not surprisingly,
a fear of them. Women are apparently capable of "stimulating man's
passions in excess of man's power of satisfying," 24
 and can "so easily
stir a man's senses" 25
 that it is a possibility that men can be
"tyrannised over by women, [could] at last become their victims,
and [could] be dragged to their death without the least chance of
escape." 26 More importantly, a woman can possibly pass illegitimate
children off as the heirs of unsuspecting husbands. 27 Luckily,
accompanying this limitless power, Rousseau also finds a natural
restraint - female modesty - which acts to constrain women's power,
ensures that they submit to their husbands, and guarantees that prima-
geniture can be practised with reasonable confidence.
Finally, the reification of woman finds a niche in Rousseau's
thoughts on Sophy. Their status as objects is constantly upheld
by his insistence that they not only be virtuous, but that they are
seen to be virtuous in a way not demanded of men. 28 It is reputation
that is a woman's "throne". 29 Women essentially, for Rousseau, help
to uphold chivalric concepts of love which he terms 'real love.'
Real love, he says, cannot exist "without enthusiasm, and no enthusiasm
without an object of perfection real or supposed, but always present
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in the imagination." 30 Women, as such objects, are the recipients
of a love usually accorded to a divinity. It is not such a large
step from this to the Victorian concept of the 'angel in the house',
and woman as the male moral touchstone.
If we interpret Mary and Jem's relationship in the light of
such a 'pastoral contract,' Mary's response to the murder of Carson
appears not contradictory, but unavoidable and predictable. Jem's
reaction to Mary's behaviour when he offers her marriage indicates
that he is working within the rules of the pastoral contract. Mary
finds herself inarticulate at Jem's proposal, and Jem both expects
and queries if her silence "gives consent"(175). His expectation
betrays his adherence to a pastoral definition of 'woman.' If, in
pastoral terms, the female body is always an object of desire, and
a woman's body and language are always incongruous, then a silent
woman 'speaks' only the language of her body: that is, the language
of consent. Mary, insisting that silence does not equal consent
with her (175), asserts herself as an individual, separate from pastoral
definitions, and in so doing momentarily shatters the pastoral contract.
Jem is forced to flee, stopping only to threaten Mary with responsibility
for any decline in his character.
Mary's refusal is her final attempt to escape the structures
of the pastoral contract. A series of incidents preceding Jem's
proposal indicates Mary's previous efforts to escape through non-
participation. From her first appearance, Mary's behaviour reveals
her acute awareness of the pastoral contract. Within minutes of
entering the novel, Mary is seen slapping Jem's face for having kissed
her. Mary is "blushing rosy red, more with anger than shame"(47),
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and it is not surprising. 31 Being only, as we are told, a girl of
thirteen, Mary is resolutely determined not to implicate herself
in a pastoral contract at such a young age. She is aware of the
ways in which to keep herself free of its constraints. Having overheard
a conjecture that Jem is her sweetheart, Mary refuses to answer Jem's
next speech (49). In the same way, when John Barton suggests that
Jem and Mary share a tea-cup [oblivious to the sexual connotations
a sharing would have for the adolescent Mary whom he still terms
'little'(44)], Mary "secretly determine[s] to take care that Alice
brought her [own] tea-cup and saucer, if the alternative was to
be her sharing anything with Jem."(51)
When Mary finally does speak to Jem she could have predicted
(and probably did) his definition of her speech. Mary visits the
Wilson home when she hears of the death of their twin sons. Responding
to Jem's deep sorrow, she offers her comfort. Jem immediately feels
a "strange leap of joy in his heart . . . it . . . was happiness,
was bliss, to be so spoken to by Mary."(119) Mary's subsequent response
to Jem's revealed feelings is "unfeigned distress, almost amounting
to vexation"(119), a response which Jem reads as repugnance. But
Mary's repugnance reveals not a loathing of Jem in particular, but
an unwillingness to ratify the pastoral contract in which Jem attempts
to engage her. To respond verbally to a statement such as Jem's
is, as Mary recognises, tantamount to an agreement to be governed
by the rules of the pastoral contract.
What Mary does not realise is that she is powerless to influence
the progression of the pastoral contract. No matter how many times
she avoids addressing Jem (120;133;161) she is inextricably caught
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by the contract's rules and definitions. Indeed Mary herself accords
with the contract in her relationship with Harry Carson. She feels
herself "as good as engaged to be married"(120) to Carson, even though
all of the speech has been articulated by Carson not herself. At
this point Mary, though aware of the existence of the pastoral contract,
is ignorant of its true nature, and the position to which she is
assigned within it. This ignorance is seen at work in Mary's meeting
with Carson when she decides to break off their relationship. Mary
states her intentions clearly, but Carson insists, to her puzzlement,
on misunderstanding her. Mary does not realise that, according to
the rules of the pastoral contract, women do not speak unless to
ratify the contract. To assert uninvolvement is not only confusing,
but contradictory - no matter what Mary says, the language of her
body/presence, as perceived by Carson, articulates consent. He considers
her rejection a "charming caprice"(186); it is inconceivable that
he would read the rejection in a way which undermined the foundation
of the contract.
Carson is unaware of Mary's semi-understanding of the contract's
terms. Though on the one hand, Mary accepts responsibility for engender-
ing love in a man32 [N.B. Mary's relief at realising that she need
not feel "penitent"(183) for arousing Carson's love once she realises
its shallow nature], she operates on the belief that she can discriminate
between those who profess to love her. Essentially Mary believes
she has the right to 'action', in the form of rejection, as long
as that rejection is clearly articulated.
But more important than Mary's inadequate grasp of the pastoral
contract's terms is that this ignorance appears to flourish despite
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her evident knowledge of the reasons for its very existence. The
novel reverberates with the power of what can be termed the myth
of sexuality. It is the power of this myth that dictates each character's
response to the murder. Mary believes that "passionate feeling"(300)
can ignite the murderous impulse; Job believes Jem's "blood has been
up"(305) and so accepts that a murder could occur; Carson finds it
easiest to hate a murderer when he "imagine[s] him a young man, full
of lusty life, defying all laws, human and divine"(439), but acting
in accordance with the 'laws' of passion as the myth perpetuates
them. Indeed, the novel's structure is the most overt 'proof' of
the power of the myth: once raised, the issue of passion cannot
be abandoned. The rest of the novel is not the 'solving' of Carson's
murder, but the expiation of Mary's more frightening sexual crime.
The depiction of Mary Barton's gradual initiation and integration
into the pastoral contract is a process which ensures that both the
passion, so all powerful that it needs the pastoral contract to define
it, and the woman who unleashed it, are again regulated by the rules
of pastoral discourse.
The expediency with which Mary is made to toe the pastoral line
testifies to the alarm which surrounds the breaking of the pastoral
contract. Mary not only immediately discovers that Jem is indeed
the man she loves, but she is soon attempting to ratify the contract
Jem extended to her by writing a letter (189). Though Mary declares
she does not intend to write a courting letter (189), her indignation
at the accusation that she is, hints at her conscious knowledge that
discourse, no matter what the subject matter, equals overt consent
to the pastoral contract. Mary's impulse here recalls her mistaken
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assumption that a woman's articulated discourse has an important
and influential role in the pastoral contract. But Margaret Legh
knows better: she advises that passivity by suggesting that Mary
must "wait and be patient"(190). Her advice is appropriate of course.
Jem will soon enough re-read the language which Mary's body offers. 33
From this point Mary's re-integration into the pastoral contract
conducts itself along exemplary lines. The revelation that Carson's
murder is economically, not sexually, motivated, causes not the slightest
hesitancy in Mary's conviction that she needs sexual re-tutoring.
In the terms of the pastoral contract, a deviation is none the less
serious because it does not lead to the outbreak of passion. It
is Mary's duty and her right (340) to save Jem because she must be
seen to destroy any vestiges of her potential to untie passion/sexuality
from its pastoral constrictions. Such an undertaking might be expected
to require much vigorous action on Mary's part, but Gaskell is careful
to show that though Mary must 'exert' herself, that exertion is accomplish-
ed in a manner compliant to the pastoral definition of women. Accordingly,
Mary's actions are compared to those of 'The Constant Woman' whose
unsteady hand and poor eye (311) introduces the reader to Mary's
method of exculpating Jem. She possesses "weak powers"(324) which
seem barely adequate for her needs. But Mary's 'activities' are
not an integral part of her powers. It is as the pastoral woman,
one based on passivity and silence, that Mary is most effective.
In a world where the actual actions needed to exculpate Jem are performed
by men ( the boatmen who row down the river; Will's testimony; the
young Charley who guides Mary through the strangeness of the Liverpool
pierhead), Mary wisely allows the pastoral contract to work for her.
110
It is her "patience . . . [and] perhaps her silence"(356) which gets
her the necessary row boat to chase the John Cropper; her "little
acknowledgement of inferiority"(349) and her willingness to "propriate"(350)
that decides Charley to help her. Indeed, so powerful is the pastoral
contract's definition of women that other women respond enthusiastically
to a Mary acting (or rather not acting) according to its strictures.
It is Mary's "humble, self-abased words"(282) that finally spur Jane
Wilson to relent in her condemnation of Mary. Similarly, it is Mary's
admission that she has done wrong which allows Margaret to view her
once again as the "same, sweet, faulty, impulsive, lovable creature
she had known in the former Mary Barton."(318)
In accordance with the de-privileging of female action in the
pastoral contract, once Mary has succeeded in contacting Will Wilson
her vigour begins its steady decline into passivity. Significantly,
that diminishment manifests itself in a decreasing power of articulation.
Mary's words seem "not her own, and beyond her power of control"(361);
indeed nothing seems to "signify"(361) to Mary at all: streets,
names, nothing is meaningful. She is losing her ability to decode
signs, the basis of the ability to articulate language, and so chooses
to keep silent out of dislike for speaking. (378)
In this context of diminishing power of articulation, the necessity
for Mary to testify in court gains new significance. She exerts
"every power she had to keep in the full understanding of what was
going on"(389), and of what she is saying, in order to ensure she
does not reveal the identity of the murderer. But Mary's testimony
not only reveals that she is adhering to the rules of the 'familial
contract' which Gaskell has privileged above the legal contract with
111
such care and ve.11em6Acz, The testimony is also Mary's final punishment
for her previous attempts to opt out of the pastoral contract by
re-defining her position within it. As such a cleansing, it is necessary
that Mary be forced to articulate in language what is generally encoded
in the submerged language of the body: her sexual desire and preference
for a specific individual. Mary must articulate clearly "what every
woman usually whispers with blushes and tears, and many hesitations"(390)
because it it her previous insistence on her right to articulate
which transgressed the pastoral rules of discourse. Mary, understanding
and accepting the punishment, does not allow "feminine shame"(390)
to stop her declaration, and it her willingness to endure exposure
and subjugation that transforms her into an exemplary 'pastoral'
woman. Jem, realising the significance of Mary's speech, stands
"erect and firm"(392) - Mary's translation into the pastoral woman
re-asserts his own male identity.
Having testified, Mary is free to undergo a 're-birth' which
guarantees her status as a pastoral woman. She suffers a nervous
breakdown which pushes her back into a pre-articulate stage of conscious-
ness: "[Sight] and hearing [are] no longer channels of information
to that poor distracted brain, nor could human voice penetrate to
her understanding."(401) After a long respite in this stage, mary
makes a rapid transition from childhood to sexual awareness which
conforms to the pastoral contract. Moving from the "tender state
of a lately-born infant"(416) through to a "look of memory and intell-
igence"(416), Mary is re-initiated into a sexual consciousness (she
blushes a bright red when she sees Jem looking at her) characterised
by softness, gentleness and a predilection for silence. (418)
Appropriately, it is Jem who witnesses this rebirth, he whose pastoral
contract was rejected, and who responds correctly to the emergent
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sexual consciousness by leaving the room. (416) When Mary completes
her recovery, their 'pastoral contract' is evidently sealed: Mary
is full "of love and confidence"(418) and Jem feels "no uneasiness"(418)
as to the state of their affairs.
Having 'mended' and so upheld the pastoral contract, Gaskell
is free to tie up the loose economic ends of the issues she has
raised. John Barton makes his re-entry at precisely this moment
(412), and the problems he brings with him are rapidly dealt with
by the reconciliation effected with Carson. Although this reconciliation,
and the last four chapters of text which outline it, have been criticised
as an over-simplistic 'solution' to the economic issues presented
in Mary Barton, the ending is in fact true to the terms of the contract
which has dominated the second half of the text. Whilst the reconcil-
iation scene itself operates on newly-forged rules of discourse between
the social classes, the emigration of Mary and Jem to Canada is not
an aberration. Rather it is a literal return to the world of the
pastoral for the two characters whose relationship has evolved into
a model of the pastoral contract.
The ending of Mary Barton also raises the issue of Esther, whose
presence on the surface appears to subvert the pastoral contract.
If Mary must undergo extensive tutoring and punishment for her early
transgression of the pastoral, why does Esther the prostitute escape
such condemnation? To answer this question, it is first necessary
to ascertain the nature or definition of the crime which Esther has
committed by becoming a prostitute. From the beginning, it would
seem that Esther's 'sexuality' is defined primarily in economic terms:
she is recognised as a prostitute by her dress (42;169) in much
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the same way that a 'lady' is recognised by her clothing. Indeed,
Esther's actual motivation for prostitution is economic - she turns
to it in order to provide for her child. (210) It is because _
Esther's sexuality is economically activated that she can be forgiven.
Though Esther feels like the "unholy Lady Geraldine" (293), Gaskell
asserts her human dignity and her right to be re-integrated into
society. Esther's self-blame is not supported by the text in the
way that Mary's is. Where Mary is shown to be correct in blaming
herself for her potential involvement in crime, Esther's hatred of
her "violent and unregulated nature"(290) is shown to be the cause
of social isolation (291) and in need of correction. Though Esther
is a prostitute, her behaviour reveals her basic adherence to the
pastoral contract. Her tale of seduction and abandonment, her rev-
elation that the man involved had "promised [her] marriage"(209)
shows that unlike Mary, Esther apparently conformed to the pastoral
contract: a man offers marriage and Esther acts accordingly. She
cannot be blamed for a subsequent withdrawal of the terms of the
pastoral contract by the man involved. In fact her continued observation
of the pastoral definition of woman [she is humble (171); ashamed
(292); and passively accepts being an outcast (290)] guarantees that
she is not forced to undergo extensive punishment. Esther's interment
in a single grave with John Barton symbolises the common, forgivable,
ground of economics which here literally unites them.
The willingness with which overtly 'economic' sexuality is not
judged can also be seen in a minor exchange between Mrs. Sturgis
and her husband. Mrs Sturgis, presented with the near unconscious
Mary by her husband, immediately ponders if Mary is "a bad one"(377),
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in exactly the same way that Mrs Jones suspects Mary to be involved
in a love affair "of not the most creditable kind"(346). Nevertheless,
both women are willing to help Mary, and are not deterred by their
suspicions. Their willingness might seem surprising in a novel which
judges Mary so harshly. But, if a prostitute, Mary is not a threat
to the pastoral contract in the way she is when she refuses to comply.
That Gaskell's depiction of the evolution of a prostitute is a reflection
of the actual situation for many Victorian prostitutes, suggests
that prostitution, far from being a transgression of the pastoral
contract on a woman's part, can be considered one of the contract's
consequences.
This last possibility leads us to the only criticism of the
pastoral contract which Gaskell ventures in the course of Mary Barton.
If Gaskell can envisage only one role for women which accords with
the pastoral rules, she recognises that men have more options. Gaskell
is careful to outline the moral status of these options, but she
is powerless to evoke a punishment for those roles she views with
distaste. In simple terms, men have two options within the pastoral
contract. They can take their role 'seriously' as do Jem and Will
Wilson, or they can 'dally' with the role. The first attitude is
seen to be conuendable: both Jem and Will articulate their offers
of marriage in good faith, and seem unwilling to articulate an offer
unless circumstances appear to render them favourable.(225) Jem
waits until Mary's offer of condolence at his brothers' deaths suggests
warm regard for him; Will patiently waits until Margaret seems open
to a proposal.
The alternative approach is exemplified in Harry Carson's multiple
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flirtations. Harry's sisters, discussing his behaviour, outline
the effects that 'dalliance' with the contract can have, and thereby
prove that the pastoral contract transcends class. 34
 The passage
is worth quoting:
I do think he is behaving wrongly. The more
I think of it the more sure I am that she
[a Jane Richardson] thinks he means something,
and that he intends her to think so . . .
As soon as he leaves off paying her
attention . . . she will have many and many a
heartache, and then she will harden herself
into being a flirt. Poor girl! . . . I think
he hardly knows the misery, the crimes to which
indulged vanity may lead him.(256)
The passage is a microcosm of the pastoral contract itself: a man
speaks, and a woman reads it as commitment, a reading which the man
can choose to ratify or not. Should he choose ratification, all
goes well. But if he does not, 'crime' must inevitably follow.
As Harry's sister is aware, that 'crime' and misery attaches to the
woman not the man. It is Miss Richardson, not Carson, who will experience
the heartache. More interestingly, the passage pinpoints the place
at which the discernible effects of the pastoral contract alter with
class. Where Esther, in the same situation as the unfortunate Miss
Richardson, evolves into a prostitute because her economic status
makes it necessary, Miss Richardson will evolve into 'a flirt', the
equivalent in all but economic terms (she will not get paid) to a
prostitute. Sophy Carson's use of the term 'crime' suggests that
being responsible for the existence of a flirt is a grave offence.
The crime is of course not what becomes of the woman denied the pastoral
contract, but the denial of the contract itself. Whether flirt or
prostitute, the cause of a woman's change in status is a male crime.
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Gaskell knowing the effects of male dalliance with the pastoral contract,
condemns Harry Carson for his actions. But his murder is not part
of that condemnation. Carson's importance in the text rests more
overtly on his part in the familial contract which transcends class
(hence his murder leads to class conciliation). His flouting of
the male position in the pastoral contract remains a submerged, but
none the less significant, issue which is never consciously analyzed.
Finally, it is vital to recognise the degree to which the pastoral
contract is integral to the familial contract which Gaskell so vehemently,
and unquestioningly, upholds. Once Mary has proven her succesful
re-integration into the pastoral contract, it is still necessary
to display the complementary nature of the two contracts. Jem is
unsuccessful in his first attempt at convincing his mother of the
compatability of the pastoral and familial contracts. His mistake
is to appeal to his ability to transcend the mythic power of sexual
love. But his query, "Why should you think I've only room for one
in my heart?"(409), is met with a silence to be expected in a novel
which depicts a universal belief in the all-consuming and destructive
power of sexual love. His second attempt is felicitous since he
appeals to the family ( and so, the familial contract) which will
be the inevitable result of his pastoral contract with Mary. (410)
Jane accepts sexual love when it is placed in the 'safe' context
of the family, and the final scene of Mary Barton in which Jem and
his family are depicted in a unified group awaiting the arrival of
another family, verifies the belief in the pastoral contract's ability
to transform sexuality into the basis of the familial contract.
Gaskell's complete support for the pastoral contract does not
continue uncriticised into her subsequent novels. What the reader
encounters instead is a gradual awareness of, first the existence
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of the contract, and secondly, its constraints upon women. Subse-
quent chapters will explore Gaskell's confrontation with 'defin-
itions'of women. Whilst Mary Barton conveys a limited grasp of the
effects of gender, the novel itself provides what proves to be a
stimulating and effective method of analysis: rules of discourse,
and the social contracts which underlie them.
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the bonds of marriage. Her return to nurse Arthur is presented as
an illustration of Helen's Christian piety, but it also makes sense
in terms of the pastoral contract. If women are 'guilty' of arousing
male passion, Helen's return to Arthur constitutes her effort to
assuage that guilt by caring for a man who is otherwise detestable.
In Jane Eyre (1847), too, one can see the influence of the pastoral
contract. Though Jane does decide to leave Rochester once she knows
of the existence of Bertha Mason, her leavetaking is not entirely
positive in her eyes. She abhors herself, is bereft of self-respect,
and hateful to herself. Such intense feelings suggest that, despite
her belief in the rightness of leaving Rochester, Jane maintains
a sense of guilt which can perhaps be attributed to the pastoral
contract. Having aroused sexual passion, and yet found herself unable
to 'legitimise' that passion through marriage, Jane must assume guilty
responsibility. Her subsequent three days of isolation can be read
as both punishment for this sexual responsibility, and as a cleansing
of the sexual guilt which ultimately allows her to return to Rochester
when marriage is once again possible.
33
Harold Toliver, Pastoral Forms and Attitudes, (London: University
of California Press, 1971), comments on the behaviour pr&scribed
for those involved in the world of the pastoral. He states that
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"stylized courtship and reluctance in pursuit are often the credentials
for success, while aggression . . . is cause for exile . . ."(25)
34itI  s interesting to note that Mary is the only working class
character who does not speak the Manchester dialect accorded to the
other working- class characters in the novel. Whilst this may suggest
Gaskell's decision to have a more 'acceptable' middle-class heroine,
it also indicates the degree to which Mary's situation and actions
can be viewed as 'archetypal.' Although contemporary opinion articulated
a belief in the greater lewdness and sexual vulgarity of the working
classes, Mary's 'neutral' middle-class speech suggests that Gaskell
does not view her sexual predicament as exclusive to the working-
classes. That Jem Wilson gradually utilises a more middle-class accent
too, consolidates the suggestion that he and Mary are a 'represent-
ative' couple, standing for the sexual or pastoral contract completely,
and not just as members of their overt class.
35	 .
Monica Correa Fryckstedt, Elizabeth Gaskell's Mary Barton 
and Ruth: A Challenge to  Christian England, (Stockholm: Almgvist
and Wiksell International, 1982).
36Ibid., 91.
Chapter Four: Ruth (1853)
Ruth is probably the most difficult of Gaskell's novels for
the modern reader to come to terms with. Whereas the critical labell-
ing of Mary Barton as a 'social novel' may produce readings which
are limited, the 'fallen woman' tag that comes attached to Ruth pre-
conditions the modern reader's response more significantly. Before
one begins to read one expects to encounter a novel earnestly arguing
for an enlightened reaction to what the modern sensibility may no
longer consider to be an interesting social problem, let alone a
sin. When one then meets Gaskell's particularly religious approach
to the novel, one tends to agree that Ruth "no longer speaks for
itself, n1 and that because of "the deep religiosity of its tone,!,2
Ruth has become "the least readable of Mrs. Gaskell's novels." 3
The modern response to Ruth has certainly engendered a number
of studies which dig deep into the structure and content of the novel
in an attempt to pinpoint precisely what it is about Gaskell's handling
of the 'fallen woman' theme that makes Ruth so unpalatable for modern
tastes. After all, we know that Ruth is in many respects a pioneering
novel in its treatment of the fallen woman. Gaskell's portrayal
of the child, Leonard, as a means of redemption, and her decision
to allow Ruth to reject Bellingham's marriage proposal were both
innovations to the fallen woman theme. Fryckstedt argues that it
is Gaskell's aim for Ruth which renders it ultimately flawed and
repellent to modern tastes. She approaches Ruth as a social document
through which Gaskell hoped to challenge the sexual double standard
123
124
operating in Victorian society by uncovering the 'facts' surrounding
the fallen woman. 5
Accordingly, Fryckstedt concentrates on the area of Victorian
attitudes to prostitution; its relation to their views on the sexuality
of men and women; the rehabilitation of prostitutes in penitentiaries
and Gaskell's personal interest in the effects of such institutions;
and finally the working conditions of dressmakers' apprentices.
Fryckstedt concludes that those parts of Ruth which are the most
abhorrent to modern readers are the result of Gaskell's attempt to
sweeten the bitter pill of social facts as she presents them by occasion-
ally conceding to the conventional morality of her day. Thus, in
order to retain readers who would find it "too shocking to meet a
street-walker as a heroine," 6 Gaskell presents Ruth as a seduced
innocent. In the process, and "in her anxiety to palliate the negative
reactions" 7 she anticipates, Gaskell attributes an unconvincingly
extreme innocence and ignorance to her heroine. 8 Similarly, Ruth's
death, probably the most unsavoury aspect of the novel, is "no doubt,
a concession to the conventional attitude of [Gaskell's] severest
readers," 9
 as well as Gaskell's way of avoiding repelling those readers
who would be alarmed at a fallen woman's successful social rehabilitation.
Other critics suggest that it is Gaskell's "cemdtment to certain
religious principles" 10 which is the source of Ruth's flaws. Ganz
suggests that Gaskell views Ruth's sexual fall as a divine rather
than social transgression. From such a standpoint, Gaskell's original
intention of challenging social attitudes to sexual offences in women
becomes less and less evident as she concentrates on Ruth's spiritual
salvation. As a consequence, the social ostracism which Gaskell
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initially set out to criticise as nothing more than the result of
the double standard, becomes more and more associated with divine
retribution or the testing necessary for Ruth's spiritual salvation.
As Ganz suggests, "the very possibility that social condemnation
reflects divine retribution will make it progressively more difficult
for [Gaskell] to challenge such manifestations of it as Ruth is forced
to endure." 11 In such a context, Ruth's death is not a concession
to contemporary conventional morality, but the result of Gaskell's
gradual equation of social with divine atonement.
Both avenues of approach point to what appears to be at the
centre of Ruth's flawed narrative: the confusion which results when
circumstantial or socially-initiated transgression is punished with
a religious intensity better suited to 'sin.' Nevertheless, where
both approaches prove unsatisfactory is in the degree to which they
fail to point out how inextricably tied the problems of Ruth are
to contemporary attitudes and conceptions of women (in particular
Gaskell's understanding of the significance of the 'double standard')
and the resulting limited number of alternatives available to Gaskell
when she chooses to investigate one such conception, the fallen woman.
Gaskell's Unitarian background makes the 'fallen woman' an almost
inevitable choice for her consideration. With the Unitarian stress
on rationality and the right of each individual to have access to
the information necessary for him/her to make informed, rational
moral decisions, the contemporary attitude to fallen women as unpardonable
sinners and deserving outcasts shouts out for investigation. Certainly
other Unitarians were interested in the subject. W.R. Greg, writing
in the Westminster Review, was only one of many voices contributing
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to the current discussion on prostitution and its causes and effects. 12
His conclusions on the ways in which women became prostitutes suggest
that in many cases a lack of knowledge and inappropriate education
is responsible. He speaks of two 'classes' of prostitutes, those
who because of a "defective or injudicious education" 13
 can be flattered
by the attentions of those above them in station, and those who 'fall'
from "pure unknowingness" 14 of what constitutes proper manners between
the sexes. Other reasons for recourse to prostitution range from
those who have no choice because their parents before them were prostitutes
themselves, to those who turned to prostitution because of abject
poverty. 15
Such causes of prostitution were certain to aggrieve the Unitarian
mind since they reveal that it is the absence of a proper, fitting
education, along with the significant weight of circumstances, both
potentially rectifiable, that cause women to 'fall.' At the same
time, Greg, like Gaskell and others, saw the situation exacerbated
by the existence of the double standard which sees "a whole life
of indulgence on the part of one sex as venial and natural, and a
single false step on the part of the other as irretrievable and unpard-
onable." 16 Greg's response to what he presented as the cause of
prostitution was however to suggest, not a broadening of education
for the women so victimised, but perversely a curtailing of the materials
available to male children in an attempt to repress the 'natural'
urge to satisfy sexual feeling and so shrink the demand for prostitutes. 17
This circumscription was to be accompanied by, amongst other things,
an improvement in the general economic status of working women by
providing them with better jobs, and a plea for the continued application
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of the controversial Contagious Diseases Act. 18 Though Greg advocates
that social ostracism as punishment for sexual transgression be
transferred from the seduced to the seducer, at no time does he suggest
the need for educational reforms for girls and women.
Gaskell's tactic in Ruth is substantially different. Her care
to point out the circumstantial nature of Ruth's fall is evident
from the beginning of her narrative. She quickly establishes her
belief in the power of individual circumstance to shape the progress
of life itself:
The daily life unto which people are
born, and into which they are absorbed
before they are well aware, forms
chains which only on in a hundred
has moral strength enough to despise,
and to break when the right time comes.19
Couple this with the orphaned Ruth's position as a dressmaker's
apprentice, the "unnatural mode of existence"(9) it entails, and
Gaskell's painstaking efforts to show the reader that Mrs Mason,
choosing to believe each of her apprentices had both friends and
activities to entertain her each Sunday and so making no provisions
to ensure either physical comfort or spiritual guidance on that day,
was the type of woman whom Greg and others such as the anonymous
writer of the "Milliners' Apprentices" 20
 partly held responsible
for the 'falling away' of many women, and we quickly see that Gaskell
gave 'circumstances' a prominent role in the progress of a young
woman's life.
But more importantly, Gaskell decides to stress the importance
of education in the lives of girls such as Ruth. We learn that Ruth
had never
received any cautions or words of advice
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respecting the subject of a woman's life-
if indeed, wise parents ever directly
speak of what, in its depth and power,
cannot be put into words -- which is a
brooding spirit with no definite form
or shape that men should know it, but
which is there, and present before we
have recognised and realised its
existence. (43)
In other words, Ruth is entirely ignorant of both love and sex, and
indeed, has no way of recognising the symptoms of falling in love.
She was "young, and innocent, and motherless"(56), and so completely
lacking in knowledge of the proper behaviour between men and women
(never mind the mechanics of sex) that her fall can only be seen
as the result of social circumstances. By her economic situation,
her unfinished education and her 'pure unknowingness', Ruth fulfills
three of Greg's six categories of women likely to fall, and so is
three times more likely to fall than most other women.
Critics, past and present, have lamented Ruth's extreme
innocence and ignorance. Some, like the reviewer in Sharpe's London 
Magazine, doubted the very existence of such purity, 21 and so dismissed
Ruth as "not a veritable type of her class. 22" Others such as G.H.Lewes
considered that "[t]he guilt . . . of Ruth is accompanied by such
entire ignorance of evil, and by such a combination of fatalities,
that even the sternest of provincial moralists could hardly be harsh
with her". 23 Still, even these criticisms could be countered by
the comment that Ruth's innocence and subsequent fall were deliberately
selected to prove Gaskell's contention: the education of girls and
young women was reprehensible because of the silence with which it
evaded 'the' subject of a woman's life: romantic and sexual knowledge.
But such a refutation of one of the most recurrent crititisms levelled
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against Ruth is impossible, for Gaskell does not dramatise, or consciously
advocate, the broadening of a young woman's education to include
the sexual knowledge which dictates her heroine's fall.
Part of the responsibility for Gaskell's apparent evasion of
the issue must lie, not with her determination to show the social
origins of Ruth's sexual transgression, but with the images and language
available to her with which to dramatise Ruth's socially-determined
sin. The imagery and language can be divided into three separate,
though inter-connected, categories: the natural, the pastoral and
the paradisal. The very first image of Ruth is a natural one. Pent
up in Mrs Mason's establisment, Ruth uses the few moments of reprieve
from work allowed her to press up against the very physical boundaries
of her work place - the building's walls - much like a bird in a
cage (4). Her view is of a tree which once flourished in a large
lawn but which now, like Ruth in Mason's home, is pent up (Gaskell
uses the same word to describe both the girl's and the tree's physical
situation) in the flagstones which comprise the backyard (5). From
this point, Ruth is continually associated with nature. She chooses
the darkest, draughtiest corner of the sewing room in which to work
because of the view it affords of a now faded panel of painted flowers
(6), the closest equivalent to the real flowers of her past home
which Ruth can find inside Mason's home. She relishes the visit
to the garden of her old home (45), and revels in the natural splendour
of the Welsh countryside (64). She is constantly associated with
flowers, from the camellia Bellingham offers her (17) to the water-
lilies he places in her hair.
Gaskell is obviously trying to use the association with nature
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to demonstrate Ruth's innocence. The echoes of Wordworth's "Tintern
Abbey" reverberate around Ruth's association with nature and intiate
Gaskell's attempt to parallel Ruth's innocence here with the bygone
innocence of the narrator of Wordsworth's poem. If Ruth's situation
is similar to that of the flagstone-trapped larch in Mason's back
garden, then the fact that the grass had once grown "caressingly
up its very trunk" (5), and the echo with Wordsworth's poem that evokes, 24
suggests that hers is an innocence locked by circumstances which
led to her city living. Similarly, the reference to Ruth's time
in Wales with Bellingham as one which the present was "all in all"(75),
and feeling and loving (73) constituted its main elements, suggest
again a parallel to the innocent narrator of Wordsworth's poem.
Undermining the establishment of innocence however is another
aspect of the natural image Gaskell chooses to utilise. If Ruth
is unconscious of the past and future, content to dwell in the present,
she seems equally unconscious of herself. Living in the present
breeds not only a "child-like dependence on others"(79) and a child-
like nature (Ruth associates Mrs Bellingham's arrival with Mrs Mason
much in the manner of a child equating fear with an early, first
figure of dread), it also generates an alarming fluidity of self
which verges on extinction. Ruth can view herself and never think
of associating the reflection with her own self. The reflection
and what it tells her is "abstract, and removed from herself."(73)
Similarly, when Bellingham is ill, Ruth's senses "seemed to have
passed into the keeping of the invalid, and to feel only as he felt"(82).
She becomes such an unsubstantial self whilst Bellingham is ill tht
she moves "as if she were a vision"(82), and surprises Mrs Bellingham
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as a "white apparition which seemed to rise out of the ground"(84).
Ruth can seem a cypher, not the living sixteen year old she is.
Gaskell's other images involve a similar undermining or quali-
fying of the innocence which she is trying to establish. Ruth's
visit to her old home, Milham Grange, with Bellingham is a case in
point. Gaskell is attempting two things at once here. On the one
hand, the visit reasserts Ruth's innocence by connecting her to a
way of life so innocently paradisal that the man-made and the natural
have forged into one. The gables of the grange are "blended"(45)
with, or pass imperceptibly into, the green growing vines of roses
and creepers. Indeed so wholly given to nature is this Wordsworthian
'pastoral farm' that human and animal inhabitants share equally the
living space which the cottage provides. The old couple who once
helped Ruth's father now occupy the back part of the cottage, whilst
the birds occupy the front. At the same time, as the chapter title
"Treading in Perilous Places" announces, Gaskell is attempting to
relay a sense of Ruth's iliEdnent elopement with Bellingham, and connect
it with the faulty education received at her home. The long passage
describing the desolation of what was once Ruth's daily existence
- content and safe in her parents' love and guidance with added help
from Thomas's didactic tales taken from Pilgrim's Progress - suggest
that Gaskell is again asserting the circumstantial nature of Ruth's
forthcoming fall. Had the scenario, now vanished, of family life
persisted, Ruth would not have turned ignorantly and innocently to
Bellingham.
But it is not the possible social causes of 'falling' to which
this long passage refers which dominate the chapter at all. Rather,
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the cumulative effect of small phrases which occur in the opening
of the chapter is to suggest that Ruth's fall is caused not by her
social circumstances, but is implicit in her gender. The phrases,
only three in number, redolent as they are of Milton's Garden of
Eden, are powerful enough to throw off the sense of innocent nature
which they are intended to evoke, and replace them with an image
of Ruth as Eve, superficially innocent perhaps, but inherently sinful.
The cottage with its "untrimmed garden"(45) is a "picturesque mass
of irregularity"(45), whilst the garden itself abounds in "luxuriant
and overgrown shrubs"(49) through which Ruth "wound in and out in
natural, graceful, wavy lines"(49). From this to the "flow'ry Arbors.../
• . . with branches overgrown" 25 which characterises Milton's pastoral
paradise is not a large step. Indeed, Gaskell here perhaps unconsciously
echoes phrases from Milton's text. The weaving path which Ruth negotiates
in the garden and the luxurious shrubs recall both the zig-zagging
movements of Satan throughout Paradise Lost, and Milton's depiction
of the Garden of Eden as fruitful and prolific to the point of disorder
and chaos.
The description of Ruth's past home life collapses under the
accumulated weight of the Miltonic, paradisal references, with the
result that the carefully established social conditions of Ruth's
forthcoming fall disintegrate. Ruth becomes at some deep, barely
articulated, level associated with the inherent sinfulness of Eve.
Indeed, the association necessitates a re-reading of a scene which
initially seemed primarily to indicate the annihilation of salf whin
accompanied some of Gaskell's chosen natural images. Ruth's detach-
ment from the reflection of herself in the pond now finds a disturbing
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parallel in Eve's own inability to associate self with reflection.26
Indeed, Ruth's much earlier dream in which Bellingham hands her flower
after flower (18) is now coloured by its similarity to Eve's dream
of a gentle voice which tempts her to a midnight walk, and the plucking
of the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge. 27
 In this context, Old Thomas's
dire but unhelpful biblical exhortations to Ruth indicate not only
the unsuitable education Ruth has received (the biblical language
is incapable of warning Ruth of sexual peril; she can think only
of childish visions of lions' heads), but signposts the shift that
Gaskell has made, however unconsciously, from the land of social
realism to the land of biblical destiny.
The discomforting shift made, Gaskell seems unable to reassert
her original thesis that Ruth's fall is socially engineered. Indeed,
if her subsequent dramatisation of Benson's supposedly rehabilitative
approach to Ruth is anything to measure by, Gaskell herself seems
unaware of the undermining tendency of the images she has invoked.
Considering her stress on the role that ignorance plays in Ruth's
seduction, one expects that at least part of Benson's rehabilitation
programme would include a restructuring of Ruth's education so as
to include the type of guidance Gaskell found wanting. Ruth does
certainly gain an education; she is seen at her lessons under Benson's
tutelage, and her subsequent post as the Bradshaw's governess along
with her decision to undertake Leonard's education indicates her
success in them. But though Ruth may have learnt history and maths,
the whole of the Benson's household, from occupants to surroundings,
seems calculated to perpetuate the very ignorance which led to Ruth's
seduction.
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The description of Ruth's bedroom warns the reader that Ruth
has returned, or rather has never left, the world of natural, flowery
images with which Gaskell indicated her sexual ignorance. The bedroom
"had something of the colouring and purity of effect of a snowdrop;
while the floor. . . suggested the idea of the garden mould out of
which the snowdrop grows."(136) More disturbingly, the Benson house
as a whole seems to be firmly in the tradition of the pastoral paradise.
The very flowers "forced themselves almost into the room"(139) in
a manner similar to the obliging nature found in images of garden
paradises such as Marvell's "The Garden." All of this at a first
reading seems nothing more than Gaskell's efforts to present the
Benson's world as unthreateningly kind and co-operative. Nevertheless,
the effect, in combination with the garden scene at Milham Grange
and the previous connections of flowers with Ruth's sexual destiny,
is once again to place Ruth, not in the context of defective social
conditioning which can be corrected, but in the context of the traditional
biblical images which surround inherently sinful sexuality.
Of course Ruth has already fallen and this must influence our
reading of the garden imagery here. If Ruth once inhabited the hortus 
conclusus of Milton's Garden of Eden, and so was fated iz fall because
of woman's role in that garden, she seems now to have been transplanted
to a hortus conclusus of another sort, the 'walled garden' of family
life as outlined by Houghton. 28 If this garden is a sacred place
in which "certain virtues too easily crushed by modern life could
ibe preserved," 29 it s also the place where sexuality, "the skeleton
in the parental chamber," 30
 is securely walled by the boundaries
of a family life which stresses or recognises only its procreative
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function. The "full luxuriance in a little square wall-encircled
garden"(206) is no longer an omen of Ruth's sinful sexuality. Rather,
because Ruth's importance, once seduced, quickly alters from that
of an ignorant innocent girl to that of a mother who must do her
best for her child, the luxuriance is a sign of the positive fertility
(ie. Leonard) that will lead to Ruth's redemption. Accordingly,
we hear very little from this point on of Ruth's ignorance on the
subject of a woman's life. As far as actual facts are concerned,
Ruth's only knowledge of what constitutes proper behaviour between
the sexes is not acquired through education, but is presumably deduced
from her knowledge of what is undesirable behaviour as attested to
by various individuals who comment on her relationship with Bellingham
in Wales. The Bensons, as Ruth's champions, certainly provide no
model of education as 'preventative medicine.' Indeed, the goodness
and purity which are depicted as the main Characteristics of the
Benson household are clearly described as the result not of education
or knowledge, but of a strict adherence to rules. Gaskell presents
a household comprised of members whose "lives were pure and good,
not merely from a lovely and beautiful nature, but from some law,
the obedience to which was, of itself, harmonious peace, and which
governed them almost implicitly, and with as little questioning on
their part, as the glorious stars which haste not, rest not, in their
eternal obedience."(141) There is no mention of education or knowledge
here. Indeed, the phrase 'governed . . . implicitly' suggests a
degree of unconsciousness which is distressingly akin to the ignorant
innocence pleaded for Ruth. If Ruth comes to the Benson's "living
in the bright present, and strangely forgetful of the past or future"(130)
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in a way which her ignorant innocence has necessitated, it is hardly
surprising that she is later approvingly described as "learning neither
to look backwards nor forwards, but to live faithfully and earnestly
for the present"(176). Having merely exchanged one garden for another,
how can one expect Ruth to have progressed?
The confusion in Gaskell's mind to which all of this attests
can be pinpointed to a type of ignorance on her own part: the ignorance
of what exactly, in challenging the traditional conception of the
'fallen woman,' she is tackling. Critics do agree that Gaskell sets
out to attack the double standard of sexual behaviour. 31 But none
investigate Gaskell's understanding of it. If Ruth represents Gaskell's
thinking on this issue, then we can see that she saw her task as
one of rebalancing. Because the double standard dictated that a
sexual transgression on a woman's part was an irretrievable error
and a sin, whilst any male 'indulgence' was tolerated as a natural
vice, Gaskell first attempts to undermine the sexual standard by
showing that 'bad' women could be rehabilitated, and secondly, by
redirecting the 'blame' of a sexual transgression from the seduced
woman to the male seducer. But both aspects of Gaskell's challenge
to the double standard reveal her ignorance of the sexual standard's
true importance. The standard is not the root cause of the issue
Gaskell wants to challenge. Rather it is the articulation of attitudes
to women which, separating women into two categories - the madonna
or whore figure - need to be dismantled in order for us to understand
the very existence of the double standard itself. In other words,
by tackling the issue of 'bad' women and showing their potential
to be 'good' women, Gaskell is ignorant that both labels categorise
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women in an attempt to restrict and disarm them. It is not just
the idea of the prostitute or fallen woman that needs to be expiated
in social terms. The labels 'good' and 'bad' reveal that the concept
of womanhood itself is seen to require the palliative of division
into stereotypes 32
The reviews of Ruth and contemporary arguments about the nature
of women show quite clearly that both the good and bad images of
women are socially constructed in the way that Gaskell understands
only the 'fallen woman' to be. Greg's important work on prostitution
shows that the negative image of the prostitute is founded on the
conception that women are essentially asexual. 33 He states that
sexual desire in women "scarcely exists in a definite and conscious
form," 34 but is "dormant, if not non-existent, till excited; always
till excited by undue familiarity; almost always till excited by
actual intercourse." 35 Indeed, sexual desire is not seen as part
of even the married woman's makeup. Greg approvingly quotes a woman
who states, "It is not a quarter-of-an-hour's ceremony in a church
that can make that welcome or tolerable to pure and delicate feelings." 36
The belief in female asexuality may seem a surprising aspect of
the double standard. If sexual desire is as hard to inculcate in
women as Greg seems to suggest, one wonders why it is that the 'fallen'
woman should be considered such irretrievable sinners. At the same
time, the concept of female asexuality does explain the more horrendous
social stigma that is attached to a fallen woman. Having succumbed
to sexual appetite, the fallen woman effectively punctures the illusion
of female asexuality. And it is for this puncturing of the illusion
that the fallen woman is punished. If, as Eva Figes suggests, the
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assumption of the image of the asexual woman is an attempt to "protect[]
oneself against feelings of sexual inadequacy," 37 and to disarm the
previously dominant image of woman as sexually insatiable compared
to the fixed sexual energy of men, 38 then the fallen woman is a threatening,
frightening female image for men, and so needs to be punished.
Gaskell's apparent unawareness that the good woman is as much
a social construct as the fallen woman leads necessarily to a short
circuiting. Because there are not images of women besides the good/bad
sides of the female coin, Gaskell must turn to an image of woman
which not only upholds the double standard she is attacking, but
which directly undermines the means - education and knowledge - by
which she feels such negative images as the fallen woman can be rectified.
If we examine the type of good woman, the mother, which Gaskell has
chosen to juxtapose against the image of the fallen woman, then we
can see the ways in which the issues of knowledge and education which
Gaskell overtly advocates in Ruth can have no place in the 'solution'
she expounds.
Gaskell first hints at the positive possibilities of the maternal
instinct when Ruth, running hastily from Benson once Bellingham has
left her, turns to help Thurstan who has fallen. The action, we
are told, "called [Ruth] out of herself"(96), making her realise
that "she was wanted in the world, and must not rush hastily out
of it."(97) The instinct, in essence the maternal one to care, is
termed a woman's "holiest instinct,"(119), and is seen to give the
previously grief-stricken Ruth a "mysterious source of strength."(125)
This is all well and good, except that it seems to provide no opport-
unity for Ruth to grow from ignorant innocence to conscious knowledge.
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Rather, the stress remains on the instincts of motherhood, a variation
only it would seem upon the instincts which connected Ruth with the
innocent Wordsworthian figure of Tintern Abbey, and more ominously
with the sexual instinct (insofar as it was inherent) of the Eye-
like Ruth in the garden of her fall. Accordingly, Ruth's growing
stature in the novel, the sign of her rehabilitation, is connected
with a degree of unconsciousness which refutes Gaskell's stance on
education. Ruth is described as being "unconsciously"(207) led to
God through her instinctual love for her child - a very strange
approach for the rationalistic Unitarian mind to support. Ruth too
is seen "insensibly teaching Leonard to conform to the law of right,
[and] to recognise duty in the mode in which every action was performed."(363)
It seems that at no time is Ruth to be credited with an active, thinking
role in her rehabilitation which Gaskell's insistence on education
and knowledge would seem to make desirable. Ruth teaches Leonard
by her "noble, humble, pious endurance"(415) of her ostracism, but
that teaching is done "unconsciously and indirectly"(415). And for
herself, it is Ruth's "true instincts"(365) which now govern her
responses to her position in life: there seems to be no degree of
consciousness in her rehabilitation. Even in her lessons with the
Bensons, it is Ruth's instincts which are stressed. Her "quick percept-
ions . . . ready adaptation of truths . . . her immediately sense
of the fitness of things . . . [and the] complete unconsciousness
of uncommon power"(185) are the distinguishing characteristics of
Ruth at her lessons. The very adjectives emphasise the immediacy
of instinctual response, not the mediation of knowledge gleaned slowly
through education.
But it is not only the instinctual basis of motherhood which
is worrisome. The images of women presented throughout Ruth all
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stress the physical aspect of women -whether it be through appearances
or by the instincts - and suggest that Gaskell is unaware that it
is this privileging of a woman's physical presense, her instincts,
above any of her other attributes which leads, not only to the sexual
double standard she is attacking, but to the other limiting images
of women available to her. Ruth's transformation into a nurse is
a case in point. Ruth initially becomes a nurse out of an instinct
comparable to the one which guides her through other areas of her
life. She does not 'decide' to be the fever-ward matron, but states
that she "felt that she must go."(422-emphasis mine) Accordingly,
Ruth's primary importance as a nurse appears to derive from her physical
self. Ruth's "manner, voice, and gesture"(387), along with her silence
(388), mean that her patients "unconsciously"(387) - as is appropriate
for a response to the physical, not articulated, gesture Ruth offers-
feel soothed and gratified by her presence.
But more interesting is Gaskell's handling of Ruth's physical
beauty. G.H. Lewes complained about Ruth's prettiness, wishing that
Ruth had been plainer so that Gaskell's discussion of the fallen
woman problem was not clouded "by all manner of graceful accessories." 38
But Gaskell's decision to make Ruth beautiful pinpoints the type
of problems to which her handling of the sexual double standard leads.
Gaskell emphasizes Bellingham's infatuation with Ruth's looks, and
in the process indicates her criticism of one who treasures such
superficial attributes. Ruth's beauty is "all [Bellingham] recognised
of her"(74), and we are told that "[s]he pleased him more by looking
so lovely than by all her tender endeavours to fall in with his varying
humour."(74) Appropriately enough for someone so interested in physical
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beauty, Bellingham is made most happy by Ruth's silence (56). Her
language is not a necessary aspect of their relationship when Bellingham
can 'read' Ruth's thoughts and feelings by the mere "trembling of
[her] little hand"(56). In order to establish Ruth's innocence in
the face of Bellingham's stress on the superficial, Ruth herself,
though aware that she is considered beautiful (12), is presented
as ignorant of the social status of physical beauty, and so misunder-
stands when she is chosen to represent Mrs Mason's establishment
at the ball (10).
All of this must be read as an evasion of the issues on Gaskell's
part. By stressing Ruth's beauty, Gaskell is evidently arguing that
it is Ruth's ignorance of her physical beauty and the temptation
it provides which contributes to her seduction. She seems to suggesting
that 'pretty women are seduced' when the statement must simply read
'women are seduced.' The change of emphasis is important. If Bellingham
is guilty of reading Ruth's physical beauty to the exclusion of all
her other attributes, then it is the act of reading the body which
must surely be considered responsible for Ruth's seduction, not the
resulting adjective.
In this context, Ruth's non-apprehension of her physical beauty
is irrelevant. Yet Gaskell herself seems not to recognise it as
inconsequential. Her portray of Ruth and other women in the text
reveals that her understanding of how the reading of physical
presence affects women is limited to the resulting labels. She recognises
that a woman can be "excluded . . . from any of the envy of rivalry"(12)
by her plainness, whilst a "waving outline of figure"(11) such as
Ruth possesses can reflect well on the proprietess of the establish-
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ment which employs it. But Gaskell does not recognise that the very
act of reading women in terms of their 'presence' is itself damaging
and insidious. Accordingly, Ruth's rehabilitation must be made manifest
in bodily terms, the emphasis upon which she concurrently asserts
led to Ruth's seduction. Though Bellingham is berated for reading
Ruth's 'trembling hand' as a sign of deep love for him (Gaskell ensures
we know it only points to her bewilderment), Gaskell herself can
assert that Ruth's eyes show she has grown "thoughtful, and spiritual"(207),
whilst her early ability to contemplate Bellingham's camill)with
equanimity is best dramatised by a description of Ruth's "open, straight-
looking eye"(17) and the absence of a blush.
One might argue that Gaskell's utilisation of the physical descript-
ion of women to relay their moral status is inevitable. Berger's
Ways of Seeing provides a possible gloss on Gaskell's technique.
He states that "the social presence of women has developed as a result
of their ingenuity in living under [the] tutelage of men". 40 Woman
has been "taught and persuaded to survey herself continually", 41 and
as a result she can be said to be made up of two elements: the 'surveyor'
and the 'surveyed.' The 'surveyor' is that part of woman which,
realising how important her appearance in a phallocentric society
is, regards what is 'surveyed' so that it 'presents' the correct,
the most beneficial aspect. Berger further states that the surveyor
in each woman is essentially male since it mimics the actions of
that most powerful spectator, whilst the surveyed element is female. 42
The result is that woman "turns herself into an object -- and most
particularly an object of vision: a sight." 43
 Gaskell's handling
of Ruth shows signs of this phenomenon. Early in the novel, two
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of Ruth's reactions to her involvement with Bellingham are illuminated
if we bring Berger's terminology into play. Ruth has met Bellingham
for the second time when both are involved in rescuing a small boy.
Ruth, chatting to Bellingham about financial arrangements for the
child, suddenly becomes aware of Bellingham's expression. She "instinct 
ively read[s] the change in the expression of his countenance, [and
so] . . . drop[s] her large white veiling lids"(24). The action,
in a girl supposedly ignorant of all matters of sexual attraction,
can be problematic since it suggests a degree of sexual sophistication
on Ruth's part (her action makes Bellingham think her lovelier than
ever) which Gaskell has vigorously opposed. If however we view the
situation in Berger's terms, the action is seen not to be contrad-
ory but inevitable. It suggests that Ruth, at this time, recognises
a 'surveyor' in Bellingham when she sees one, and so assumes the
modest demeanour, not with intent to seduce, but innocently in the
manner she has been trained. That her recognition is instinctual
further indicates that Ruth, as a woman, has been brought up to view
herself as men do and so can recognise the activity when performed
by another. Finally, Gaskell's own description of Ruth's 'large,
white veiling lids" which so captivate Bellingham suggests that she
too is practised in the art of surveying the female form, perhaps
by the necessity in her own life of performing the two roles Berger
describes.
Other incidents in the novel suggest that the notions of the
'surveyed' and the 'surveyor' affect Gaskell's handling of the women
in the text. Ruth, again with Bellingham, suddenly becomes aware
of his admiration for her figure, and as suddenly is rendered silent (46).
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Her response suggests a level of awareness of her role as 'woman.'
Being surveyed, Ruth becomes as silent as one might expect an 'object'
or 'sight' to be. In the same way, Jemima's response to Ruth's announce-
ment that she is to be a fever nurse, is to "involuntarily glanc[e]
over the beautiful lithe figure, and the lovely refinement of Ruth's
face"(384). The involuntary nature of Jemima's reaction is important.
It suggests a woman's awareness of the importance of appearance,
and so means that Jemima's first response must be to check if appearance
will fit the proposed occupation. Though Jemima's assumption that
Ruth's beauty is inappropriate for a sick nurse is proved wrong,
her instinct to 'read' the body is correct since it is Ruth's body
which is her primary definition. Similarly, the description of Ruth
in her mother's garden when she revisits her home, emphasises the
degree to which the 'surveyed' part of the woman is her important
credential. Ruth wanders in the garden "careless of watching eyes,
indeed unconscious, for the time, of their existence."(49) But if
Ruth temporarily forgets that she is the 'surveyed,' the two male
spectators of the scene reassert her significance as a 'sight.'
Bellingham can feel only "passionate admiration"(49) for Ruth's beauty
despite the fact that he knows she is visiting the home of her deceased
parents. Old Thomas too, though not a prospective lover, is aware
that Ruth's status as a "pretty creature"(49) means that she is in
danger from other male gazers even if she is, as he is confident,
the same sweet girl he knew.
It is interesting to note at this point, when Ruth is the object
of two male spectators, that Gaskell chooses to present Ruth, waving
and weaving in the shrubbery, as a type of 'unconscious' Eve in the
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garden, an erotic image which emphasises her sexual, bodily elements.
Gaskell seems powerless to assume any other role than that of the
essentially male surveyor herself.
Other women too seem powerless to be other than the surveyor
of those parts of themselves and other women which constitute the
'surveyed.' When Sally cuts Ruth's long hair, she removes not only
one of the more avert symbols of Ruth's nubility and sexual status,
she also ensures that Ruth's appearance complies with her adopted
situation. Faith Benson's own worries that her inner youthful feelings
belie her outer appearance (204) reveal how important it is that
the 'surveyed' elements of woman match up to her situation. Faith's
answer to a mismatch confirms the priority given to physical presence.
She thinks of ways "to keep remembering how old [she is], so as to
prevent [herself] from feeling so young"(205). She never considers
matching her body to her inside state. In such a context, it is
not surprising that the young Bradshaw girls, aged twelve and eight,
are already accomplished observers of love affairs (240). It is
after all as skillful 'observers' or surveyors of themselves that
they will spend their lives.
Since women appear to be powerless to be anything other than
the surveyor of themselves, it is to be expected that the last image
of Ruth herself which we see in the novel is the one seen by the
male surveyor. Interestingly, this surveyor has a, triple presence
in Ruth's last appearance, an overwhelming indication of its power
and ubiquity. Donne/Bellingham, visiting the Benson house to make
financial arrangements for his son, is inadvertently led up to view
Ruth's body. Though he is initially repelled by the thought of what
146
he is about to see, Donne finds Ruth to be what she has always been
to him, an object of beauty. Accordingly, he is "awed into admiration"(447)
by the sight of the dead Ruth. It is a sign of how little importance
he attaches to a living Ruth that Bellingham is able to carry on
a relatively lengthy conversation with Mt Benson about his intentions
regarding Leonard with no signs of distress caused by the presence
of his past lover. Ruth dead and Ruth alive are, it would seem,
equally inconspicuous.
The second and third 'surveyors' of Ruth in the scene are however
more interesting. Importantly, it is Sally who, "grown strangely
proud of [the] marble beauty"(447) of the corpse, induces Bellingham
to view it. Her equanimity in the face of death is such that she
can kiss the "marble, unyielding"(448) lips of the corpse in a way
that suggests that Sally the surveyor recognises no real difference
between this "motionless, serene body"(448) and the once-alive, though
still surveyed, Ruth. Indeed, there seems not to be. The surveyed
Ruth remains as beautiful, serene and calm as she ever was in life.
Death has not altered her distinguishing characteristics at all.
Accordingly, that third surveyor, Gaskell herself, can utilise the
same technique of physical description which she applied to Ruth.
It is Ruth's "perfect oval"(447) of a face, her "waving auburn hair"(447)
and her "delicate cheeks"(447) which relays to the reader Ruth's
'essence', her true self, at this time, exactly as her unblushing
face, wide eyes, and calm demeanour denoted her character when alive.
Finally, the stress on the physical appearance of women makes
the absence of such descriptions of men all the more conspicuous.
Since men are never the 'surveyed', only the 'surveyor,' their physical
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appearance is of no consequence. Only one male, Thurstan Benson,
of all the male characters in Ruth, is treated to a physical treat-
ment. As might be predicted, he is found to be beautiful (67), and
is accredited with a "feminine morbidness of conscience"(374).
Thus far it would seem that Gaskell is prostrate before the
combined might of a society which trains women to be the continual
surveyors of themselves, and which sites their importance in their
success or failure to be objects of such surveillance by man. Attacking
the accepted definition of the fallen woman, Gaskell seems powerless
to confront and dismantle the processes which led to the existence
of such a female category. Nevertheless, though Gaskell does seem
predominantly a colluder in the processes which lead to male images
of women, there are aspects of Ruth which suggest that her collusion
is not only unwilling, but that she is attempting to come to terms
with the "mythic masks . . . fastened over [the female] human face," 44
and so see behind them. The relationship between Jemima and Ruth
is a case in point. Though little critical attention has been paid
to the friendship of these two women, it does illustrate a certain
awareness on Gaskell's part of the way in which male expectations
and definitions of women influence their appraisal of each other.
More importantly, it suggests that Gaskell is struggling to find
an alternative.
Jemima first makes her appearance as an admirer of the by now
exemplary Ruth. Ruth so appears the epitome of Victorian womanliness,
vulnerable, patient, humble and beautiful, that Jemima feels she
could be her slave (182). Gaskell presents this heroine-worship
in a convincing way. Jemima, we know, is a girl just on the edge
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of womanhood. Lacking the physical beauty preferred for women, and
knowing the advantage that lack represents in a male-dominated society,
Jemima is attracted to the womanly ideal which Ruth embodies, whilst
understandably rebelling against the pattern of womanhood to which
she feels she cannot aspire. At the same time, Jemima is highly
conscious of the injustice to which the patterns of womanhood expose
her. She is outraged by the overt manoeuvring with which relationships
between the sexes are arranged (238), and feels that the "calm consent
of acquiescent acceptance"(219) which is expected of a woman is far
more degrading than to be openly treated as the object or commodity
which these manoeuvres prove women to be (238). One wishes that
Jemima would win her battle of rebellion. Unfortunately, Jemima
is soon seen to be desirous of becoming the object which she scorns
(217), if the alternative is to be ignored. Accordingly, all eventually
comes right with her proposed husband, and Mr Farquhar who so dreaded
Jemima's impetuousness is left to ponder with satisfaction "the control
which he should have a right to exercise his actions at some future
day" (371).
But underlying Jemima's conventional development from rebellious
teenager to relatively acquiescent woman, is a questioning of the
mobhod of male surveillance of women which her attitude to a newly-
sinful Ruth constitutes. Upon hearing of Ruth's fall, Jemima is
immediately convinced that Ruth is a "sinful creatureP(319). At the
time, the surveyor in Jemima is deeply confused by the revelation
of Ruth's sexual conduct: "if Ruth - calm, modest, delicate,
dignified Ruth"(321) is completely abhorrent then on what can that
part of her which is the surveyor base its judgement? Ruth is,
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as Jemima recognises, a challenge to the whole system of surveill-
ance. One can argue that the system which Berger outlines functions
as a means of reassurance for the male surveyor. In the bluntest
terms, the system provides the illusion of knowing that which is,
to the observer, unknowable: the physical intactness of the woman
surveyed. 45 The investiture of certain actions/signs (modest demean-
our etc.) with the status of infallible indicators of sexual innocence,
and other opposing signs (bold behaviour etc.) with the status of
the indicators of sexual experience, coupled with the social process
which ensures that women early, and completely, learn this sign system 46 ,
mean that an illusion of complete knowledge of the female is created
and delicately kept afloat. The calm, modest demeanour with which
Ruth faces the world undermines the entire system.
Faced with the devastation of her methods of gleaning what is
'true' about other women, Jemima does not reject them. Rather, the
shock causes her to review her surveillance, carefully searching
for an overlooked indicator of what she now knows Ruth to be. To
her bewilderment, Jemima can only conclude that "Whatever Ruth had
been, she was good, and to be respected as such, now"(323). It is
important to note that Jemima trusts this conclusion of her surveill-
ance only once she realises that Ruth has never attempted to re-introduce
herself into the sexual market. That is, despite carrying all of
the outward signs of modest, young, 'intact,' womanhood, Ruth has
never exploited the reading which a surveyor could make in order
to attract male affection. Indeed she has actively repelled it (322).
More importantly, Jemima's recognition that she governs Ruth's activity
in the sexual market [she can intervene with an articulation of Ruth's
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sin (322)], suggests that Jemima is unconsciously aware of why it
is women are surveyed by both themselves and others.
Still Jemima is sufficiently indoctrinated in the surveillance
ideology to continue her watching of Ruth. And it is this surveillance
which allows her to make an important and challenging statement of
support for Ruth when Ruth's sexual status is revealed to I vir Bradshaw.
Jemima asserts that, after weeks of watching Ruth, she has "never
seen one paltering with duty . . . [nor] the faintest speck of impurity
in thought, or word, or look"(335). Her statement suggests that
she, and Gaskell with her, are to a degree questioning the importance
if not the reality of Ruth's sexual fall. Since Ruth outwardly conforms
to what has been put forward as phallocentric society's notion of
female virtue, for what can she be ostracised?
Unfortunately for Ruth, Jemima misunderstands the function of
the surveillance technique because she herself is a product of it.
What her own conditioning as an object of surveillance has suppressed
is an important aspect of her ignorance here. Jemima assumes that
since Ruth's fall appears not to have changed her essence (ie. her
goodness and modesty), Ruth's goodness deserves to be reinstated
as her defining characteristic. Jemima is of course unaware that
it is precisely a woman's sexual state which the surveyor, though
s/he cannot rightly discern it, constitutes as her 'presence', as
her definition. Accordingly, once this physical state has been 'proven'
to be sullied, the woman's status is unalterable. Whatever her behaviour,
no matter to what degree her modesty and goodness are indicated,
her 'essence' is that of a 'fallen' woman, a despoiled object.
At the same time, Jemima's ignorance of the centrality of a
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women's sexuality is itself dictated by her position within the surveillance
system. As Berger states, a woman surveys herself continually because
the importance of her appearance to man has been a carefully and thoroughly
learnt lesson. 47 Her marginal status in a phallocentric society necess-
itates an adherence to the methods of assessment of the dominant members,
their notions of acceptability, if she is to survive economically and
socially. If we combine this with the knowledge that the male Victorian
ideal of womanhood embraced an ignorance of sexual matters, 48 then Jemima's
use of surveillance, despite her ignorance of what it exists to survey,
can be accounted for. Indeed the proof of Jemima's thorough grasp of
the female surveillance lesson can be seen in her reaction to her first
recognition that she can feel sexual jealousy. Her realisation that
Ruth is a preferred person in Farquhar's eyes, leads her to condemn
the "capability for evil"(243), that is the sexual desire, she can exper-
ience. Even later, assured of Farquhar's love, Jemima remembers the
evil thoughts (372) which once characterised her feelings towards Ruth,
and feels undeserving of her present happiness because of it. The extremity
of her terminology for what is a natural feeling indicates the degree
to which surveillance is dominant. Wanting to retain her status as
'modest' and 'virginal' she must vehemently reject any desires which
the Victorian ideal of woman excludes.
Because she is both ignorant, and a product, of the surveillance
technique, Jemima does not doubt the knowledge of Ruth's 'essence' which
its methods provide. Ruth is fol Jemima tte good, kind woman she reads
her to be. Accordingly, Bradshaw's rejection of Jemima's witnessing
on the grounds that it reveals only "more and more how deep is the corrupt-
ion this wanton [Ruth] has spread"(336), renders Jemima immobile. Having
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had her only method of finding 'truth' rejected, Jemima finds that
Ruth's predicament is not "past [her] power"(337) and understanding.
She fails to see that, despite its superficial air of authority,
the surveillance method masks a fundamental recognition of its own
inability to ascertain what it aims to uncover: the sexual status
of the woman surveyed. Bradshaw can instantly accuse Ruth of "innocent
seeming"(336) because it is precisely the figure of the woman whose
physical appearance hides a sexual nature that haunts the surveyor.
At the same time, such a figure is a necessary element in the
illusion of authority which the surveillance method gathers about
itself. If the surveyor posits a central female figure whose physical
presence is duplicitous, then his readings can never be termed faulty.
All those women who, learning the lesson of surveillance at an early
age as well as the Victorian lesson of sexual ignorance, are indeed
'modest women' (ie. physically intact, or sexual only in the legitimate
context of the procreative family), and will know the correct manner
of articulating that sexual status. At the same time, all those
women known to be physically 'despoiled' and yet continue, as their
education has taught them, to exude a modest presence, can be accounted
for. The surveyor's knowledge will be far outweighed by what is
known as the 'truth' about such women. Even women, like Jemima,
who are physically modest will be sufficiently the product of surveillance
to see as 'evil' any immodest behaviour or thoughts which threaten
their carefully learnt sexual innocence. In each case, the surveyor's
stance as absolute authority is never questioned. He either 'knows'
through surveillance the essence of women, or can refer to the model
of female potential for corruption and so privilege the knowledge 
of a sexual fall over any 'truth' his surveillance might yield.
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Hence Bradshaw, meeting Ruth, is assured of his authority and rejects
outright Jemima's attempts to re-define his knowledge.
At this point, it is necessary to revert to Gaskell's invocation
of the Eve-like figure in Chapter four. If Gaskell is unable to
extricate herself from the role of surveyor as her descriptions of
Ruth throughout the text suggest, then this earlier apparent 'slip'
in Gaskell's imaging of Ruth becomes more explicable. It is Eve
who is the model of the woman possessing a hidden, unfathomable nature
and who allows Bradshaw to be certain of Ruth's guilt, despite her
outwardly modest behaviour. Ruth, like Eve, looks exactly the same
after her transgression. Gaskell's early switch from a socially-
determined fall to one which is inherent now seems inevitable. With
the male tools of surveillance as the only method with which to assess
women, the spectre of Eve and her hidden sexual status will remain
firmly at the centre of her assessment, as it does for Bradshaw,
despite her attempts to explore the phenomenon of the fallen woman
from another angle.
Gaskell seems truly locked in a method of analysis which will
not permit her the images of women for which she is searching. Nevertheless,
amongst the products of male surveillance techniques, one can discern
a level of meaning in the novel which suggests a tentative dismantling
of the surveillance. From that dismantling, one can excavate a liberating
image of woman. If we retrace our steps back to the point at which
Ruth's 'fall' is first aired in Eccleston, we can see that the process
which upsets the definitions produced by the visual methods of surveill-
ance is essentially verbal in nature. Jemima is told, not shown,
that Ruth is a 'sinful creature.' One assumes that Bradshaw learns
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the 'truth' concerning Ruth's sexual status in a similar way. One
then remembers that Ruth's own consciousness of her fallen state
is similarly the result of a verbal transaction (71). What is most
important is that, in each instance, an individual who usually privileges
the truth of visually-transmitted information, immediately revises
his/her definition of another (or in Ruth's case, of herself) in
the light of this verbally-transmitted information. The immediacy
of the change is significant. It suggests that Gaskell recognises
that Ruth's fall is primarily an effect of language. That is, Ruth
is 'sinful' only to those who have been told she is - it is not something
which can be seen to exist otherwise. Indeed Gaskell's apparently
unconscious imaging of Ruth as Eve strengthens the primacy of the
verbal articulation. Gaskell uses a literary source to present what
is the ultimate literary type of woman: the biblical Eve in Paradise.
One would imagine that Gaskell's ability to disengage herself
from the literary authority of the biblical and Miltonic Eve would
be slight. But, her decision to use the authority given to verbal
articulation to over-ride what is the effect of language - Ruth's
status as a fallen woman - intimates an invalidation of this dominant
image of woman. She does this primarily in two ways. The first
can be seen as a direct result of her Unitarian heritage. Jemima's
declaration of Ruth's purity and goodness is an assertion that Jemima's
status as a living reliable witness of truth outweighs any previously
conceived 'witnesses' to women. Jemima has seen Ruth to be good
and truthful, and bears witness to, that is articulates, that truth.
This for Gaskell is as true an assessment as one can hope for.
Her second method is the result of her recognition that, as
explained above, such witnesses as Jemima are considered inadequate
in the minds of those who assesses 'truth' with a surveillance method
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based on preconceived notions. If we explore a crucial scene in
ElailL, the meeting on the sands between Ruth and Bellingham, we can
see Gaskell's attempts to re-work the 'preconceived' idea which is
at the centre of the surveillance technique, and so undermine it.
The meeting on the sands was certainly controversial in Gaskell's
day. Ruth's rejection of Bellingham's marriage proposal was attacked
by contemporary critics. Some urged Ruth's acceptance on the basisof
her moral influence over Bellingham, for "who will save him from
his own unrighteousness if she will not." 49 Others protested Ruth's
presumption at denying Leonard a father's guidance and protection.
If we investigate the tactics with which Ruth and Bellingham
approach each other, we can see that each is bringing to the confrontation
decidedly opposite notions of what constitutes 'womanhood'. In terms
of speech-act theory, each brings to their meeting a different set
of meanings, or a different 'discourse. ,50 In effect, they bring
to their meeting differing notions of what exactly constitutes the
social contract obtaining between them. The 'discourse' that influences
Bellingham's behaviour and comments is that of the surveyor. His
first perception of the woman he believes to resemble Ruth is a physical
one: "this woman was far handsomer. Her face was positively Greek
. • .[with a] proud, superb turn of the head; quite queenly."(275)
Importantly Bellingham's immediate assessment is that such a woman
cannot be Ruth. The regal bearing does not accord with the male
surveyor's perception of the 'one thing' Ruth could have become.
More interestingly, Bellingham brings to the interview the male
surveyor's belief in the sexual nature of a woman's essence. That
is, he enters the meeting in the terms of the pastoral contract;
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it is the pastoral contract's rules which he feels govern its progress.
He assumes that because he knows of Ruth's sexual status (n.b. he
is the only male surveyor that can ever 'know' Ruth's status because
he is the seducer), he is in the position to manipulate her behaviour.
To Bellingham, and any participant in the pastoral contract, a 'fallen
woman' has only two possible choices of social roles. Her sexually
despoiled status means that she must either become a prostitute as
he had assumed Ruth to be (275), or she must legitimise her despoiled
state by marrying the man responsible for it. He expects Ruth's
face "[to] brighten into joy"(299) when he offers the possiblity
of the latter, and is bewildered when his offer is rejected. 51
To Bellingham, Ruth is always the sexual commodity - the "beautiful
walk"(299), the "majestic and graceful"(299) attitudes - which the
pastoral contract defines as 'woman.' Her sexuality is all he recognises
and can respond to.
In opposition, Ruth comes to this meeting with a very different
social contract in mind. And accompanying her social contract is
a different discourse, a different set of assumed meanings. Her
sexuality, as rejection of Bellingham's proposal shows, is not her
defining characteristic of herself. She is not, at this point, an
observer or participant in the pastoral contract. Accordingly, she
can remember a time of past sexual joy	 in Wales without implicitly
assuming that sexuality must perpetually be her definition. Bellingham,
in contrast, assumes the admission of sexuality to be the first step
in Ruth's capitulation to his male surveyor's definition of her and
all women.
What Ruth has placed at the centre of her discourse is a conception
157
of identity which, unlike Bellingham's, is fluid. Though her past
'sin' is part of her consciousness (300), it is not the entirety
of her essence. Ruth loved Bellingham once; she does not do so now,
and cannot envisage ever doing so again. Bellingham's concept of
a fixed female identity, with sexuality at its centre, is undermined
by Ruth's vision of a fluid self. Ruth, accordingly, posits her
status as maternal carer as her present identity, and she, as carer,
can reject Bellingham in Leonard's name. To capitulate at this point
would mean to resign her vision of a fluid self for the model of
woman which Bellingham assumes, and the fixity which accompanies
it.
Though one might argue that Ruth's substitution of a maternal
'centre' for a sexual one is nothing more than a by-product of her
sexuality, her stress on what she is now, and her unwilllingness
to accept past behaviour as definitive essence suggests that it is
her conception of a 'changing' identity which is important, not its
present manifestation. Unlike her past self which seemed fluid and
insubstantial to the point where she could not recognise herself,
this ability to change and adapt does not denote weakness, but strength.
Ruth derives from her present status a strength of purpose and identity
which equips her to reject the sexual essence which male surveyors;
the pastoral contract, and the surveyor in herself, place at the
centre of female identity.
But one must also note that, contrary to one's initial expectations,
Bellingham eventually accepts Ruth's reworked definition of female
identity. At first he is confused at Ruth's ability to use verbal
articulation. A woman who declares her identity ( that is, proclaims
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her 'essence' through her speech not her physical presence) is an
oddity which eludes the pastoral contract and the accompanying discourse
which Bellingham has at his disposal. Ruth's speech-acts are "strange
and incoherent"(295) - he can assign them no meaningful status in
his own discourse. Indeed, he attempts to rework Ruth's words into
the discourse of the pastoral contract from which he works. Though
he cannot understand her, Ruth's lack of anger and resentment (296)
suggest to Bellingham that her words are mere "pretty defiance"(300).
Such defiance is not an act which the pastoral contract's discourse
allows him to approach. Bellingham defines it as the behaviour of
one who, aware that their 'true' sexual status is known, requires
more than the usual amounts of overtures and compliments before marriage.
Finally however Ruth's perseverance in placing her maternal
role at her centre wins. It is again a measure of the degree to
which participants in the pastoral contract, users of the surveillance
technique, can privilege verbal articulation as a 'truer' source
of essence than their own flawed surveillance system. 52 Because
they privilege speech, Ruth's verbal articulation must be recognised
as valid despite its deviation from the tradition which denies women
speech by stressing presence. Bellingham's discourse, relying as
it does on a construct of woman designed to keep the illusion of
male authority intact, contains also the seeds for the recognition
of Ruth's verbal articulation, and so forces him to accept her refusal.
In terms of speech act theory, Ruth's triumph at this point
posits a social contract between men and women which can, if tapped,
over-ride the dominant pastoral contract. It is furthermore, a contract
which, unlike the pastoral contract, privileges verbal articulation
159
without discriminating against the gender of the speaker. Whilst
the pastoral contract is based on the devaluation of a woman's verbal
authority and a concurrent privileging of male verbal authority,
the social contract in which Ruth has engaged Bellingham utilises
this existing verbal privileging without an accompanying sexual
discrimination. The possibility of redefinition of the contract
is an important step forward for Gaskell. She has found the means
with which to reshape that which has previously presented an unmitigat-
ing unassailable front.
After rejecting Bellingham's advances, Ruth's experience of
desolation is a sign of her remembrance that her present 'identity'
as mother is also subject to change and redefinition. Though it
gives her the strength to reject Bellingham, it will not always remain
as an 'essence' with which she can combat the definitions which others
will thrust upon her. One can perhaps interpret Ruth's subsequent
definition as 'nurse' as a tacit admission of the fluidity of 'essence'.
With the recognition that she will not always be the carer she now
is to Leonard, Ruth must look elsewhere for identity.
If we analyse Ruth's subsequent 'act', her nursing of Bellingham,
we can see the extent to which Ruth's search for identity is hindered
not only by its fluidity, but the limited number of choices. Ruth's
status as 'nurse' is perhaps the inevitable 'next' identity for a
woman who claims, for a time, a maternal essence. It is simply the
extension of the focus of caring. At the same time, the image of
the nurse is, like that of mother, a part of the 'good' woman image
which Ruth presents in opposition to the bad/fallen woman image previously
fastened upon her. In other words, though Ruth has successfully
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cast off the image of the fallen woman by the end of the novel, she
is left with an identity which, whilst socially desirable, is no
less an 'essence' pressed upon her than the previous fallen label.
In such a context, Ruth's desolation after Abermouth, and her
eager embrace of a life-threatening career, indicates the anxiety
which the imposition of yet another social construct of woman - the
good woman - causes. Ruth still has no identity which she can claim
as her own, and which encompasses the sexuality that she finds a
part of herself. She has merely oscillated between the two poles
of the model of womanhood espoused by the surveillance system.
Ruth's predicament, the oscillating nature of her social identity
and the apparent impossibility of attaining a social identity which
embraces her sense of a multiplicity of essences (the mother, the
sexual woman, the carer, the friend) is neatly embodied in her final
act. The scene in which Ruth expresses her decision to nurse Bellingham
is significant on two levels: it reveals that the only possible
identities for women belong to the dichotomy discussed above, and
it reasserts the degree to which these categories are effects of
language or products of discourse.
When Ruth discovers that Bellingham is ill, she immediately
approaches Mr Davis the doctor, urging the necessity of her attendance
at Bellingham's bedside. Davis, unwilling to risk Ruth's life, ,attempts
to dissuade her; but Ruth is adamant. Unlike her first 'feeling'
that she should nurse (422), Ruth asserts three times her decision
that she 'must go' (436-7). Ruth's assertion, however, takes on
a multiplicity of meanings depending upon whom one assumes to be
the listener. Firstly Ruth's statement is seen as simply the 'decision'
161
of the 'good woman' to continue to perform those acts which validate
her status. Davis, representing the opinion of others such as Benson
and the Eccleston villagers who view Ruth as a 'good woman', therefore
attempts to persuade Ruth that this last act is not necessary to
uphold her image. Ruth has more than proved her goodness.
On the other hand, had Bellingham been conscious and so able
to hear Ruth's assertion at this point, her statement would signify
the exact opposite. It would be an indication of Ruth's sexual capitulation,
and hence a confirmation of her identity as the 'fallen', that is
sexual, woman. Both Bellingham and Davis read Ruth's statement in
the terms of the two only possible public meanings it can have:
the utterance of a 'good woman' or the utterance of the 'fallen woman.'
At the same time, we as readers must note that Ruth's assertion
is not, as far as she is concerned, a public statement. 53 Her 'I
must go' is addressed privately and secretly to Davis. At this level,
Ruth's 'I must go' has a different meaning. To Davis, the illegitimate
son of a fallen woman, Ruth's statement (once he informed of her
relationship to Bellingham) makes sense because it is "but what my
mother would have done" (438). That is, he can recognise that Ruth
will be performing an individual, private act, and not one which
constitutes a part of her public image as the 'good woman.' Davis
recognises, in essence, a 'family contract' between Ruth and Bellingham,
and gives validity to that contract, though illegitimate in society's
terms, because of his own experience as an illegitimate child.
At the same time, we must recognise that Davis's reading of
Ruth's assertion is extremely limited. Although he apprehends a
familial claim in Ruth's statement that she cares for Bellingham,
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he does not seem to recognise it as a claim for an identity which
the public images of good/bad women cannot offer. Importantly Ruth
herself appears to perceive Davis's limited vision, and understands
the level of meaning at which to engage Davis in order to gain his
approval. She initially dwells on her intimate feelings for Bellingham
before suddenly stating that he is Leonard's father (437). The suddenness
of the statement suggests that Ruth can see that it is only within
a family contract - whether 'illegitimate' or not - that Davis will
understand her decision. But her need to care for Bellingham is
not one that arises out of the familial contract Davis posits; it
is rather a desperate avowal of Ruth's sexuality, presented in the
private sphere because she realises it is an impossible statement
in the public one. Ruth yearns to care for Bellingham because he
is her past lover, not because he is Leonard's father. Her stuttering
admission of her love for him attests to the importance of their
intimate relationship, not the parental link she previously rejected
in Leonard's name (300).
But even this private assertion, this private claim to a sexual
voice and identity, is lost in the multiplicity of discourses by which
her statement can be decoded. Her love as evidence of a familial
contract; her love as evidence of her 'good woman' status; her love
as evidence of a sexual capitulation; these readings overpower and
eliminate Ruth's plea for an individual identity which would allow
an	 escape from the sexual dichotomy of female images, and thus
embrace both goodness and sexuality. 'I must go' is ultimately meaningless
to the very one who speaks it because of the multiple meanings which
are attached to it. With its meaninglessness, Ruth's opportunity to
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forge an identity evaporates.
In such a context, Ruth finally attests to the strength and
durability of the restricting images of women which the surveillance
technique, and the pastoral contract which underlies it, projects.
Ruth succumbs, or is forced to submit, to the definition of herself
as 'fallen.' Being a product of surveillance, Ruth, like Jemima,
cannot accept the sexuality which Bellingham's reappearance has forced
her to confront. Unable to incorporate that sexuality into her identity,
yet unwilling to reject completely an aspect of herself which can,
as she knows, bring great happiness, Ruth dies with no real sense
of herself, no discourse by which to fashion an identity, that is,
insane.
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Chapter Five: Cranford (1853)
In 1851 the Census of Great Britain listed a statistic which
proved to be the focus of much debate: a spate of articles in the
journals and newspapers of the day show the range of reactions to
the unsettling revelation. The figures which caused such consternation
stated the 'excess' of women to men in Great Britain. The figures
themselves are interesting. In 1801 there were 180,027 more women
than men in Great Britain. By 1851, that figure had risen to 349,871.
Though the census also revealed that the proportion of women to men
remained relatively stable [from 103,353:100,000 in 1801 to 103,363:
100,000 in 1851), it was the apparent doubling of 'surplus' women
which caused dismay. More troubling was the announcement that of
the 290,209 women considered to be at child-bearing age (ie. between
the ages of twenty and forty-five), nearly half (120,403) were
unmarried. 1
That Cranford, which began serialisation in December 1851, has
never been considered in the light of these statistics and the panic
which followed seems a curious omission. If however one approaches
the novel within this context, aspects of the text leap to the fore-
ground which the traditional approach to it as a charming tale of
rural life downplays. The shift of focus begins with the first line.
Much critical commentary on Cranford concerns itself with the degree
to which the opening line, "In the first place, Cranford is in possession
of the Amazons, 2
 is ironic. Many commentators, like the editor to
the Penguin edition, assert that the sentence "is, of course, an
168
169
ironic reinforcement of the qualities not normally associated with
the mythical Amazons." 3 That 'of course' is typical of the general
assurance that the text's irony operates at only one level of meaning.
The Cranford ladies - genteel, delicate and verging on the delightfully
dotty - are 'simply' the complete inverse of the mythically fierce
female warriors. When the sentence is not read as primarily 'ironic',
it is usually considered as an indication of the extent to which
the Cranfordians constitute a caring, close-knit, female community.
A look at the articles which surfaced in response to the Census
figures, however, suggests an alternative. When the number of 'surplus'
women was pinpointed in 1851, there began increased agitation for
the widening of educational opportunities and possible 'occupations'
for women. F.B. Cobbe's "What Shall We do with Our Old Maids?"4,
published in 1862 in response to the renewed panic caused by the
1861 census which confirmed the rising number of 'excess' women,
is typical of the articles which advocated female education and indeed
female emigration (a favourite with many reviewers) 5 in an attempt
to re-structure the social arrangements which made marriage the sole
'occupation' of women. In response to the articles pleading for
reform, however, came articles which reasserted the traditional role
of women, and castigated those who attempted to redefine the 'natural'
function of women in response to what was seen as a temporary problem. 6
Within these articles one can sense a feeling of comforting
definitions being under siege. Reviewers worry that women given
more educational opportunities will abandon marriage, and the "tedious
duties of training and bringing up children, and keeping the tradesmen's
7bills, and mending the linen" will fall upon the men. Others invoke
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the dire spectacle of unmarried women, having taken advantage of
increased educational opportunities, becoming feckless doctors prone
to being "decoyed into any den of infamy" 8 and so being ruined.
More alarming is the prospect of female commitment to careers which
might lead to a "gross infringement of the connubial contract" 9 when
these commitments involve night duty.
Lurking behind such outraged responses to the idea of female
education is, not very surprisingly, a great fear that the reign
of the status quo was hastily coming to an end. Though reviews seem
confident in their assertions of the traditional role of women and
their ridiculing of those who seek change, the image of being under
siege is striking. In a few cases, that image is expressed in
such a way as to prove interesting for readers of Cranford. One
writer attempts to deflate the cry for reform by invoking the name
of the Amazons, in particular Penthesilea - leader of the Amazons. 10
He notes what he terms the tendency of women to 'display' their triumphs
over men, even if those triumphs number but one, and hopes by the
comparison to belittle the significance of the recently passed Divorce
Act. By making the act comparable to Penthesilea's triumph over
Achilles, he effectively makes any female supporter of the act into
one of the "ten thousand tight-zoned virgin warriors" 11 who celebrated
with Penthesilea. He makes a similar attempt to deflate the Congress
for the Promotion of Social Science (a forum for many feminist speakers,
Bessie Parks amongst them) by placing the "insane, idle, crotchety
and preposterous" 12 suggestions which emerge from that forum firmly
in the 'Amazonian tradition' of the writings of Wollstonecraft -
the apparent 'failure' of Wollstonecraft's writing to elicit reform
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effectively damning the Congress to the same fate. Another writer
for the Saturday Review terms those women who agitate for female
rights, "indiscreet amazons," 13 effectively disparaging their activities
by the innocuous adjective.
Although these reviews are not exactly contemporary with Cranford,
one nevertheless suspects that the term 'amazon' was a current, disparaging
term for women exploring women's rights. Gaskell's use, in this
context, of the same term intimates that contrary to being an ironic
description of the Cranford women, the term 'amazon' is a suggestion
for a certain approach to Cranford. 14 The new focus certainly yields
interesting results. In the contemporary journals, there is the
latent assumption that the very women who agitate for reform are
the women who, in one reviewer's terminology, have "failed in [a
woman's] business" 15 . Their 'cackling' and "shrill protests" 16 pinpoint
them as spinsters. Gaskell's 'amazons' are also spinsters, with
the added distinction of being in precisely the class of women which
the Victorian advocates of reform posited to be most at risk. The
amazons of Cranford are in possession, not of the town in entirety,
but of all the houses above a certain rent. They thus constitute
the specifically located sub-group of women, middle class and educated, 17
were identified as especially hard-hit 'victims' of the excess of
women.
18
With the women of Cranford thus firmly established as the subjects
of a current debate it seems an oversight to approach the text in
a manner which may, or may not, ignore what it has to say about the
status of women. In ardor to examine the text thoroughly, it is first
necessary to establish the both the gender and the status of the
'speaker' of Cranford. Mary Smith, as we later discover her to be,
is female, middle class and single. Gaskell's later story "The Cage
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at Cranford" (1863) intimates that we can place the Mary of the earlier
chapters in her early to middle twenties, and we can further deduce
that her marital status remains unchanged. 19 In other words, the
observer of the Cranford spinsters is a woman who can conceive the
possibility of her own future status as 'spinster.'
Issuing from the mouth of such a speaker, Cranford's opening
sentence gains a wholly new resonance. If the amazon evoked in the
reviews pointed to a fear of what reform could lead to, in what way
can these apparently benign, timid, and fearful women be seen as
amazons? The answer lies in the tactics used by the journals cited
earlier. If the term 'amazon' both betrayed and consolidated the
sense of fear at female reform which one senses in the reviews, it
is also a tactic of deflation. By the application of derogatory
labels reviewers can be seen to be 'defining' and so 'limiting' a
phenomenon which threatens to destabilise the status quo of sexual
relations. Such a tactic, literary or linguistic in essence, suggests
that an investigation of uses or tactics of language in Cranford 
may prove illuminating.
The investigation reveals an interesting split. On the one
hand one can place the type of language usage exemplified by Deborah
Jenkyns and her love for Doctor Johnson. Johnson's measured, balanced
prose is embraced as a model of literary propriety, opposed to the
vulgarity of other literary forms (48). In essence, this type of
language is depicted as masculine. Not only is Johnson its originator,
but the rector is its propogator, and through Deborah ensures that
it remains at the centre of Cranford's language. The characteristics
of this type of language can be ascertained by collating the 'evidence'
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which the language of the rector, of Mr Smith, and others provide.
From Mr Smith's letter to Mary, we can deduce that 'masculine' language
confines itself to the comuunication of apparently impersonal facts:
there is rain, trade is stagnant, and business rumours are disagree-
able (172). The rector's letters to his wife share this element
of impersonality insofar as they appear not to be addressed to his
wife at all, and provide none of the personal information which she
requires from him. Instead of a letter about killing a pig, which
Mrs Jenkyn's required, she receives an ode, in classical style, addressed
to Maria. Indeed the public, impersonal style of the letter is confirmed
by the fact that the ode it contains was initiated by the occasion
of the publication of one of the rector's sermons, and is itself
reported as published in the Gentleman's Magazine number for December
1782 (88). Deborah's own letters confirm both the impersonal and
public nature of masculine speech. Miss Matty laments the necessity
for burning Deborah's letters, stating that "Anyone might profit
by reading them"(89), and comparing them to the published Letters 
on the Improvement of the Mind (1774) by Hester Chapone.
The residents of Cranford appear to share Deborah's enthusiasm
for masculine language. 20 Their obsession with nomenclature, the
'proper' form of address, suggests an interest in an impersonal use
of language which establishes public status. The discussion on
how to address Lady Glenmore (115); the preference for calling Sam
Brown 'the signor' because "it sounded so much better"(153); and
the tendency to transform names from the personal (Miss Matty;Mary)
to the formal (Miss Matilda Jenkyns; Miss Smith) when the occasion requires
it (155;191) suggests that the Cranford women can use and delight in
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a language comparable to 'masculine' language along with Deborah
and the rector.
For Mary however such language is unsatisfactory, dull, and
lifeless (88;172). Her disapproval of the letters appears to parallel
her disapproval, couched in comic terms, of that aspect of Cranford
society ruled over by the despot of 'propriety' and elegant economy.
Mary cites a number of occasions on which adherence to propriety
necessitates the public disavowal of what is a personal pleasure.
Miss Matty and Deborah must retire to separate, private rooms in
order to enjoy an orange without offending anyone with the 'unpleasantness'
of a sound associated with babies (66); Miss Matty wonders if what
she finds thoroughly entertaining is not improper, and looks to the
presence of the rector at the evening with Signor Brunoni to dispell
her reservations (136). More importantly, the fifteen minute limit
imposed on social calls suggests that 'propriety', and the impersonality
that implies, leads not only to the repression of personal pleasures,
but to stagnation. Not only does the fifteen minute rule limit conversation,
the apparent rule that ladies must talk about what they read and
the impossibility of getting good servants means that the Cranford
women, not widely-read and happy with their servants, suffer from
a "dearth of subjects for conversation."(49)
But of course, reading Cranford one is struck not by a lack
of talking but the volubility of speech. How can one account for
these apparent transgressions from the rules of propriety and 'conversa-
tion'? The answer lies in the split between the public and the personal
to which both the concept of propriety and the 'impersonal' nature
of personal letters point. Before examining that split, it is
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necessary to review the 'other' usage of language one can detect
in Cranford. If the Cranford women are concerned with nomenclature,
they are also prodigious and imaginative story tellers. 21
 Not only
does the imparter of news partake of an exalted status in Cranford
(168), but there is a constant - exchange of stories. Mary herself
(besides being the 'author' of Cranford) tells us the story of the
cow in the grey flannel suit (43-44), and shows a propensity for
fashioning tales of sentimental romance (70). Miss Matty's story
of Peter's expulsion is an evocative piece of story-telling, all
the more surprising as it comes from a usually timid speaker (98-
99); Miss Pole and Miss Matty exchange stories of murder and mayhem
(141); and all of the women reveal their talent for collective story-
telling when they manage to create the 'Panic' between them.
As story tellers the women of Cranford are certainly distinguished
from users of 'masculine' language. Whereas the latter stress fact
and maintain a demeanour of impersonality, the story telling of the
Cranford 'amazons' suggests a spontaneity and creativity opposed
to fact and impersonality. More importantly, the status of the women
as users of 'masculine' language or as story tellers is significantly
different. At each of those points where the women espouse 'masculine'
language and the rules of propriety which mimics its impersonality,
thcy are essentially ridiculous creatures. For all of Miss Matty's
asservations that Deborah's letters rank with those of Mrs Chapone's
and Mrs Carter's, the over-riding image is of Deborah brandishing
her crossed letters as models of communication, when in fact "the
words [which] gathered size like snowballs"(90) are just so much
gibberish to Miss Matty. Similarly, it is when Miss Betty Barker
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and Miss Matty adhere closely to the rules of the fifteen minute
social call, all "swimming courtesy"(108), bowing acceptance (107)
and polite speech (106-7), that Miss Matty is primarily a ridiculous
spectacle wearing two caps, and Miss Barker an unappealing snob to
the social hierarchies of Cranford. Significantly, it is Deborah,
one of the few Cranford women to abstain from story telling, who
represents the stereotypical 'spinster'; her jockey cap identifies
her as the ridiculous old maid par excellence.
As story tellers however, the Cranford women retain a dignity
which overrides any impression of ridiculousness. The dignity is
achieved primarily by the personal characteristic of story-telling.
Miss Matty's narrative on Peter's disappearance cannot be dismissed
as ridiculous, but is a moving tale of personal experience. Similarly,
the cat who swallowed the lace, and the cow in the flannel suit story
are not ridiculous, though comic. Neither Mrs Forrester nor Miss
Barker appear with two caps when relating their respective tales,
nor is communication hampered by an impenetrable style.
The change of status which the women undergo when they alter
their method of communication requires elucidation, and can be explained
by the split between the public and the private referred to earlier.
The journals attest to the prevalence of what has come to be termed
the doctrine of 'separate spheres.' The sphere of women is defined
as being "exclusively domestic" 22
 , the space within which women are
to fulfill their 'proper' destiny of being married, having children,
regulating the household, and being a helpmate to her husband. 23
 By
keeping to their 'proper' sphere, women ensure that society functions
as it should, and any considerations of the 'enlargement' of that
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sphere must be guided by an awareness of the chaos that will ensue
if the status quo were unsettled. The male 'proper' sphere embraces,
in contrast, both a domestic world of sorts (he has wife, home and
family), and a public one. It is the male who is seen as the leader
of armies, the maker of laws, the governor of empires. 24
 In
essence, the 'proper' male sphere consists of a fullness of life
which the female sphere, restricted to the domestic, does not emulate.
In Cranford the split is quite tangible. Only men such as
Captain Brown, the rector, and Mr Smith, have lives unfettered by
domesticity, and distinguished by travel. Their mobility is ubiquitous:
Brown is a half-pay captain from the army and is connected with the
railway; the rector ventures to London: and the Mr Smith leads an
active, business life. The only women, aside from Mary herself,
to have travelled is Signor Brunoni's wife. Her trek across India,
however, is not life-enhancing but life-threatening. With such unrestricted,
mobile lives, it seems only logical that these men are users of the
impersonal, masculine language. Adherence to facts is not dull and
lifeless if one's own life provides excitement, change and stimulation.
Significantly, it is the Cranford women, leading lives restricted
by elegant economy and their status as women limited to a domestic
sphere which precludes careers, who are the story-tellers - users
of a language which stresses the spontaneity, vitality and creativity
missing from their lives. 25 At the same time, the fact that the
Cranford women are also users of masculine language, and concede
to the limitations of propriety in the rules which govern their social
calls, is a vital qualification of their use of 'creative', unrestrictive
language. The women of Cranford are fragmented speakers, adapting
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to different types of language to different situations.
The fluctuating language usage of such fragmented speakers is
important, and appears to be the phenomenon upon which Mary Smith
concentrates. The existence of two languages, one which restricts
by its impersonality and insistence on facts, the other which fosters
creativity, is an indication that Mary Smith, and the text with her,
perceives the 'domestic sphere' of women in a way which would surprise
or at least discomfort the writers of the contemporary journals
We have discussed the way in which reviewers asserted the 'natural'
role of women and their place in the domestic sphere, and we have
also noted the fear which appears to structure the ridiculing of
those who attempt to widen that sphere. The fear seems initially
puzzling, accompanied as it usually is with an apparent trust that
women are 'naturally' inferior to men in intellect, 26 and that the
doctrine of separate spheres is divinely ordained. 27
But the fear indicates that despite such superficial assertions
of the ridiculousness of independent women, the reviewers are uneasy
about the status of the female domestic sphere, and its ability to
provide an outlet for all that a woman should be. In such a context,
the story-telling so foregrounded in Cranford corroborates that fear.
It is an indication that hidden behind the world of propriety and
decorum, the domestic sphere of women who cannot be wives or mothers,
is another world of existence.
This world needs to be examined in two ways: firstly, the way
in which it operates for the women in Cranford, and secondly, the
purpose to which Mary Smith puts its existence.
The first has been briefly noted. The Cranford women in general
lose that quality of ridiculousness which seams to obtain when they
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are users of 'masculine' language. More specifically, this other
'world' and its language shed the limitations of propriety and hierarchy.
What is put in its place is not a stereotypical depiction of female
speech. The Cranford women are not variations upon Austen's Miss
Bates - garrulous ridiculous spinsters - nor the source of humour
which Vicinus tell us spinsters represented in the Victorian music-
halls and operattas. 28 If the creators of 'masculine' language see
spinsters as ridiculous, voluble fools, the story telling in Cranford 
undermines that definition. If Mrs Forrester tells the story of
the cat who swallowed the lace, she does not disruptively inject
the tale into conversation. Though this 'creative' speech is free
of the strictures molding the public, fifteen-minute discourse, it
is not as a result chaotic or disordered. Mrs Forrester's tale comes
in response to Lady Glenmire's admiration for the lace, and so is
offered to one who has expressed an interest in its background.
It is a satisfying, tellable tale for the listener, not a dull, lifeless
and impersonal relation of facts.
All of the women's creative discourse share this characteristic.
They swap stories and tales as equals, knowing the interest of the
listeners and desiring to satisfy it. This is not the discourse
of the 'social' visit when financial inequalities force one to pleadL
the beauty of the night in order to disguise the absence of a coach
and four (42). As creative speakers, all such distinctions are erased.
When Miss Pole tells the story of Lady Glenmire's forthcoming marriage,
all thoughts of "darned caps and patched collars"(168) are forgotten.
In their place comes a flexibility characterised by a consideration
for speakers (168), a concern to satisfy listeners (131), and a general
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assumption of equality between speakers and listeners (149) which
encourages the exchange of tales.
Mary's interest in this other language usage, and the change
it occasions in the women, is vital. On one level she is as willing
a listener to these tales as Miss Pole, Miss Barker or Miss Matty
herself, and her enjoyment of them is evident. At the same time,
Mary does with these tales something which the Cranford women would
never think of doing: she publishes them. The importance of the
act must be emphasized. A particular incident provides a useful
illustration. The Cranford women as we have seen are fragmented
speakers. As users of masculine language, and participants in propriety,
their acts and speeches are seen to be based on social hierarchies,
and what is deemed to be the 'correct' manner of behaviour. But
Smith suggests that the use of masculine language and dictates of
what is 'proper' for spinsters is more than simply ridiculous, it
transforms the women into non-speakers. Mrs Forrester's tea parties
are a case in point. Mary notes that the women, herself included,
confine themselves to "short sentences of small talk"(41) and are
"punctual to our time."(41) Even when they are obliged to vacate
their seats in order to facilitate the removal of tea trays concealed
there, the women of Cranford continue to talk about "household forms
and ceremonies"(41), implicitly overlooking any indication that their
hostess did not have "a regular servants' hall, second table, with
housekeeper and steward"(41). In other words, the women bypass the
obvious narrative potential, the tellability, of such an incident
in preference of maintaining an illusion of a specific, socially
acceptable, atmosphere.
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But Mary does tell it, and what is more, she publishes it.
that the women deem a 'private' incident to be related when propriety
can be momentarily banished, is brought into the public realm of
discourse - taking its place with the rector's sermons, Mrs Chapone's
letters, and Doctor Johnson in the published world. By doing so
she effectively confers the same 'authority' and 'validity' which
such public discourse possesses, upon the private discourse which
resides behind the 'proper' sphere of the Cranford spinsters.
In the same way, Mary relates several incidents in which the
two types of language usage confront each other, and where the
'creative' usage effectively displaces the masculine as 'authoritative',
however temporarily. The first is the relation of the cow in the
flannel suit tale. It is important to note, first, that Captain
Brown whilst sharing a 'public' life and mobility with the other
men of Cranford, is also aligned on several levels with the 'creative'
urge of the Cranford women. Unlike the rector and the factual Mr
Smith, Captain Brown's interest lies not in the impersonal, factual
language epitomised by Johnson, but with Dickens, the model of vulgar
language usage scorned by Deborah Jenkyns (48). He also appears
to break the rules of propriety, associated with masculine language
usage, at several points. Not only does he attend the women's tea
parties unlike the other male inhabitants of Cranford (46), he also
does not modulate his discourse to the occasion, talking instead
"in a voice too large for the room."(43) This breaking of 'propriety'
of course appeals to the ladies who are also breakers of propriety
when they swap stories, and it is not surprising that Captain Brown
is popular with the women at Cranford.
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This popularity, however, does not banish or preclude Brown's
usage of 'masculine' speech, and it is equally unsurprising that
he is also considered an "authority"(43) by the women of Cranford
in a way similar to the 'authority' of men such as Johnson and the
rector. His gender seems to strike the women of Cranford more than
his interest in 'creative' language. His dual status has been thus
outlined because it is an important fact to bring to any look at
the incident of the cow in the flannel suit. Miss Betty Barker,
owner of the poor lime-flayed cow in question, approaches Brown for
advice. She accepts his sarcastically offered precepts in a manner
which the 'authority' of masculine language dictates. That is, Miss
Barker accepts all of Brown's statement as 'fact.' One might wonder
that she is not surprised that language deserving of the 'authorative'
label should apparently be able to diversify into personal response
(in the suggestion to dress the cow). Miss Barker is either too
assured of its 'authority' to question what appears to be a deviation
from the factual, or she is too relieved to hear the 'solution' offered
to question its validity. Accordingly, a flannel waistcoat and flannel
drawers are fetched, and the cow survives.
The incident is interesting on several levels. On the first,
it reveals one of the pitfalls of impersonal, masculine language.
Brown's real advice, to kill the cow, neglects to consider one vital
piece of information: Miss Barker's cow is no ordinary cow, it is
a favoured pet, the loss of which would be devastating. For Brown,
a cow with no hair is simply one which should be killed, presumably
because it is past its functional use. 29 He overlooks the personal
element in Miss Barker's request.
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Secondly, the fact that the advice which was offered flippantly
in masculine terms, proves successful suggests that 'authority; and
the sense of infallibility which goes with it, usually attributed
to 'masculine' language is not wholly deserved. What to one language
seems a fanciful and frivolous measure, is a viable alternative in
another, and one which avoids the cruelty of impersonality that masculine
usage implicitly suggests.
Another incident in Cranford illustrates the way in which the
'creative' speech of the women is a more benevolent language usage
than the masculine. At the same time the incident reveals the way
in which the women at Cranford are constantly shuttling between masculine
language and the rules which accompany it, and their own private
discourse. When Miss Matty enters a shop, only to hear of the rejection
of a man's five pound note, she immediately engages in conversation
with them in an attempt to understand the situation., What is crucial
here is that thoFe rules of 'propriety' which would disallow Matty
from discussing subjects with a shopkeeper and farmer (the individual
involved), except within an exchange recognising social hierarchies,
are here absent. Matty, Mr Johnson the shopkeeper, and Mr Dobson
the farmer, engage in an exchange in which each has an equal, personal
interest. As a 'personal' speaker, unhampered by rules of public
discourse for middle class spinsters, Matty is able to speak freely
and cogently about the note. Once however Matty becomes aware of
the public context of this speech-exchange, the individuals with
whom she speaks become an "audience(177). In public, the rules
of propriety reassert themselves, and though Matty follows through
her parsonal interest in the transaction by making good the farmer's
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rejected note, she loses her eloquence. It belongs to the realm
of equal, creative speakers, not the public world of short sentences
and time limitations.
A final illustration confirms the status of creative speech
as usage which is effective and viable in contrast to the stultification
of masculine speech. Matty tells Mary of the time when her father
made Deborah and herself keep a diary: "on one side [they] were
to put down in the morning what [they] thought would be the course
and events of the coming day, and at night [they] were to put down
on the other side what really happened."(158) As Matty tells us
this in the context of a discussion on matrimony and her own _past
belief that she would marry, the recollection that it was the rector's
concern for social hierarchies that prevented Matty's marriage to
Holbrook (69) highlights the potential for cruelty in the 'masculine'
use of language, and the accompanying rules of propriety. In his
emphasis on facts, the rector denies what we recognise is a positive,
vital use of language. To imagine what will happen in one's day
is closely akin to telling a story; the rector's insistence on puncturing
that 'story' by the 'facts' of the day appears a hard lesson which
we as readers are meant to reject in favour of the delight which
the exercise of the imagination can bring.
Ultimately of course whilst these episodes attest to the positive,
creative aspect of the 'private' discourse of the Cranford women,
one is struck by the way in which they vacillate between 'masculine'language
and the creative, personal speech of their own stories. It is Mary
who asserts the validity of such creative speech, not the women themselves.
The difference between Mary's perception of story-telling and the
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women's perception can best be seen if we look at a specific occurence
in Cranford: the return of Peter Jenkyns. The return has been inter-
preted as an admission on Gaskell's part that 'women without men'
lead unsatisfactory and inadequate lives. 30
 The interpretation can
be challenged on several levels.
Firstly one must point out that Peter, like Captain Brown, cannot
be aligned completely with masculine users of language such as the
rector, Mr Smith and Doctor Johnson. Though his school letters to
his father show a capacity to utilise the "occasional quotation from
the classics,"(92) his 'real' style appears to have a more personal
element akin to the creative language of the women in Cranford.
Importantly, it is the excerpts of these more 'personal' sections
of his letters ("Mother dear, do send me a cake, and put plenty of
citron in," and "My dear, dear, dear, dearest mother, I will be a
better boy -- I will indeed . . ."(92)], which are quoted to us,
not the accounts of his studies written to his father. The excerpts
suggest that it is this 'personal' language which we are to note
as constituting Peter's salient characteristic.
With the capacity for such personal writing, it is not surprising
that Peter proves to be, upon his return to Cranford, as prodigious
a story-teller as the women themselves (211). He is accordingly
very popular with them, and they delight in his tales of India.
But his warm reception into the Cranford circle is not primarily
an indication of an empty space of Cranford society which he then
fills. Though his appearance in Cranford means that Matty closes
her tea-shop, and the kind contributions of her friends are no longer
necessary, one must not deduce that the tea-shop and the contributions
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were therefore, and necessarily, only inadequate measures taken by
the inadequate women in Cranford. Mary is careful to point out that
the tea shop is a viable concern (205) and that Matty enjoys the
employment it brings her.
Still, Peter's reappearance does effect change, and one must
investigate its nature in order to determine precisely the role he
plays in Cranford. It is important to note, for example, that whilst
the women enjoy Peter's story-telling prowess, they also have the
tendency to view him as 'authoritative' in much the same way that
they saw Captain Brown in two ways. It is by appeal to propriety,
and the social hierarchy that underpins it, that Peter successfully
brings together that bastion of social snobbery, Mrs Jamieson, and
the woman who so offends her, Mrs Hoggins. His 'authority' as a
male means that Mrs Jamieson responds to his bribe of patronage rather
than to the apparent transgression of hierarchies which Mrs Hoggins
represents (217). As creatures who vacillate between masculine language
and story telling, it is not surprising that the women of Cranford
respond to Peter in both ways.
But though the women see Peter as 	 authoritative because
of his gender and a story teller, Mary suggests an alternative.
For Mary, it seems Peter is simply another Cranfordian. His reappear-
ance at Cranford does not change its world fundamentally. He simply
foregrounds one aspect of Cranford society which is always latent,
in much the same way that Mary does by publishing the tales. Though
the appeal to hierarchy effects the change, it is the equality and
"old friendly sociability"(218) which always existed in the women's
story-telling that Peter helps to precipitate.
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Accordingly, Mary as story teller foregrounds not the ploy by
which Peter bribes Mrs Jamieson, but the story of the cherubim which
he uses to maintain it (217), and the effect of equal sociability
which is the ultimate result. In other words, Mary presents Peter
as a creative type of language user, not as a representative of the
'authority' of masculine language and gender.
For the reader sensitive to the depiction of types of language
in Cranford, the opening sentence seems no longer ironic. By asserting
the validity of a language which stresses creativity, equality and
the personal, Mary attempts to banish the fragmented female self
created by the split between the 'public' female sphere - that is
the domestic, restricted sphere of the Cranford spinsters - and the
'private', or hidden sphere of their story telling. She confers
retrospectively a unification of being upon Cranford women which,
as speakers/users of both masculine and creative languages, they
lack. By 'publishing' their private speech and in effect making
them speak, Mary attempts to fashion the women of Cranford into 'amazons;
women who, like those referred to in the contemporary journals, step
out of the boundaries of a female 'proper' sphere by speaking with
a voice not contained by the domestic sphere to which they ostensibly
belong. 31
The appeal of fashioning such a unified female self is certainly
strong. If Ruth articulates anything it is the extent to which Gaskell
perceives the absence of a unified self as 'non self', that is an
horrific annihilation of being. The strange serenity that surrounds
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Ruth's insane death suggests that death, however individually a tragedy,
is in some manner preferable to an existence of continual efforts
to redefine 'essence' in the hopes of eventually achieving an acceptable
and liberating image of womanhood. But does Cranford provide such
an image?
The answer is a complex one. On the side of reservation, one
must note that the Cranford women do not themselves speak publicly.
Their private story-telling remains private, and they would not 'publish'
it as Mary does. Secondly, Cranford does not address the obstacle
to a unified female self which Ruth posits: sexuality. The Victorian
journals and indeed the 1851 census itself can only discuss the 'excess'
number of women as a 'problem' because of the assumption they share
that women are simply a sexual function. 32Women are intended to marry
and have children; if they cannot, because they outnumber men, women
become not wives nor mothers, but spinsters. The label indicates
that the sexual function is stagnant because unused in a legitimate
way.
Cranford seems to have overlooked the sexual basis, then, of
the doctrine of separate spheres. Though it notes the fragmented
life of the Cranford women, it does not grasp the prime reason for
that fragmentation. Even when it does enter into the realm of the
sexual, Cranford does not link it with fragmentation. Mary Smith
notes the way in which the Misses Jenkyns retire to their separate
rooms when sucking oranges. But she does not overtly connect their
sense of shame at a noise resembling that of an infant's suckling
to the ignorance of sexual matters revealed in Matty's obliviousness
to Martha's pregnancy. Both incidents confirm the Misses Jenkyns'
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exemplary status as what Cominos terms the 'innocent femina sensualis.'
The attitude to oranges, and Miss Matty's ignorance of a nine-month
pregnant woman, suggest that the mechanism of repression which Cominos
describes is functioning well to repress all things connected with
sexuality, instincts and desires, and keeps both Miss Jenkyns's as
models of female modesty and sexual ignorance.
But even if Cranford did address the sexuality which causes
fragmentation of the female self, and still managed to fashion an
image of unified womanhood, how successful is that image? Mary is
a case in point. It is an important, though not an emphasized point,
that if Matty is ignorant of childbirth, Mary is not. Though she
comes from a similar middle class background, Mary is not an Innocent
Femina Sensualis. She knows of sexual matters, at least in its maternal
manifestation, and is an advocate for reaching for what one desires
[eg. her enthusiasm for Matty's trip to Holbrook's farm (72)]. More
significantly, it is Mary who is the 'speaking centre' of Cranford.
If Mary is the unfragmented, speaking female self which Cranford 
celebrates, how does one account for the complete absence of review/readings
of the novel which ascertain that self? The contemporary reviews
of Cranford did not view it as 'amazonian', as a threatening, speaking
image of women unconfined to 'proper' spheres. Contemporary reviewers
saw in the text a reflection of what was 'real' in their society.
"[T]his unpretending little' book evokes the reality of its old-
maid 'heroines' and their commonplace lives." 33 - the emphasis is
upon the 'realistic' qualities of a book which depicts the 'little'
sphere of spinsters in a 'little' book, reasserting a reassuring
image of spinsters, not as leading a rather large army (349,871)
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of amazons, but as leading commonplace and unthreatening lives.
It is the "'imitation' of ordinary life"; 34 the well-written account
of what is "'almost nothing to write about,'" 35 the "'most inimitable
portraiture of human nature female'"' 36
 the exaltation of "traditional
female 'virtues"; 87 and the "uniquely adorable vitality" 88 , which
captivated contemporary readers and continues to appeal to readers
today. The stress is on finding in Cranford something which, whilst
'adorable,' in no way confounds the reader. It is 'portraiture',
'realism,' the encounter of nothing unknown, that characterises this
response to Cranford.
How are the contradictory views possible? How does the 'challenge'
which Mary's narrative constitutes remain so clearly unobserved by
these readers? The answer lies in the text itself. One remembers
Matty's conversation in the draper's shop about the demise of the
joint-stock bank, her imllediate eloquence and sudden inarticulacy.
The change was effected by Matty's sudden redefinition of her listeners:
different listeners entailed and so elicited different speech. The
incident seems a fairly close analogy to the situation in which Cranford 
finds itself. Some readers see in the text a level of meaning which
disrupts the traditional image of womanhood; others see it as confirmation
of that image. If we then recall Gaskell's Unitarian, speech-act
based, background, its ideological assumptions, we can see the reasons
why Cranford can be seen to occupy an uneasy status in her writings:
it both asserts 'truths' which she found missing from the dominant
culture's imaging of women, and undermines those 'truths' by disclosing
fundamental flaws in the process by which those truths were constructed.
One recalls Unitarianism's insistence on the importance of the
191
individual: the emphasis upon the individual's outlook on events
and the subsequent valuation of the concept of witnessing; the stress
on each individual to work continually through speech and act towards
a type of language termed 'pure performative.' One then recalls
the Gaskell's deep interest in Romantic literature, and the emphasis
on the individual in that tradition. One further recalls the Unitarian
emphasis on the right of the individual to education and, in broader
terms, their political support of such democratic movements as the
Revolution in France, and their unease (eventually settled) over
the apparent over-riding of individual rights in the American Civil
war when they considered the right of the South to secede from the
Union. 40 The emphasis is quite clearly on the individual, the autonomous
unified self, to participate freely in society. The fettering of
just such a self, through denial of access to education, information,
or the right to vote, was a major Unitarian concern.
Cora Kaplan in an essay concerned with the relationship of women
to the concept of the autonomous, unified self, begins with the example
of Mary Wollstonecraft and A Vindication of the Rights of Women (1792).
Although Wollstonecraft was not a Unitarian herself, she came into
contact with it through her friendship with Dr. Richard Price. 42 In
the simplest terms, Wollstonecraft, a warm supporter of the French
Revolution, saw as the major obstacle to female participation in
the democratic process an education which led to a concept of the
female self which effectively barred involvement. The woman, as
exemplified in Emile's (1762) Sophy, is no more than an object of
desire, incapable of rational, autonomous selfhood. In A Vindication./
therefore, Wollstonecraft strives to liberate women from this sexually-
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based identity in order that they could freely and equally take part
in the democratic process opening up to them. 43
It would seem that Gaskell's Unitarianism and its concept of
language necessitates a similar construction of the unified, autonomous
female self. Beginning with the positing of a model of society in
which each individual slowly progressed towards the divine language
of the 'pure performative' through the exercise of their own 'performative'
language skills, Gaskell first encounters the social injunction against
female speech - that is she encounters the 'pastoral contract', the
contract of communication by which a female 'communicates,' or is
spoken, through her physical presence. Gaskell's struggle against
this contract and its privileging of female 'presence' has been explored
in Ruth, but it would seem that Cranford constitutes Gaskell's 'answer'
to the pastoral contract. If one can make women 'speak,' the pastoral
contract is not only nullified, but the now autonomous and unified
female speaker can get on with her divinely appointed task along
with all the other Unitarian individuals.
What both Gaskell and Unitarianism neglect to explore is the
security of the basis of the 'speaking self.' Cranford presents
'speaking' women, but not all readers have moved closer to the image
of womanhood which the 'speaking female self' suggests is possible.
In order to explore the foundations of the 'unified self' it is first
necessary to construct an idea of what this concept 'meant' to individuals
like Gaskell, and what powers would have been attributed to it.
The Unitarian conception of a 'performative' language is a good starting
point. The term 'performative'language assumes a 'performer', an
individual who 'performs' the act of speaking. Unitarianism with
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its basis in the Scottish commonsense philosophers and its belief
that one must trust God-given senses, would never question the assumption
of such an identity. One's senses 'prove' that one exists: the
existence of the 'I', the performer, of the utterance is not challenged
or doubted.
The notion of performative language and the '1 1 /performer also
implies, as speech-act theory makes clear, the idea of intention
and commitment. Victorian Unitarians would concede this characteristic,
concerned as they were with achieving a language in which act/word
coincided, and with measuring human performatives by the degree to
which speech coincided with act. Speech acts are in some way 'guaranteed'
or 'made good' by the speaker her/himself. The 'felicity' of a promise
depends upon the subsequent actions of the speaker. Accompanying
this notion of intention is one of control. The speaker is seen
as in 'control' of the 'meaning' which his/her speech act imparts
to a listener. But as Derrida points out, this assumption is contradictory
with the speech act view of language. Speech act theory foregrounds
the communicative element of language, the way in which speakers
utilise language forms to relay meaning. Necessarily, a model of
language forms or structures which can be appropriated by the speaker
for his/her utterances is proposed. Included amongst these structures
(eg. that verb will follow noun, and will agree) is a commitment
to shared meaning. Each speaker 'communicates' knowing that listeners
hear the utterance with an understanding of the meaning he implies
with each word. Derrida points out however that the pre-existence
of these structures and forms contradicts the idea of a speaker in
'control' of meaning. If s/he has to choose from pre-existing meanings
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and structures, then the very act of 'choice' limits the meanings
available for use, and precludes the possibility of an individual
in complete 'control' of speech. 44 For Derrida, speech act's theory
of language "partake[s] of the differance or distancing from origin
that marks all language in so far as it exceeds and pre-exists the
speaker's intention." 45
One can see in this quick over-view why Cranford might be, in
Unitarian terms, a radical text. A female, speaking 'I' effectively
banishes the pastoral contract. Gaskell proceeds from the fundamental
premise that women have a unified self which is simply fragmented
in the dominant culture. It is a case simply of releasing the barred
segments of femaleness by giving women a chance to do what they are
denied: that is to speak. 46 Once given the opportunity to speak,
to undermine the 'authority' of the 'speaking' female physical presence,
individual women can relay her 'own' meanings. Having a woman 'speak'
that the female possesses a unified, autonomous self, that the life
women lead and the language they use is as valid as that of the male
in dominant culture, is to relay the meaning of the vitality, the
attractiveness, and the real existence of such a female self.
What Cranford shows us however, is that the 'communicative'
model of language is the only one which will yield such a meaning.
Moreover, it shows us that speech-act theory has a fundamental flaw
which accOunts for the differing responses to the text. Speech act
theory assumes that each speaker and listener will agree to enter
discourse with the 'agreed' meanings it posits. It does not account
for the refusal of speakers to make such a pact; the effect of such
variables as gender and class on the conception of that pact; or
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a speaker/listener's decision to withdraw from the pact, but to keep
that withdrawal secret. In other words Cranford shows us the precise
way in which readers, approaching the text, can refuse or reject
the 'meanings' which the text potentially contains. If Cranford 
foregrounds the story telling capacity of women, a reader can 'choose'
to foreground, not the story tellings, but its position within the
masculine language of the dominant culture. One can choose to foreground
Matty's inarticulacy in front of an audience and so view that inarticulacy
as a literary corollary to the 'speech-less' status of women in the
dominant culture. 47 That choice, furthermore, is influenced by the
particular point which social/biological variables meet to form
from which 'I' approach the text. If I am a male reviewer, writing
in an anti-feminist review for anti-feminist readers, my 'choice'
will be made accordingly: 'I' will foreground inarticulacy. 48
Cranford's reception points moreover to a contradiction in the
text itself. Where story telling stresses the equality of speakers,
and the text attempts to upgrade the status of women by both giving
them speech and asserting its equality with the dominant 'male' discourse,
the effect of Cranford is very different. One must note that 'equality'
in the 'new' language foregrounded in the text effectively means
'shared meanings.' It does not mean that differing meanings are
given equal status in the text. One enters Cranford as Peter and
Captain Brown do - as a story teller or user of 'creative' language
in some way. Peter and Brown must share Mary's disdain of hierarchy
to be admitted. Though masculine language is ostensibly asked to
consider a 'co-language', in effect Cranford banishes 'masculine
language' as completely as it is possible. It does not become part
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of the 'shared' meaning of Cranford society. By privileging story
telling and equality, by silencing masculine language by labelling
it dull, lifeless and impersonal, Cranford performs the same act
of exclusion, restriction and silencing of which it accuses the
dominant culture.
All of this assumes of course the pre-existence of a 'speaker'
to use the structures of language as meaningfully, or for Derrida
as meaninglessly, for him/herself as possible. But the existence
of such a speaker, such an 'I', is itself a contestable point.
Benveniste, in Problems in General Linguistics, questions to what
the 'I' in speech refers. He notes that "[t]here is no concept
'I' that incorporates all the I's that are uttered every moment in
the mouths of all speakers," 49
 and questions if 'I' can therefore
be a reference to any particular individual. What he concludes is
that the 'I' in discourse can refer only "to the act of individual
discourse in which it is pronounced, and by this it designates a
speaker . . . [it] has only a momentary reference. The reality to
which it refers is the reality of the discourse." 50 In other words,
the 'I' of speech is only the 'I' which is at a specific point in
time uttering. In order to proclaim oneself constantly a subject,
one would constantly have to use 'I', for "the basis of subjectivity
is in the exercise of language." 51
One can see in this context the importance of 'speaking,' of
saying 'I', for the female. But more, one sees the precariousness
of that 'I' which Cranford presents as a liberating image. If the
'I' position which enables the individual to speak, 52 refers to no
constant individual 'I', except that one to which it refers in that
specific moment of discourse, in what is the 'unified' self to take
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root? How can one postulate that such a changing entity can generate
meaning in a way that another 'I', similarly inconstant and changing,
could grasp and retain? 'Meaning' would necessarily be as fleeting
and as impossible to pin down as post-structuralists posit it to
be. 53
 
Cranford's basis in the unity of self, the power of discourse,
and the ability of each unified self to use discourse as a means
of conveying the 'intended' meaning of the self, is thus Challenged.
Having just read Cranford, and derived from it this very concept
of a unified, female self, one can only conclude that ultimately
the question one must ask is, "What does the experience of reading
do for the 'reader'?" Belsey notes that realist fiction is one of
the ways in which the existing ideology of modern time (capitalist/
liberal humanist) represents and reproduces the "myths and beliefs
necessary to enable people to work within the existing social
formation." 54 The particular myth which realist fiction represents
is the individual's existence as an autonomous, unified self. By
inviting the reader to assess or 'judge' the 'truth' of the reproduction,
the reader effectively 'proves' his/her existence and the validity
of his/her world view (it is 'truth' in this 'realist' novel). The
fact that 'I' can see in Cranford's concept of a female unified self
the signs of collapse of the conception itself, must be a positive
thing. If the very structure of essence Cranford is proposing offers
the possibility of fluidity, then for women who have always been
constrained/limited by the insistence on an 'essential' self, the
power of 'essence' (even when sympathetically refashioned) is drastically
undermined. Secondly, and perhaps this is where one must bring a
perpetually undermining, shifting argument to an end, the ability
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to posit a 'reading,' a 'perspective' in a mode of discourse (realism)
which attempts to state that only one 'truth' is possible, is a radical
ability. "[Texts] do not determine like fate the ways in which they
must be read." 55 Finding a relativist perspective on realism, and
so finding that "meaning is never a fixed essence inherent in the
text but is always constructed by the reader, the result of a 'circulation'
between social formation, reader and text," 56
 means being able to
approach such texts as Cranford as the ideological constructs they
are: containing no 'truths', negative or positive, but ideologies
which we can reject, reshape or appropriate as we see fit.
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Chapter Six: North and South (1855)
Midway through North and South, Margaret Hale and John Thornton
discuss the meaning of the terms 'gentleman' and 'man.' Thornton
asserts that the former is "a term that only describes a person in
his relation to others; but when we speak of him as a 'man', we consider
him not merely with regard to his fellow-men, but in relation to
himself, - to life - to time - to eternity." 1
 
 Thornton quite evidently
places a higher value on the relation of man to himself, and Margaret
with a "slow conviction"(218) she finds unable to express agrees.
There follows proof that Thornton's preference for the latter term
yields a very authoritative, and to Margaret, attractive image.
Thornton's brusque comments to other masters about the strike, reveal
him to be a 'man' sturdily in touch with himself. His comments,
studded as they are with 'I's', are notable for the attention they
draw to the image of a man of endurance, strength and faith in himself.
The incident is an interesting one since it points to a conflict
of 'meaning' and its source which is central to the novel: the def-
inition of 'I' which the individual attributes to, and forges for,
him/herself, and the relationship of that 'I' to the 'I' whose
meaning is formulated in relation to others in a community. The
incident is central too because the existence of, and value attached
to, these two definitions of 'I' are asserted by a man, attended
to and conceded by a woman, within the context of discourse.
Before beginning an exploration of the significance of the above
incident, it is perhaps useful to overview the concept of 'meaning'
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and its relation to discourse and the speaking subject so as to keep
in mind the approaches which are possible. Derrida's analysis of
Husserl's phenomenology is one such overview which both outlines
the assumptions about meaning in a traditional western metaphysics,
and points to their contradictions and limitations. One can propose
that Gaskell's Unitarian education and beliefs, with its 'commonsense'
belief in the evidence of one's senses rooted in the work of the
eighteenth-century Scottish common sense philosophers, its stress
on rationality, and the division traditionally implicit in such a
stress between the mind or soul and the body, shares many of the
assumptions of the traditional metaphysics Derrida detects in Husserl's
work. One can conjecture, therefore, that Husserl's perspective
on meaning and discourse is a fair approximation to the types of
ideas on meaning and the individual's relation to it which informed
Gaskell's attitude to the subject.
A simplified version of Husserl's main premises is as follows.
Firstly, and most revealingly to Derrida, Husserl's interpretation
of the sense of being is as 'presence': "something is insofar as
it presents itself or is capable of presenting itself to a subject-
as the present object (ob-jection) of a sensible intuition or as
an objectivity presented to thought", 2 and the subject or self "is
only insofar as it is self-present, present to itself in the immediacy
of a conscious act." 3 Upon this foundation of 'being as presence'
Husserl erects the possibility of 'meaningful' language. The move
from one to the other needs to be examined closely. It would seem
that for Husserl, the awareness of being (or presence) and being
itself are the same thing. In the same way, the awareness of things
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in the sensory world (sense experience) and the things themselves
are the same - 'objects' are what one intuits them to be, not temporal
objects, but ideal in the Platonic manner. 'Meaning' then is subjective,
is controlled and intended by the subject whose awareness of being/being
itself is the transcendental signifier which allows him/herself to
intuit 'meaning'.
The possibility for meaningful language thus established, Husserl
further divides it into two categories: expressive signification
and indicative signification. The former is what Husserl terms,
and privileges, as 'pure expression'. Pure expression takes place
within the internal sphere of the subject's "solitary mental life" 4
in the awareness of being as it were. Indeed, the expressive sign-
ification has not even need to go beyond this internal sphere; it
is a type of internal monologue whose 'meaning' is ever clear and
present to the internal sphere in which it takes place because that
sphere is also the site of 'meaning' itself. It is a monologue utilising,
as it were, 'pure' signs that can be "fully understood as [they]
are found in . . . private mental life, without reference to transient
circumstances or actual empirical objects." 5
When expressive signification does venture outside of the 'solitary
mental life', as it necessarily must for Husserl admits that 'expression'
is 'originally framed' for communication, it is transformed into
'indicative signification' which is essentially a voluntary ex-terior-
isation of the 'meaning' of the internal sphere. Since such an expression
cannot be the expressive signification, it is necessarily indicative.
Actual communication is precisely a matter of indicative signification,
a "re-presentation of what primordially occurs in [the] inner sphere." 6
207
As such it is a 'contaminated' version of 'pure expression', of pure
signs, capable only of indicating meaning. 7 It comes, in effect,
only at the expense of meaning. 8 It is important to note that 'expression'
involves the intention or will of the internal sphere to express:
"[I]t animates a voice which may remain entirely internal and . .
the expressed is a meaning . . . , that is, an ideality 'existing'
nowhere in the world." 9 There is "no expression [no indicative sign-
ification] without the intention of a subject animating the sign". 10
'Meaning', in comumnication, remains in the control of the speaking
subject.
The main points to be drawn from Husserl then, for the purposes
of the argument here, are three in number: i) that Husserl posits
being as 'presence' and that one's constant presence to oneself constitutes
'subjectivity' or the solitary mental life; ii) that the site of
consciousness is also the site of meaning, of expressive signification
(pure signs); and iii) that the expression of 'meaning' is effected
through indicative signification and is a willed, intentional process
which involves a 'contamination' from the 'pure expressive' or the
meaning of expressive signification.
What Derrida sets out to prove, by pointing to inconsistencies
in Husserl's account, is that 'signification' precedes and gives
rise to the very concepts of self, presence and meaning, and is not
the result of those concepts. 11 Meaning, for Derrida, is not what
is explicitly intended or willed by a subject, a matter of 'pure
signs', but "derives from the distance that extends between one particular
sign and the system of other signs in linguistic use." 12
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Derrida begins his deconstruction by pointing to the implicit
contradictions of Husserl's interpretation of being as presence.
Husserl conflates awareness of being and being itself so as to imply
a state of 'being' which is not maintained through repetition, but
is atemporal. 'Self-presence', however, which forms Husserl's basis
of consciousness of being, seems to imply a continuous (and so temporal)
process - the repeated presentation of self to self provides the
basis for 'meaning', for establishing the ideality of the object,
the 'pure sign'. As Derrida says, ideality is "but another name
for the permanence of the same and the possibility of its repetition
• . • absolute ideality is the correlative of a possibility of indefinite
repetition. ,, 13
Secondly, Derrida points out that Husserl "admits that expression
is 'originally framed' to serve the function of communication. And
yet expression itself is never purely expression as long as it fulfil5
this original function; only when communication is suspended can
pure expression appear." 14
 Derrida traces this confusion to Husserl's
conception of the 'sign' in general which Husserl never actually
discusses, and yet which must exist if his distinction between expressive
signification and indicative signification is to work. Husserl asserts
that 'indication' is not a function of the solitary life: "In a
monologue words can form no function of indicating the existence
of mental acts, since such indication would there be quite purposeless.
For the acts in question are themselves experienced by us at that
very moment." 15 Self-communication is an impossibility; one can
imagine oneself communicating with oneself, but this is only a represent-
ation of communication. Indeed, as Derrida points out, there is
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no need to communicate with oneself in Husserl's philosophy, certainly
not to prove the existence of the inner sphere: "The certitude of
inner existence, Husserl thinks, has no need to be signified. It
is immediately present to itself. It has living consciousness." 16
And yet, Husserl posits expressive signification - a term which Derrida
shows to be a contradiction, even in Husserlian terms. If 'expression'
and 'pure expression' are the 'meaning' of the solitary mental life,
their uniqueness is implied. Yet signification, and language, by
its very nature, is representative. A sign is re-usable, one is
able to repeat it. It is its "formal identity [which] enables it
to be issued again and to be recognised." 17
 Without formal identity,
a "sign . . . would take place but 'once' [and that] would not be
a sign." 18 Husserl's term expressive signification seems to betray
that it is representative in nature, not the matter of 'pure signs'
as Husserl claims it to be.
Effectively, Derrida deconstructs in Husserl what he sees as
a variant of the privileging of voice over writing common .in Western
philosophies. 19 HusserL's privil2ging of a:Tressive signification
as a matter of pure signs is akin to the privileging of voice, or
voix, and the idea of presence, and the individual's intention of
meaning (hence more 'truthful' language) which lies behind it.
Similarly, his downgrading of indicative signification, as a contamin-
ation of the pure signs in order to communicate, is analagous to
the ubiquitous damning of writing as more false, because removed
from 'presence', than voice in Western culture.
With Husserl and Derrida's analysis of his work in mind, North
and South is more than one woman's return to the site of social issues
she explored in Mary Barton seven years earlier. If the text has
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as its ostensible subject the relationship between the working classes
and the 'masters' who employ them, it also has as a sub-structure
of sorts a concern with the relationship of the speaking subject
to the concept of 'meaning' which informs and complicates the superficial
'social' theme of social relations. If we examine Margaret Hale's
progress in the novel and compare it with that of John Thornton,
her male antagonist/protagonist, that sub-structure of subject and
meaning is spotlighted.
The opening scene in Harley street, London, neatly sets up the
types of overt issues and themes which the text explores. Edith,
all "white muslin and blue ribbons . . . and silken curls"(35), is
set against the ignored "tall, finely made figure, in [a] black silk
dress"(39) which Margaret presents. Her physical difference from
the conventionally pretty, and socially-admired and desired figure
of Edith, is an important aspect of Margaret's 'uniqueness'. For
if Edith is seen as the pliant soft figure of femaleness whose
'identity' is rooted in, if not constituted by, the traditional roles
of mother and wife which she is on the threshold of assuming, Margaret
is presented to the reader as that rarity: the woman who is, and
wants to be, in control of her self and her identity. What makes
Edith "shiver and shudder"(37) in dual proof of her conventional
femininity (the shuddering is both a call to be "coaxed out of her
dislike by her fond lover"(37) and a manifestation of her real distaste
for anything resembling an unusual life), makes Margaret "glow"(37),
come alive in a way which underscores her 'deviance' from the trad-
itionally feminine.
But more than this physical uniqueness, Margaret is presented
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in these early pages as a woman who not only aims to control her
own identity, but who appears to have, in her own view, successfully
conveyed that identity to others. Both levels of 'controlled meaning'
are intimately linked with life at Helstone, and it perhaps best
to begin there in tracing Margaret's 'uniqueness'. Margaret is brought
"all untamed from the forest"(38) to London, and whilst that adjective
suggests the gradual 'civilisation' of her into a creature socially
acceptable in London, her leavetaking of that city is tinged with
"cat-like regret"(39). The description, slight as it is, points
to a 'core' of Margaret which is presented as relatively unchanged
by her life in London, and it is to that 'core' that one must pay
attention. It is the core which "snuff[s] up"(39) the spicy eastern
smell of the Indian shawls she is called upon to model, and which
takes tactile pleasure in those same shawls' "soft feel and their
brilliant colours"(39) in a way which is linked to childhood,
specifically for Margaret, her Helstone childhood (40).
More importantly, this 'core' provides Margaret with a strong
sense of control over 'meaning'. If Helstone is a place where, as
she later recalls, she walked "only guided by her own sweet will"(110),
it is also a place the meaning of which Margaret is confident she
has complete control. Attempting to describe Helstone to the barrister
Lennox, Margaret is adamant that she is "not making a picture [but]
trying to describe Helstone as it really is."(42) Although the comment
reveals Margaret's distrust that language can adequately convey 'reality',
it equally reveals that Margaret is speaking as someone who assumes
she has the 'reality' of Helstone firmly in her mind. Where Lennox
anticipates a description of the 'picturesque', that is what has
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been socially accepted as the "village in a tale"(42), Margaret insists
not only on her on perspective, but on the connection between her
perspective ["what I think of it"(43)] and reality itself ["what
it really is"(43)]. The connection is represented textually with
a (-), and the immediacy of connection which that dash denotes must
be noted. And indeed the control over Helstone which Margaret's
comments imply here, is clearly upheld in the chapter of her return
to Helstone itself. The forest fern "yield[s]"(48) to Margaret's
tramping foot, its people are "her people"(48), and her life at
Helstone, most specifically her life in the forest, "realize[s] all
Margaret's anticipations."(48) She appears, in other words, to be
that unique being whose 'life' seems composed of what Husserl would
call her 'solitary mental life' - at least to herself. For Margaret,
the inner and outer Helstone, no matter how difficult to describe
or represent in language, match - her 'meanings', her definitions
of Helstone and its pleasures appear to be the sole ones they contain.
Unsurprisingly in one so confident of her 'meaning' of place,
Margaret is similarly confident of her 'control' over the 'meaning'
of herself. What Margaret is to herself, she assumes she is to others,
and any apparent indication that this is otherwise is forcibly rejected.
Margaret, standing in the Indian shawls when Lennox bursts into the
room, is not, like the other ladies, "half-ashamed of their feminine
interest in dress"(40). Having no such feminine interest (hers is
tactile and sensuous), Margaret looks at Lennox with a "bright, amused
face, as if assured of his sympathy in her sense of the ludicrousness
at being thus surprised."(40) She assumes, in other words, that
her 'look will effectively convey her 'meaning', her dissociation
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from the feminine interest in dress to Lennox.
The same assumption of control over self-definition is seen
in Margaret's reactions and responses to Lennox when he visits Helstone.
It is an indication of the strength of Margaret's belief in such
control, that it takes a proposal of marriage from Lennox for Margaret
to begin to, if not question, then doubt the strength of her self-
definition. Lennox's arrival causes no initial alarm in Margaret.
She greets him openly and eagerly, and does not seem to note the
very 'personal' signification which Lennox attaches to this visit.
What seemed to Margaret a friendly promise to visit Helstone merits,
in Lennox's view, to be spoken about in the "lower tone"(54) of voice
reserved for intimacy. Margaret's resilient ignorance of Lennox's
purpose in visiting, however, remains intact. His sketch of Margaret
appears no indication of his personal interest in her - her flush
seems more the result of the exertion of washing her paint palette
than any sign of flustered embarrassment. Lennox appears dumbfounded
by Margaret's ignorance of what a "regular London girl . . . looking
through every speech that a young man made her for the arriere-pensee 
of a compliment"(58), would soon discern. He certainly is sure that
Mr Hale will perceive the meaning of his visit, and withholds his
sketch of Margaret momentarily for that very reason (58).
When Lennox does venture to propose, one is struck by Margaret's
surprise and contempt. Having always though of Lennox as a friend,
his proposal is not only startling but an affront, an assault, to
her self-definition. She has not considered herself as a 'lover',
and for Lennox to do so is highly offensive. It is "maidenly dignity"(61)
which characterises Margaret to herself, not desirability. The guilt
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she feels at having found herself "grown so much into a woman as
to be thought of in marriage"(65 - emphasis mine), suggests that
Margaret is angered by the sudden revelation of an apparent ineptness
of self-control; she has failed to be the vigilant gardener of her
own growth. Though her "instinct"(64) allows her to refuse Lennox's
offer - thereby matching inner definition with outer - it was not
powerful enough to have stunted her 'growth' in the first place.
Indeed, it is lack of control which she finds disconcerting
in Lennox himself. His hesitations in speech are unbearable indications
of lack of control in the same way that his assumption of a quiet
sarcasm, upon being refused, concerning "what ought to have been
the deepest, holiest proposal of his life"(64), reveals an inability
to assert "real self"(63) consistently in the way that Margaret,
able to "answer the right thing"(63), could. Only upon reflection
can Margaret see the possibility that Lennox's sarcasm is the sign
not of a wavering self-will, but of deep disappointment.
It is Margaret's first real encounter with the world outside
the 'solitary mental life' which she has thus far inhabited, the
first realisation that she is not the sole site, the only creator,
of 'meanings' of herself. It is her ignorance of the other 'mental
lives' with which she comes inevitably into contact, that seem to
be the intended focus of North and South, for no sooner has Margaret
been seen to be insensitive to Lennox, than her whole world falls
apart. Margaret is called into her father's study to be told of
the necessity for leaving Helstone, and the "one staid foundation
of her home, of her idea of her beloved father, seemed reeling and
rocking."(67) Our sympathy for Margaret at this time may blind us
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to her apparent overlooking of Mr Hale's earlier behaviour - "musing
over something, and from time to time sighing deeply"(65). But the
condemnation of Mr Hale, in this chapter, for being unable to communicate
his problems and ideas much earlier to his family mean that we must
concentrate on the role which the 'solitary mental life' will be
permitted to play in North and South. Mr Hale's dilemma suggests,
not that the individual's willed meanings of him/herself are per
se (Mr Hale is seen to be positive in being strong in his convictions
of what he does and does not believe in), but that they must be tempered
with due concern for the 'willed meanings' of those around him/herself.
Hale's transgression is a wish to be "but myself in the world"(73),
to be 'responsible' only to his own solitary mental life in exactly
the same way in which Margaret has shown herself hitherto to be.
The role of the solitary mental life and the extent to which
it is legitimate as the site of meaning, then, is a vital issue in
the text. And yet that issue is present obliquely. If we cast our
eyes over the preceding chapters of the text in light of the role
of the solitary mental life, then one thing must stand out clearly.
If Mr Hale's 'mental life' has led him to defer making an important
communication to his family, and indeed abdicate from any responsibility
to communication by enjoining Margaret to be his speaker, Margaret's
is complicated in a very different way. What one is struck by is
the sexual component to Margaret's situation. Where Mr Hale's religious
convictions are seen to have led him to abuse familial communication,
Margaret's ignorance of any 'meaning' other than her own is, at a
covert level not fully articulated in the text, seen to collide with
'sexual' definitions of women. If we return to the opening scene
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of contrast between Edith and Margaret what one now sees is not simply
that Margaret is strong-willed in comparison with Edith's soft pliancy,
but that the text itself is saying something about women at the deep
level of sub-structure, and that deep level of meaning will complicate
and subvert the overt level. That deep level of meaning is that
women are their physical presence: Edith is soft muslin, ruffled
curls and ribbon; Margaret is tall, stately, dark and regal with
a "wide mouth [that] was one soft curve of rich red lips; and [with]
skin, if not white and fair, [that] was of an ivory smoothness and
delicacy." (48)
The scene with the shawls is now illuminated, from below as
it were. What Margaret does not know, and what the text does not
overtly recognise, is that North and South is not simply the tale
of Margaret's gradual enlargement of her solitary mental life to
include 'communication' or the meanings of others. North and South
is at a deeper level the tracing of one woman's gradual relinquishment
of her 'mental life', of herself as a site of meaning, with a cor -
respondingly gradual grasp of her 'meaning' as sited in the society
around her. The shawl scene reveals that, despite her look of dis-
sociation from the traditionally feminine, despite her evident dislike
of Lennox's compliments on her character, Margaret will be regarded,
will be 'defined' by Lennox, as other men define all women in the
sub-structure of this novel; not as a "sort of block for the shawls"(40),
but as a woman to be responded to in terms of her physical presence.
Lennox will 'read' Margaret at this moment very differently than
she assumes: as a woman whose particular physical presence elicits
a proposal of marriage from him. And to underscore the inevitability
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of such a reading, the shawl scene is immediately followed by Edith's
entry into the room, "altogether looking like the Sleeping Beauty
just startled from her dreams"(40) - the mythical figure of woman
animated, literally given 'being' and life, and so meaning, by man.
The role of the mental life and the individual as a site of
meaning then is complicated in a way which the text itself strives
to constrain. In order to tease out the complications, it is perhaps
best to first look at a presentation of the role of the mental life
which is presented straightforwardly - excavating a measuring device,
as it were, for Margaret's relation to the issue. Thornton, Margaret's
antagonist-cum-protagonist, is the obvious starting point, for his
'progress' in the novel is paralleled by and counterpointed to Margaret's
throughout. Thornton is presented in the novel as an almost stereo-
typical 'self-made' man, confident of what he wants and determined
to get it. The real picture we get of him is in his second visit
to the Hale home, now removed from Helstone to Milton Northern, and
one of his first comments indicates the strong sense of self-will
which he shares with Margaret. Speaking about the Parliament bill
of 1844 which sought to ensure that every mill-furnace burnt its
own smoke, Thornton declares that his were "altered by [his] own
will, before Parliament meddled with the affair"(123), and indeed
underscores the strength of his self-will when he states that he
is not "sure whether [he] should have done it, if [he] had waited
until the act was passed. At any rate, [he] should have waited to
be informed against and fined, and given all the trouble in yielding
that [he] legally could."(123) It is a minor example of Thornton's
self-will, his determination that the meanings of his 'solitary mental
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life' would match his life in the outside world. But more important
than Thornton's financial or business will, is the stress on his
ability to control 'meaning' in his personal life. Throughout North 
and South, Thornton is presented as one who stops and wills something
to be or 'to mean', and is successful in doing so. Responding to
Margaret's actions at the time of the riot, Thornton approaches her
with an avowal of love and a proposal of marriage. But what is pertinent
at this point, is the way in which Thornton, for all his "hot passion"(252),
panting (253), and "savage words"(254), is remarkably controlled.
He stops to "weigh each word"(252) and there is a sense of great
effort of will, a refusal to allow his 'meaning' to be lost or over-
ridden by any of the possible responses to such an exclamation.
His "will is triumphant"(252) in the encounter, allowing him to impress
the strength of his 'meaning' on Margaret. Though she declares her
lack of interest, indeed her contempt, Thornton insists that she
"cannot avoid [his] love"(254), and that he "would not"(254 - emphasis
mine) allow her to escape from it, even if he could.
Once away from the encounter with Margaret, Thornton's self-
will does not falter. Chapter twenty-six opens with what is essentially
a scene of one man reaffirming himself, his inner life, as the 'site
of meaning' of his life. Though words of hate are spoken to himself,
the 'meaning' of the inner sphere is triumphant. The text makes
clear the difference between language [what he "said to himself"(267)]
and what actually is, what actually 'means' in Thornton's inner sphere,
in a way which upholds the distinction Husserl makes between the
inner sphere's 'expressive signification' and the indicative signification
of language, of communication. What Thornton "shape[s]"(267) to
219
himself is immediately cast out by an actual physical "sharp sensation
of love"(267). The adjectives which describe that sensation, 'wild,'
'sharp,' like 'lightning' (267), connect it to the 'wild', untamed
Margaret of Helstone who, then in any case, seems similarly in control
of meaning. Thornton's own meaning, that "[s]he could not make him
change. He loved her, and would love her; and defy her"(267), is
reaffirmed, entrenched by a willed determination to "make this resolu-
tion firm and clear."(267) Thornton remains the site of his own
meanings, uncontaminated by any of the input which Margaret's response
to him constitutes. He can take the basket of fruit to the ailing
Mrs Hale, despite any 'reading' which Margaret might confer on hs
reappearance in her home, because he "will not be daunted from doing
as [he] choose[s] by the thought of her."(275) And his 'meaning'
is triumphant; Thornton is right to "exult in the power he showed
in compelling himself to face her"(302). Margaret 'reads' the act
as Thornton willed it to be read: it is "good of him to bring it;
and after yesterday too!"(276). It is not seen as a sign of 'love'
by Margaret, but as the act of kindness he intended it to mean.
Of course, though Thornton's 'self-will' is seen as positive
and admirable, the text does present it as something which does need
to be tempered by consideration of other points of view, of meaning.
Thornton is castigated for his refusal to 'communicate' with his
men, for failing to give their 'meanings' equal status with his own.
His movement towards 'communication' is presented as his positive
growth, and is indeed the only change which the text overtly dictates
as necessary. Importantly, Thornton remains the "architect of his
own fortunes"(511), remains in control of his 'definition' and 'meaning',
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but this is seen to operate alongside a willingness to communicate.
When Higgins is allowed to work in his factory, the "intercourse"(512)
which arises as a result is not characterised by a lessening of Thornton's
will. Thornton's attitude to Higgins near the end of the novel,
when Thornton's manufacturing career is proving to be unstable, is
a case in point. Though Thornton is angered by Higgins's involvement
in a strike which contributed to his present uncertain position,
he is quick in his resolve to curb his anger: "It could not satisfy
him to avoid Higgins; he must convince himself that he was master
over his own anger"(512). It is a significant detail. Though we
learn that this anger does subside, "he lost all sense of resentment
in wonder how it was, or could be, that two men like himself and
Higgins, living by the same trade, working in their different ways
at the same object, could look upon each other's positions and duties
in so strangely different a way"(512) - the eradication of anger
does not equal the eradication of Thornton's own meaning. It is
carefully pointed out that communication does "not have the effect
of preventing all future clash of opinion"(512;525) - the individual
retains his/her own meaning or perspective on issues - but it does
lead to the individual granting the validity of the 'meanings' which
others retain. Importantly, it is the individual's encounter with
another individual which causes the assimilation, or acknowledgement
of other 'meanings.' Thornton has had ample contact with men as
'hands' - as mere segments of humanity to which he could not attribute
a 'solitary mental life'. It takes being "brought face to face,
man to man, with an individual of the masses around him"(511) for
Thornton to realise what he shares in common with other men.
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Higgins represents the same movement towards such assimilation
as Thornton. Though they begin from what seem patently opposing
sides, North and South reveals the shared prejudice that both must
shed. The depiction of the Union is one which stresses its members'
enforced espousal of one perspective. Men like Boucher, who repudiate
the Union's vision, pay for their dissent. They are either "obliged
to come in"(366) by the treatment meted out by their fellow workers,
or [like Boucher made to join against his will (368)] end their
lives miserably. Margaret's questions to Higgins on Boucher and
the Union underscore the calamitous results of the imposition of
one man's 'will' or 'meaning' on another. Not only does Boucher
kill himself, but his enforced membership in the Union leads both
to the riot and the consequent detraction of public sympathy for
the Union's cause. Only when brought face to face with the consequences
of the imposition of his 'meaning' on Boucher does Higgins begins
his movement towards 'communication.' And when he does reach that
goal, it too is characterised by a retention of his own willed meanings
along with a willingness to hear the other side. Higgins maintains
his union ideas, but now he discusses them with Thornton, and that
communication is advantageous to both (524).
But if the progress of class relations illustrates the need
for a blending of the individual's 'site of meaning' with the solitary
mental lives of those around him/her, the progress of sexual
relations when measured against it assumes quite a different character.
If we examine Thornton's relationship with Margaret then we can see
that the only time Thornton's 'willed meanings' waver are, not in
a class context, but in a sexual one. Their first meeting is vital
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to the novel for it encapsulates the way in which the text operates
at two levels at those points in which sexuality becomes a factor
in the relationship of the speaking subject to meaning. Margaret
enters the room in which Thornton awaits her with the "straight,
fearless, dignified presence habitual to her."(99) This fearless-
ness, coupled with the "simple, straight, unabashed look"(99) which
characterises Margaret's countenance at this time, both disconcerts
and eventually incenses Thornton to the point that he wants to leave
the room. The reader may well wonder why one stranger should, apparently
instantaneously, evoke such a reaction in another. Part of the answer
can be found in the undermining of Thornton's expectations of who
the daughter of Mr Hale would be. Expecting a little girl, he sees
a self-possessed young woman. The issue is transparently one of
power, and Thornton's subsequent note that "she seemed to assume
some kind of rule over him at once"(99) is significant. At the same
time, the issue of power cannot be confined to one of age. Thornton's
real anger occurs in response to Margaret's indifference in the face
of his unrepressed admiration - it is the unbalancing of sexual power
that is unnerving. Thornton faces the "white flexile throat. .
the full, yet lithe figure; her lips . . . her eyes"(100), and cannot
reconcile them with the message of "quiet maiden freedom"(100) which
Margaret sends. In other words, where Thornton reads women as physical
presence and so expects the, to him, sexually desirable Margaret
to blush in confusion and surprise at his presence, Margaret seems
to allow no such 'reading' to be sustained. For one "in habits of
authority himself"(99), the undermining of his own meaning is unbear-
able; he wants to leave the scene of such a challenge, and only the
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arrival of Mr Hale persuades him to stay.
The scene points to the vulnerability of the individual 'site'
of meaning; Thornton finds at least one who does not concur with,
indeed, seems unaware of, his 'meaning' of her. At the same time,
however, the text subtly reinforces Thornton's male perspective on
the female figure. Though we have never encountered Thornton before,
and have had a detailed description of Margaret, the reader is not
provided with a physical description of Thornton. Rather, Margaret's
physical presence is carefully catalogued. Details of her clothes,
her look, her lips, her throat, her figure, her eyes, tumble from
the text in a way which only emphasizes the apparent perversity of
Margaret's behaviour. Why isn't such a woman, so sensually 'present',
blushing in the manner Thornton expects of her? The male perspective,
the male reading of woman as physical presence, is privileged. Though
Margaret is described as having a 'quiet maiden freedom', it is
far outweighed by the two paragraphs of physical description which
precede.
The reader may understandably be confused. If Thornton's willed
meanings, Mr Hale's 'solitary mental life', Higgins's self will,
are all seen to be needing only the leavening of other's meanings,
through the process of conaunication, why is Margaret's own meaning
here so completely over-ridden by the text in favour of the male
perspective? The answer must be that the scene constitutes a fissure
in the text, a point at which the overt and covert structures of
the text meet and garble. The scene implicitly tells us three things,
all of which can be traced through the text to its close. Firstly,
that women have no 'site of meaning' for themselves. Secondly, that
the male perspective on female 'meaning' will be privileged in such a
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way that all 'meaning', except that of female 'presence', will be
seen to require the moderation of communication with other men.
Thirdly, and most importantly, the scene reveals that what the text
presents as 'self will' is itself a social construct. Because the
'omniscient' narrative and Thornton's perspective collude on the
definition of women as presence, the status of Thornton's perspective
as his 'solitary mental life' is undermined. What Thornton thinks
of as his own 'meaning' of Margaret is a social one, shared by the
text and one presumed to be shared by the reader. The siting of
'meaning' in the individual is seen to be a social construct, a shared
communal assumption.
All three of these statements, the implicit basis of the scene
between Margaret and Thornton, need to be brought to bear on what
can be termed the two major incidents in North and South: the riot
and Margaret's lie. Though on the surface both events illustrate
what can be called points of progress in Margaret's ostensible 'journey'
from self-willing individual to an individual, like Thornton and
Higgins, who recognises the validity of communication, they in fact
point to a second, deeper 'journey' which Margaret undertakes and
successfully completes in the course of the novel.
The chapters describing the riot begin with Margaret's plea
for communication. Interestingly, the rioters themselves are initially
presented in natural terms. There is a "thunderous atmosphere"(226),
a "low, distant roar"(226), and Margaret hears the "first long far-
off roll of the tempest; saw the first slow-surging wave of the dark
crowd come, with its threatening crest"(226). That naturalness is
coupled with descriptions of violence; the men ram themselves with
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"great beats"(229) against Thornton's millgates, setting up a "fierce
unearthy groan"(229), a "fierce growl"(231), a "fiendlike noise"(232)
which is likened to be as "inarticulate as that of a troop of animals"(233).
Both sets of images, the natural and the violent, link the rioters
strongly to Margaret as she was at Helstone, at one with a natural
environment to which she responded with 'gentle violence'. Though
the degree of violence is greater, the kind is not, and it suggests
that the rioters are operating from the same sense of 'self-will'
that Margaret herself did at Helstone. Importantly, it is Margaret
who recognises what lies beneath the apparent animalistic violence.
She urges Thornton to "[s]peak to [his] workmen as if they were human
beings . . . [to] go out and speak to them, man to man"(232).
The context of successfully urged communication - the rioters
do disperse - is covertly ironic. For what happens in the midst
of this appeal, Margaret's shielding of Thornton from the rioters,
will be seen to involve precisely the relationship of the individual
to communication. Margaret's action is clearly seen to be 'instinct-
ual': "She only thoughthow she could save him."(234) But what to
her is "woman's work"(247), enacted only in the name of fair play,
is seen as a sign of her love for Thornton. The clash is between
Margaret's 'willed meaning' of the event, and the public meaning
of female presence. That public meaning is, again as in the scene
when Thornton and Margaret first meet, presented as the private 'meaning'
of Thornton. No sooner have the rioters dispersed, and Margaret
brought inside the Thornton home, than Thornton is considering the
'meaning' of Margaret's act. Every "pulse beat in him as he remembered
how she had come down and placed herself in foremost danger, - could
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it be for him? . . . every nerved in his body thrill[ed] at the thought
of her"(237). The connection of Thornton's meaning with his inner
mental state (again, as with the rioters and Margaret, through natural
bodily sensations), and the interrogative form of Thornton's reflections
intend to personalise Thornton's reading of Margaret's act. But
indeed his tentative reading, that Margaret must care for him, immediately
given communal authority by the women's response to Margaret's action.
The Thornton servant declares to have seen "Miss Hale with her arms
about master's neck, hugging him before all the people"(239) and
Thornton's sister Fanny, immediately reads this as evidence that
Margaret "cares for [her] brother . . . [and would] give her eyes
if he'd marry her"(239). Indeed "anybody can see"(239) that Margaret
cares for Thornton now. Certainly, Mrs Thornton shares the reading
of Margaret's behaviour. Margaret's action shows that "[a] girl
in love will do a good deal"(243), and indeed finds she likes Margaret
"the better for seeing clearly at last."(246) Margaret's action
has only the one, the clear, reading of sexual capitulation which
all of these characters formulate. Thornton's inability to read
the "touch of [Margaret's] arms around his neck - the soft clinging
which made the dark colour come and go in his cheek"(244) as anything
but proof of passion is now given communal authority. Though the
text persists in presenting Thornton's reading as a personal, bodily
felt meaning, it is now nothing of the kind. Thornton's decision
to ask Margaret to marry him is a significant translation of a 'personal'
reading into a social act.
But it is Margaret's response to her act which is most revealing
of the text's deeper structure. Her immediate response is to reassert
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her own meaning of her own act. Her "well-poised judgment"(247)
refuses to relinquish its hold on the reasonable nature of her action,
and she concludes, "I would do it again, let who will say what they
like of me. If I saved one blow, one cruel, angry action that might
otherwise have been committed, I did a woman's work"(247). And yet
underneath this ringing rhetoric, there lies in Margaret's speech
the seeds of recognition of the 'public' meaning of such female action.
Margaret contrasts the "fallen"(247) status of a woman who has so
"disgraced"(247) herself as to be 'read' in a sexual way, with her
resolution that she is "pure"(247) and can withstand any insults
cast on her "maiden pride"(247). The choice of words, redolent as
they are of the contemporary vocabulary for the physical (ie. sexually
despoiled or not) state of women, suggest that Margaret has shifted,
almost imperceptively, to the perspective which reads women as physical
presence, if indeed she was ever disentangled from it in the first
place. She reads her act, at a deep level, as a physical one - one
which makes her 'maiden' or 'pure' - despite her dissociation from
the physical reading of those around her. Unsurprisingly, Margaret's
overt assertion of the non-physical nature of her act is followed
by a dream in which "[s]he could not be alone . . . a cloud of faces
looked up at her, giving her . . . a deep sense of shame that she
should thus be the object of universal regard"(248-9). Margaret
is, after all, in her own mind the 'object', the physical presence,
she professes not to be.
From this point in the novel, Margaret's hold over her own 'meanings',
her ability to rely on herself as a site of meaning, diminishes rapidly.
Though she repudiates Thornton's offer of marriage, the incident
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leaves her disliking him "for having mastered her inner will"(257),
and unable to confront the "great power . . . [of] his idea."(257)
The "[s]harp, decisive speeches"(257) that might have impressed her
own meanings on the action at the riot come to late to be used, and
Margaret is left with "[t]he deep impression made by the interview,
[that] was like . . . a horror in a dream"(257) - a reaffirmation
perhaps of her status as 'female presence' conveyed in her own dream
the night before. Where Thornton is able to relay his meaning of
love for Margaret, able to communicate a "clear conviction"(256),
Margaret's own meanings are denied any such clarity of conveyance.
Margaret's 'lie' is a similar, heightened indication of the
covert, gradual relinquishment of meaning which is juxtaposed by
her overt 'progress' to the synthesis of communication and individual
meaning. Again, the event concerns Margaret's 'presence' as a woman,
and the reading of that presence. Whereas, during the riot, the
reading of Margaret's presence is bolstered by certain physical actions
to be interpreted, this second instance deals with, as it were, distilled
female presence. Was Margaret at a particular place or not, and
what is the reading to be gleaned if she was? The stress on mere
'presence' and the sexual signification it always has is made clear
in the details of the scene. Thornton simply sees Margaret at the
Outwood station accompanied by her brother. What the reader has
been told is Frederick's "wistful anxiety"(331) at leaving his sister
to cope alone with their grieving father, is immediately read by
Thornton as an "attitude of . . . familiar confidence"(339), with
stress on 'familiar'. Merely by being out, "[alt that late hour,
so far from home"(339) is a sign so sexually weighlthat there follows
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in Thornton's mind "all sorts of wild fancies"(339) of the way in
which Margaret would love. To fortify the sexual significance of
Margaret's presence at the station further, Margaret rejects a look
of "undisguised admiration"(332) from a local shopboy. Margaret's
insistence "upon going into the full light of the flaring gas"(331),
and so into a situation where she finds herself admired, is a subtle
indication of Margaret's intention to be 'seen' - and to be seen
is to be read, in this novel, as all women are, as physical presence.
Though the 'plot' of the novel tells us the reason behind Margaret's
insistence (to shield Frederick, as she shielded Thornton), the admiring
stare of the young man betrays its social significance.
In this context of the sexual meaning of female presence, Margaret
must 'lie' about her presence in order to protect her brother. The
'willing' behind this meaning of female presence is quite discernible.
Margaret's impact on the inspector who arrives to question her is
somewhat akin to her first impression on Thornton. The inspector
is "daunted by the haughtiness of her manner as she entered"(342),
and is "a little abashed by her regal composure"(345). For her part,
Margaret is "controlled" (343), "expressionless" (343), and "unflinching" (344),
like "some great Egyptian statue"(345), in her attempt to make her
words, her meaning of non-presence, overpower the 'meaning' of presence
so automatically imposed on women. One must note that the emphasis
here is on Margaret's physical appearance to appreciate the obstacle
she is attempting to bypass. Part of the 'meaning' of Margaret's
actions here are conveyed in precisely the terms which the text suggests
she can evade through	 The reader is expected to know, if
the inspector does not, the significance of the lips which "swell[]
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out into a richer curve than ordinary"(343). The inspector expects
Margaret to "wince"(345) if she is lying, not stand immobile. The
'truth' for both reader and inspector is still sited in Margaret's
physical presence.
After her ordeal, Margaret can only temporarily uphold her faith
in her meaning. She tells herself that "she would tell that lie
again"(349) if Frederick's safety required it. And yet, for all
her apparent strength of purpose, the status of Margaret's lie is
ambiguous. On the one hand, the text acknowledges Margaret's claim
that she lies for Frederick's protection. Mr Bell concurs with that
justification, and indeed his surprise that Margaret considers the
lie a shaming thing suggests her overwrought reaction (484;486).
On the other hand, the text quickly and deftly strips away any claim
to family loyalty or concern for another that Margaret might make
in defence of her lie. In its place we find a growing assertion
that Margaret's reasons for lying cannot super<Tede the reading of
her presence as sexually significant.
Accordingly, what is the subtlest indication of Margaret's forth,
coming redefinition of her lie, the naming of the lie as a "tempta-
tion"(348) thereby giving it the sexual dimension she overtly rejects,
is foregrounded in Margaret's subsequent analysis of the event.
There is a tangible split in Margaret's mind, and the narrative itself,
between the lie as something "really false and wrong"(355) and the
'natural' act of accompanying her brother. But again, the language
employed belies the distinction. Though Margaret asserts that the
lie was wrong, whilst her presence was justified, her choice of words
to describe the lie ["the one lurid fact"(355) , the thing which
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"degrade[s]"(355) her and causes her to "fall"(356) from imaginary
heights to Thornton's feet, compels her to dream of "exaggerated
and monstrous circumstances of Pain"(335) in a way similar to her
dream of exposure after the riot] all intimate a conflation of the
lie and her presence in a way which bestows upon both the sexual
signification of female presence. Margaret is degraded and shamed
by her lie in precisely the way she felt degraded by her actions
at the riot because it has become a sign of her 'presence.'
Importantly, one must note that Margaret's intense reaction
to her lie comes only after she has learnt of Thornton's knowledge
of it. All knowledge of her reasons for the lie, all the meanings
with which she has invested it, are lost because "in Mr Thornton's
eyes, she was degraded."(335) Margaret has lost her individual perspective,
herself as a site of meaning, and has assumed the sexual meanings
of female presence which Thornton himself expresses. Her language
then, 'lurid', 'degraded', 'fall', is no longer her own, but that
of the male perspective. The anguish of the loss is clearly conveyed.
Margaret cannot understand why "[Thornton] haunted her imagination
so persistently"(358), why "in spite of herself"(358 - emphasis mine),
she finds the prospect of Thornton's "low opinion"(358 - emphasis
mine) more difficult to contend with than the "sense of Almighty
displeasure"(358). But the "strong feeling"(358) of Thornton's reading
of her act remains triumphant, despite her questionings. She feels
"not good enough, not pure enough"(358 - emphasis mine), an indication
that the assimilation of sexual meaning is complete.
Margaret's language at this point must be emphasized because
there is a basic contradiction in the text about Margaret's awareness
232
of Thornton's 'reading' of her presence at Outwood station. Mrs
Thornton is, in terms of plot, the person who reveals to Margaret
what her presence signifies to those around her. Margaret responds
passionately to Mrs Thornton's 'new idea' as "too insulting"(392)
and refuses to discuss it. The scene itself however, like similar
ones preceding it, fortifies the significance of female presence.
Mrs Thornton, anticipating the scolding she is about to administer
to Margaret, relishes the thought of showing her indifference to
the " 'glamour' which she [is] well aware Margaret had the power
of throwing over many people"(391). The full extent of that 'glamour',
that bewitching power, is seen by the immediate sight of Mrs Thorton's
succumbing to it. Her imagining of a "picture of the beauty of her
victim; her jet black hair, her clear smooth skin, her lucid eyes"(391)
is proof that sexual presence is always the basis from which the
individual responds to a woman. Mrs Thornton declares her insuscept-
ibility to Margaret's physical presence, but her thoughts show otherwise.
And yet, despite Mrs Thornton's warning and the overwhelming
power attributed to physical presence, both Margaret and the reader
are expected to believe in her later ignorance of this significance
of her presence at the station. Talking to Mr Bell, Margaret is
"surprised . . . hurt and offended"(486) by Mr Bell's suggestion
that Thornton would consider Frederick her suitor. One is tempted
to see the incident as a straightforward flaw in the text. But yet
again, Margaret's rejection of this reading is couched in sexual
terms which confuse and undermine her statement. She talks again
of being "tempted"(486) and of how she "fell into the snare"(486)—
language which pinpoints her as a 'fallen' woman in a way she does
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not overtly intend.
Margaret seems truly to have lost all power over herself, all
ability to assert herself as a 'site of meaning'. Unsurprisingly
she longs to "gain her power and command over herself"(408), to escape
the feeling of "individual nothingness"(488) which overpowers her.
The rest of the text suggests, in fact, that Margaret does regain
that power, that self-will. But the context in which that accomplish-
ment takes place requires careful consideration. A close look at
the text reveals that despite Margaret's purported movement towards
synthesis of communication and self will, something very different
actually takes place. Margaret does recognise that she "change[s]
perpetually"(489) as does Helstone, the place in which she is prompted
to reflect on change and continuity. The recognition suggests Margaret's
movement away from the self as touchstone of meaning, no longer "disappoint-
ed and peevish because all is not exactly as [she] had pictured it"(489),
towards a stance which embraces diversity and change in a way which
intimates an increased value for communication, for different per-
spectives. Though Margaret had always espoused the value of communi-
cation in class relations, urging Thornton to speak to his workmen,
her refusal to discuss her lie (until with Mr Bell) suggests that,
on a personal level, communication has not been so favourably assessed.
Nevertheless before the synthesis is crystallised, two things
occur in North and South which complicate the synthesis and point
to a very different, covert, 'resolution' in the novel. Margaret
is seen to contemplate her past life, when "it had seemed to her
. . . that she had only to will"(502) to have the meaningful life
she desired, and by such contemplation "to put events in their right
places, as to origin and significance"(506). Margaret emerges believing
herself responsible for her own life (508), and determining upon
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a course of charitable good works which reflects the 'meaning' of
the life as she had chosen it. But before this resumption of self-
determination takes place, two events have occurred: Mr Bell has
died, leaving Margaret a very rich heiress, and Mr Thornton, unbeknownst
to Margaret, has learnt the identity of the man accompanying her
at Outwood station.
The first event is an important indication of what exactly provides
Margaret with the will to reassume 'self-determination'. It is as
soon as she hears of Bell's death that Margaret "surprises herself
with the firmness with which she asserted something of her right
to independence of action."(501) The reader may not, however, be
as surprised as Margaret herself. The relationship between money
and the 'power' of the individual is an understated theme in North 
and South insofar as it involves Margaret. The relationship between
Thornton and his 'hands' is the obvious illustration of the power
money wields as a 'self-determining' tool. Thornton can compel "all
material power to yield to science"(122), and his money means he
has very nearly the same control over the 'material power' of his
workmen. His money, able to import labour from Ireland, is the 'catalyst'
which dooms the strike. His handling of his money allows him to
be assured of his status amongst fellow masters (216) and provides
him with a calling card to London society (523). Most importantly,
Thornton's handling of his money allows him to end his business career
in the manner he desires, in a way which upholds his definition of
himself. Choosing not to risk ruining others, for his "own paltry
aggrandisement"(516), Thornton leaves the world of Milton Northern
business in the way he determines. Once his money is gone, however,
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it is not Thornton but another master, Watson, who is "wise and far-
seeing"(518) as Thornton was once considered to be.
Margaret's relation to money, and its role in 'self-determination',
is a more subtle affair. It is nevertheless there, not only in her
attraction to "the exultation in the sense of power which Milton
men had"(217), and her assumption of power over the servant Dixon
(83), but in the way in which her status in the novel is indelibly
linked to her financial status. Secure in Harley street, financially
stable in Helstone, Margaret maintains a sense of self-determination
which is lost only when her family loses their financial security
and financial status. In Milton Northern, the Hales are simply a
family that "only spent at a certain rate"(109) and one which is
notably lower than their air of gentility leads the local people
to expect. Once money is gained, however, Margaret resumes 'control'
of her life. Though it appears that the recovery of self-determination,
and the ability to confer meaning on her life by organising it herself,
comes as a result of Margaret's acceptance of change, of the different
perspectives that facilitate communication, the conferment of money
upon her at such a significant moment suggests that the text, at
a deep level, recognises that it is money which confers self-determin-
ation upon those who have it, and not vice-versa, as the text superficially,
through Thornton, articulates.
The second event however, Thornton's knowledge of Frederick's
identity, is a more significant complication to Margaret's ostensibly
straightforward progress from self will to a synthesis of that quality
with communication. This chapter has already outlined the way in
which Margaret has gradually assimilated the male 'meaning' of her
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two most prominent actions in North and South, and made it her own.
Thornton's recognition of Frederick as Margaret's brother appears
to validate Margaret's meaning of her presence at Outwood station.
The recognition however has a more complicated status than that.
It is important to note Thornton's reaction to the news Higgins provides
him. He says to himself, "I know she could not be unmaidenly; and
yet I have yearned for conviction. Now I am glad" (515). The statement
reveals the way in which personal meanings or definitions of women
are no such things, but are instead solely the social ones of presence.
Though Thornton's knowledge of Margaret would lead him to discredit
any 'unmaidenly' conduct attributed to her, the social definition
of women as presence makes any conviction on his part impossible.
Thornton reads women as 'presence' in both instances, though he might
not consciously recognise it. Margaret's behaviour, up until Outwood,
might seem to make that presence 'positive', but once any doubt oon
that presence is articulated, Thornton must capitulate. The very
'reading' of women which incensed Thornton when he first met Margaret,
is the one which allows him to imagine her "dancing toward him with
outspread arms, and with a lightness and gaiety which made him loathe
her, even while it allured him."(410-11) Higgins's information simply
calls for a re-reading of Margaret's presence at Outwood; it does
not alter the 'essence' which is being assessed, nor privilege Thornton's
conviction of Margaret's maidenliness. Both are readings based on
the social meaning of woman as presence. The Outwood incident, for
all of Margaret's attempts to make it a sexually empty incident,
retains its full sexual signficance. Whereas it initially seemed
an indication of Margaret's already sexually 'taken' (and therefore
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fallen) status, it now signifies her 'purity', or availability as
a lover.
With these two events occurring just as Margaret appears to
reach the synthesis which North and South ostensibly promotes, it
must come as no surprise that Margaret's reaction to Thornton's proposal
is one of "beautiful shame"(530). Though the text attempts to connect
this Margaret with the Margaret of Helstone, grabbing at the Helstone
roses with a "gentle violence"(530) characteristic of that earlier,
self-willed individual, and though the text stresses 'communication'
by an ending dialogue, Margaret's 'shame' and her comment that she
is not "good enough"(529) tell the reader that her 'self-definition'
is possible only because it has become that of the male perspective:
Margaret is now presence. Unsurprising because though Margaret now
has money, real power to define in North and South, she cannot use
that power as one might have expected her to. Having assimilated
the meaning of woman as presence, having 'recognised' that a woman's
natural duties are as wife and mother (509), money gives her the
power only to consolidate what is no longer in her control. Margaret
will become both wife and mother because money will make contact
with Thornton possible. But more ominously, it will make that
inevitability seem, both to Margaret and to the reader of North and 
South, an exercise of individual choice and self determination in
a novel whose very deep structure shows such choices to be impossibilities.
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Chapter Seven: Cousin Phillis (1863)
Cousin Phillis has been described as a "simple romantic idyll", '
a "country love story of the simplest and tenderest kind", 2 which
shows "Mrs Gaskell's feminine talent at its best." 3 At the same
time, Margaret Lane who makes these critically orthodox remarks,
points us unwittingly in the direction for a possible reassessment
of Cousin Phillis. Lane, summarising the plot of the novella, refers
to the moment in the text when Minister Holman discovers Phillis'
love for Holdsworth, and accuses her of lacking in filial love.
Lane then states, as is indeed the case, "[f]rom this point it is
on Phillis herself that our attention is concentrated". 4
 The comment
is extraordinarily misleading for the reader unacquainted with the
text, implying as it does that an in-depth look at Phillis and her
predicament follows. It may startle some readers to discover that,
contrary to the import of Lane's remark, there follows only eight-
and-one half pages of narrative 'concentrating' on Phillis in a text
nearly one hundred pages in length named after her.
The apparent perversity of titling the text Cousin Phillis when
Paul Manning would seem more appropriate is, however, more than explic-
able if we examine the text in light of the insight into the concepts
of 'self' and 'language' which Cousin Phillis's predecessor, North 
and South, yielded to the reader. The overt contrasts in Cousin 
Phillis between Virgilian language and Holdsworth-ian language, the
progressing world of the railway and the pastoral realm of the farm,
between in fact growth and stasis, can be see to be gendered issues
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in a text which, though a love story, does not directly address gender.
It is important that from the start of Cousin Phillis the right
of the male to progress or evolve is clearly stated. Paul Manning,
writing from a past personal perspective, notes that he was never
"so satisfied and proud in [his] life" 5 as when he first attained
the independence of his own lodgings. Indeed most of the male characters
in the novel can be seen in some way as progressing or evolving creatures.
Paul's father is "raising himself every year in men's consideration
and respect"(219) by virtue of his inventive genius; Holdsworth is
involved not only with the railway, a literal sign of the changing
times, but works his way to a greater position of authority when
he accepts the position of a challenging job in Canada; and Minister
Holman, whilst apparently leading a changeless life, is in a continual
state of progression or evolution due to the constant change in his
'role' which his dual status as minister/farmer requires.
Within this general male right to progress or evolve, however,
Cousin Phillis seems primarily to focus upon one aspect of change
in male life: the change which incorporates sexual maturation.
Paul, as narrator as the text, has become not only financially independent,
but free for the first time to indulge his senses. He begins "to
taste with relish the pleasure of being his own master"(220), and
although that feeling seems initially focused on food - the hamper
packed with pots of preserves by his mother - there is a general
sense in Paul's relish for "interminable feasts"(220) and the prospect
of indulgence, which indicates that it is the independent exercising
of all his physical sense, not just his tastebuds, to which Paul
looks forward.
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It is not surprising therefore that juxtaposed closely to this
concern for his meals, Paul's encounters Phillis whose skin is so
white (226) that he immediately compares their ages and is curiously
pleased to find them close enough to render them companions. He
finds himself "in a little flutter of desire to make [himself] agreeable,
and wishing that his companion were not quite so tall"(230). Phillis,
in other words, is immediately perceived by Paul as a potential sexual
partner: she is assessed for her desirability - white skin, but
too tall. It is not until Paul has determined their incompatibility
by concluding that Phillis's knowledge of books outweighs her physical
appeal, even though "her hair was looking more golden, her dark eyelashes
longer, her round pillar of a throat whiter than ever"(235), that
they can be friends and confidantes (241).
One might expect to find a paralleling developing independence
for Phillis,who is Paul's contemporary, but we only ever see her
in her role as daughter to the Holmans in these opening scenes, doing
her kitchen chores and being pleasant to Paul as a family guest.
This is perhaps explained by the fact that Cousin Phillis is Paul's
story, told from his perspective, and therefore privileging his view-
point and his feelings. But as we shall see such a defence in fact
inverts the process which dictates the text's structure. The reason
why Phillis is always viewed as a character (not presented from within)
is not because this is Paul's story about her. Rather, a story concerning
Phillis must always present her as viewed, not as the reflecting
consciousness of a narrative, precisely because the definition of
'woman', as gleaned from the text, bars any sense of autonomy, any
sense of a female viewing self, from being attributed to Phillis.
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This definition of ' woman' which so dictates the presentation
of Phillis is perhaps best seen, in action as it were, in the scene
which is crucial to the reading of the novel as a whole: the revelation
to Minister Holman of Phillis's love for Holdsworth. The scene takes
place immediately after the minister receives a letter from Holdsworth
announcing his marriage to a Canadian girl, Lucille. His surprise
that both Paul and Phillis already know of the marriage quickly leads
to a suspicion that Holdsworth had "played tricks upon Phillis"(306).
Paul is obliged to divulge that he had informed Phillis of Holdsworth's
declared love for her, and Holman rails against the destruction of
Phillis's "peaceful maidenhood"(307) which Paul has effected. But
more important is Holman's reaction to Phillis's confession that
she had loved Holdsworth. His first response is to state, "I don't
understand"(308), quickly followed by a question which reveals the
definition of 'woman' upon which the novel revolves: "Had he ever
spoken of love to you?"(308).
Holman's response is vital for it demands that a comparison
be made between the two 'indiscretions' which Paul and Phillis have
unwittingly committed in Holman's eyes. Both indiscretions involve
language, the individual's right to use it, and the proper way in
which to utilise it. But the two indiscretions are made startlingly
different in status in Cousin Phillis by only one variable: the
gender of the speaker. If we investigate Holman's initial response
to Paul's confession we can see that it involves the protocol which
surrounds the declaration of love made by a man to a woman, what
has been termed earlier in this thesis the 'pastoral contract.'
Paul's indiscretion lies in repeating an avowal of love for a woman
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made by another man, Holdsworth, but not addressed to the woman,
Phillis, herself. Paul himself has felt misgivings over his actions.
Though he had not "received any charge of secrecy, or given even
the slightest promise to Holdsworth that [he] would not repeat his
words"(287), he retains "an uneasy feeling sometimes when [he] thought
of what [he] had done"(287). But if we actually investigate the
reasons why Paul repeats Holdsworth's words, we can see that his
feelings of unease stem not from his unauthorised repetition, but
from his accidental discovery of the reason for Phillis's ill-health.
Paul stumbles across Phillis re-reading the pencil notes Holdsworth
had made in one of her Italian books. The realisation of her love
for Holdsworth comes to him "like a flash of lightning on a dark
night"(283); it is because he cannot "bear to see the sweet serenity
of [his] dear cousin's life so disturbed by a suffering which [he]
thought he could assuage"(284) that he tells Phillis of Holdsworth's
love for her. Her response to his disclosure immediately tells him
that this "conjecture was well-founded"(285).
From this point, Paul does all he can to protect her 'secret'.
When he must tell Phillis that Holdsworth is married, he carefully
refrains from telling the minister thereby allowing the change in
Phillis - "a new, sharp, discordant sound . . . in her voice, a sort
of jangle in her tone; . . . her restless eyes [with] no quietness
in them"(296) - to be unconnected with that event, if it is detected
at all by her family and those around her. Similarly, he ensures
that Betty, who also intuits Phillis's love for Holdsworth, keeps
the secret, and is as we have seen determined not to reveal Phillis's
secret to her father.
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But one must ask the question why Paul would consider a knowledge
of Phillis's love for Holdsworth reason enough to divulge information
which, as he knows himself, is not his to tell? The reason is not
unconnected with the minister's immediate question to Phillis when
he hears her confession: "Had he ever spoken of love to you?"(308).
There must be, in both Paul's and Holman's minds, a preceding male
desire before one can speak of a love between a man and a woman.
To think of Phillis loving Holdsworth before knowing of his love
for her is, to Holman, an unnatural act which can only stem from
some failing in Phillis's family life: "Have we not loved you
enough?"(308). It is not something which could occur within a 'normal'
set of circumstances.
In the same way, Paul, discovering Phillis's love, puts it
'right' by providing the male desire which, though Phillis did not
know it, preceded the signs of her love for Holdsworth. Having made
it 'right', having given Phillis the 'nutrient' required for her
to become "like a rose that had come to full bloom"(290), Paul can
have no misgivings until Holdsworth is found to have altered his
affections.
The shared impulse behind Paul's action and Holman's question
is crucial. It is important to note that as soon as Holman has the
full 'facts' of the situation, that is that Phillis loves Holdsworth,
his assessment of Paul's indiscretion alters drastically. Whereas
initially Paul's talk with Phillis appeared as a perverse attempt
to inculcate desire where none existed, on behalf of another man,
with Phillis'a admission it becomes explicable. Even though a love
declared by proxy is still to be censured Paul's action suddenly
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appears an attempt to balance the equation of desire. Seeing Phillis's
love, Paul matches it with Holdsworth's - an irresponsible, but no
longer despicable, act in Holman's eyes. Suddenly we see that
Phillis's indiscretion is to proclaim love without encouragement,
an act so apparently pernicious that only a breakdown in the family
structure can account for it. And indeed, such a breakdown is precisely
what follows: Hope Farm is left to manage without Holman at its
head, and Holman himself is unable to lead the family prayers as
is his wont, whilst Phillis lies ill with a brain fever.
In order to make sense of the complete breakdown which follows
Phillis's articulation of love one must investigate closely the status
of the 'declaration of love', and how it functions in Cousin Phillis.
Specifically one must determine the nature of the contract between
men and women which dictates that of the three individuals who art-
iculate this particular declaration in various ways - Paul, Phillis
and Holdsworth - only Phillis is overtly 'punished', or rather allows
herself to be, for her speech. Though like Holdsworth and Paul she
can only be said to be 'guilty' of proclaiming love to a person other
than the loved one, her breakdown suggests that, in terms of the
ideology of womanhood underpinning the text, such a proclamation
is at some level in the text, more harmful than that of either man. 6
In order to begin assessing the differing status of the three
speakers, it is perhaps best to begin with an analysis of the 'types'
of language or discourse which Cousin Phillis presents as possible
language choices. Language appears to fall into two distinct categories:
the Virgiian and what may be termed the Holdsworthian. The main
characteristic of the former is established by Minister Holman who,
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extolling the virtues of Virgil, claims that "It is all living truth
in these days."(296) It is this quality of enduring 'truth', an
eternal veracity, in Virgil which is constantly stressed. Not only
do particular agricultural practices laid down by Virgil in the
Georgics seem right to Holman centuries later, but he has also "hit
the enduring epithets, nearly two thousand years ago, and in Italy"(233)
for describing Nature as it is in Italy or nineteenth-century England.
Unsurprisingly, Holman himself, the character most closely associated
with Virgil in the text, reveals a propensity to use words only in
their 'correct' place which is connected to this idea of eternal
veracity. Though he is a minister, as a farmer he recognises the
inconvenience that ill-timed sermonising can pose to working men
(244). Unlike his wife, Holman considers that words can be out of
their place. To misuse language by ill-timing threatens its durability
and so its veracity. Indeed, the threat that misuse of language
constitutes is effectively revealed in Holman's reactions to fellow
ministers who, hearing of Phillis's ill-health, exhort him to bespeak
his resignation in the face of his troubles. Holman, who cannot
feel such resignation, refuses to express it since that would constitute
"using words as if they were a charm."(312) Holman's choice of term
here, 'charm', is illuminating. With its connotations of magic and
deception, the term represents an antonym to truth and as such contra-
dicts Holman's Virgilian sense of language.
In contrast 'Holdsworthian' language is characterised precisely
by its randomness, its apparent lack of 'eternal veracities'.
Holdsworth speaks "a style of half-joking talk"(259) unknown to the
the inhabitants of Hope Farm. His style of speech both confuses
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and attracts the Holmans who, if Holdsworth did but know it, do "take
Virgil for gospel"(265). The minister proclaims his view on Holdsworth,
characteristically "weighing his words"(265) as he does so, as someone
whom he likes, but "who takes hold of [him], as it were"(265), who
threatens to carry the minister away in spite of his judgement, and
indeed is intoxicating "like dram-drinking"(266). Paul too reports
on the "unconscious hold that [his] friend had got over all the family"(266),
and notes that any "suspicion that [Holdsworth's] careless words
were not always those of soberness and truth"(271) which Holman may
harbour, seemed "more as a protest against the fascination which
the younger man evidently exercised over the elder one"(271).
Both Paul's and Holman's language when describing Holdsworth
is important for it connects Holdsworth firmly with the type of language-
use which Holman ostensibly rejects. A speaker who has the ability
to carry his listeners away, whose effect is one of a fascination
akin to the effects of alcohol, is clearly using words as a 'charm'
in Virgilian terms. And yet, what is most important, is that despite
two such differing approaches to language, these male speakers in
Cousin Phillis are, if not eager, then able, to overlook these differences,
and so come to see worth in that other language use. Holdsworth
finds that "really it is a very wholesome exercise, this trying to
make one's words represent one's thoughts instead of merely looking
to their effect on others."(264) Holman too comes to see Holdsworth's
words as 'fit' in their context. Though Holdsworth's words would
not have been "true and sober"(290) in Holman's mouth, "they were
so to a man of his class of perceptions"(290). In other words, both
Holdsworth and Holman are allowed to change their perceptions and
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attitudes to language use. Despite the clear-cut divisions between
'Virgilian' and 'Holdsworthian' language, individual preferences
do not in the end constitute prejudices.
Phillis's punishment as a speaker in Cousin Phillis in this
context of an open-minded approach to language use is contradictory.
Having recognised and accepted a relativist element in language because
of his association with Holdsworth, one might expect Holman to accept
Phillis's statement of love for Holdsworth as a 'fit' expression
of her viewpoint in much the same way as he accepts that Holdsworth
speaks 'true and sober words' for a man of his perceptions. Instead,
Holman looks for a 'matching' declaration from Holdsworth as a measure
of the validity of Phillis's speech. His response indicates that
she has no right to use language in either of the ways the text outlines.
Her speech is intolerable and unjustifiable in a narrative which
otherwise illustrates a widening of attitudes to language use. At
the same time, Holman's response directs us to reasons for the negative
status of Phillis as a speaker. Phillis's love for Holdsworth appears
to have overthrown the very basis of her identity in Holman's eyes.
She would have "left [her] home, left [her] father and [her] mother,
and gone away with [a] stranger, wandering over the world."(309)
Her identity as her father's "only child; [his] little daughter . .
hardly out of childhood"(306) whom he had expected to "gather . .
under [his] wings for years to come"(306) has been completely undermined.
Suddenly there appears a part of Phillis of which he has no knowledge,
over which he exerts no influence. Though Paul is at a similar point
in his life, the first break from the family, Phillis is evidently
disallowed a paralleling opportunity to assert independence and
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selfhood, and one must ask why.
The answer lies in the status of women, and their function in
this novel. In each respect, the women in Cousin Phillis are assessed
in terms of their usefulness to men. Both Holman and Phillis see
the parish women as 'morally' important. Not in themselves, however -
indeed, they seem an inadequate group "apt to tarry before coming
to [chapel], to put on ribbons and gauds"(245). But despite such
moral backsliding, the women are valued as moral guides for their
husbands and children. We have already seen the way in which Phillis
is immediately assessed as a potential sexual partner by Paul. She
is similarly assessed by Mr Manning, senior. Relating the four main
attributes of Phillis which stand out in his mind - her upbringing
which makes her a good homemaker, her cleverness, her fortune as
a farmer's only child, her beauty - it is important to note that
Manning judges each attribute according to its usefulness in a wife
(252). Phillis' homemaking skills, her dowry and beauty are seen
as assets in a wife; while her one drawback - her intelligence -
is not only discounted because non-functional in a wife, but undermined
as a fleeting, superficial attribute which will soon disperse once
Phillis is "a wife and a mother"(252).
A more insidious measure however of woman's status lies in the
terms with which she is described, Phillis being the prime example.
It has been a critical commonplace to note the 'natural descriptions'
which proliferate in Cousin Phillis: the evocation of the countryside,
the descriptions of the seasons as they unfold in the cyclical activities
of a farm. But more important is Phillis's strong association with
nature, and the cyclical passage of time. She is first seen as "[t]he
westering sun shone full upon her"(226), and from this point she
is associated with, or described in, natural images. She is the
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sun with her "golden hair, her dazzling complexion, lighting up the
corner of the vine-shadowed room"(228); her empathy with animals
is such that pigeons on the farm "fluttered down at the sound of
her voice"(240); the afternoon sun shining on her hair gives Paul
a feeling of such "tranquil monotony"(242) that he felt he "should
live forever"(242). Walks make "her cheeks bloom like the rose"(246);
she moans "like the sobbing of the wind"(283); she can gurgle and
whistle in precise imitation of various birds (289); she is the "very
apple of her father's eye"(289); and is "like a rose that had come
to full bloom on the sunny side of a lonely house, sheltered from
storms"(289) when she hears of Holdsworth's love for her. At the
same time, she is always present at those activities on the farm
which register the cyclical progress of time: the hay-making, the
apple-harvest, and the shelling of summer peas.
Importantly however none of these images originate from Phillis.
Each is an imposed description, and as such tells the reader more
about the observer than the subject/object observed. The effect
of such descriptions of Phillis is to render her a curiously atemporal
object of beauty who, if she exists in time at all, exists in that
type of cyclical time which suggests eternity and changelessness.
She is a unified object of perception and observation, always
consistent, changing only as nature changes, in cycles.
One might question how such female images function for men in
Cousin Phillis, in what way they measure female status. If we recall
the concepts explored in North and South, the relation of the self
to language, and Margaret's dilemma as a woman operating as an autonomous
self with control over meaning who suddenly finds both selfhood and
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control denied her, then the natural images surrounding Phillis in
this text become startlingly ominous. If North and South illustrates
the impossibility of a female perception of 'self', and the gradual
relinquishment of control over self and language by Margaret as a
necessary corollary of that impossibility, then Cousin Phillis illustrates
the reasons why a female conception of 'self' is a threatening proposition.
The notion of self, as illustrated in North and South and as theorised
by Husserl, must precede the possibility of control over the 'meaning'
of language. Husserl constructs this notion of self on the basis
of awareness - to be aware of oneself is to 'be.' Husserl's debt
to the subjective idealism of such philosophers as Berkeley and Hume
on this point is clear. Berkeley's assertion that "[i]n truth the
object and the sensation are the same thing", 7 that n esse is percipi ,8
and Flume's extension of this idea to the concept of self - that the
self is inextricably bound up with its perceptions, and without
perceptions there can be no self - have profound implications for
Cousin Phillis and Phillis's status within that text. That Phillis
is, is solely what she is perceived to be by Paul, her father and
Holdsworth - a unified object, essentially static and unchanging
In their perception, who alters only in a patterned, foreseeable
way as do the cycles of nature.
Her stable image is vital for, as we shall we, it provides the
basis upon which the male identity constructs itself. If we return
momentarily to Husserl, Berkeley and Hume, we see that what unites
these three theorists is the centrality, by virtue of either its
presence or absence, of a stable entity which permits the possibility
of 'meaning', and so language. Husserl posits the 'self', the 'solitary
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mental life'as the fount of meaning; Berkeley posits a God, an infinite
mind, who ensures "the existence of all things when no human mind
is perceiving them", 9 and with it a stability of meaning. Hume,
too, though "unable to find a 'principle of connexion' which binds
the particular perceptions" 10 in the form of, say, an infinite mind
or self, finds it difficult to go beyond the idea of such an absence,
such a vacuum, and so "take[s] it for granted, whatever may be the
reader's opinion at this present moment, that an hour hence he will
be persuaded there is both an external and internal world." 11
This 'principle of connexion', or stable entity which allows
the possibility of meaning is, in Cousin Phillis, not an infinite
mind, a God or the self: it is Phillis, woman, herself. If we re-
read those passages where Phillis is perceived, is given a 'meaning'
by an observer, and those infrequent points where Phillis undermines
these perceptions either through speech or appearance, we can see
that she is a primary source of 'meaning' in Cousin Phillis - an
absolute other. We noted at the beginning of this chapter the conspicuous
presence of the male right to progress; Paul not only gets a job,
but is being sexually educated; Holdsworth quite literally travels.
But more important is the way in which this progress is 'meaningful'
only in juxtaposition to the 'stable signifier' of woman. When Paul
first meets Phillis, he describes her at length, and then notes that
she looks at him "steadily in the face with large, quiet eyes, wondering,
but untroubled by the sight of a stranger."(226) He states too that
he "found it odd that so old, so full-grown as she was, she should
wear a pinafore over her gown."(226) Later when he says goodbye
to the Holmans after his first visit, he stresses Phillis's golden,
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dazzling hair, and again notes that she "looked at [him] straight
as she said her tranquil words of farewell"(228). A suspicion that
Phillis's "steady gaze"(227) is upon him, causes Paul to raise his
own "stealthily"(227) in respose. On the surface these minor
descriptions seem to register nothing more than the glances they
describe. But if re-read closely, we can see that it is Paul's consistent
perception of Phillis which allows him to document the progress of
his slowly awakening sexual interest. Though the young Paul may
claim that he is unsure why a comparison of his and Phillis's ages
is pleasurable, the elder narrating Paul notes its repressed disingen-
uousness. It is Phillis, if Paul but knew it, and her unchanging
beauty which makes Paul's comments 'speak', make them the meaningful
indications of his newly emerging sexuality. From making a first
obscure relation between his sexuality and Phillis ["when I was nearly
nineteen, and beginning to think of whiskers on my own account, I
came to know Cousin Phillis"(222)], Paul eventually progresses to
stating the connection overtly. But more importantly, this can only
take place once their sexual incompatibility is established. Paul
is pleased that Phillis states her liking for him, but being "young
coxcomb enough to have wished to play the lover"(244), also recognises
the remark as too straightforward an avowal of friendship to indicate
any romantic inclinations on her side.
Phillis provides a similar 'connexion of perception' for her
father. As long as Phillis remains a child, his daughter, Holman
is a capable and successful minister and farmer. Hope Farm is an
image of the bounteous, pastoral world in which all have their appointed
place: animals are well-kept and carefully tended; the land provides
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a plentiful crop which is never seriously threatened by natural
events (the lightning storm is more a background for a love scene
than a serious threat to the hay-gathering); and even the 'half-wit'
Timothy Cooper is accommodated. Once Phillis steps out of her role
as 'daughter' however, Minister Holman and Hope Farm with him lose
their sense of identity. The farm is entrusted to the workers' care,
but without Phillis it is "as though a cloud was over the sun."(310)
The minister loses his power for language, unable to lead even his
family to their daily prayer (315) and Timothy Cooper is hurled out
of the once pastoral paradise. Not until Phillis recovers is he
reinstated.
As a 'connexion of perceptions', Phillis fits into what Homans
has termed a 'masculine tradition' of literature. Discussing the
way in which the male poet forges an identity, Homans notes the
traditional use of feminine images in such writers. These images
serve as a 'primary other', a basis for imagination, and the way
of separating the subject or writer from the object of perception
which gives the poet an identity and a voice. Importantly, while
these images provide a basis for subjectivity, they themselves lack
subjectivity or identity. 12 The Mother Nature that proliferates
in Wordsworth's poetry, whilst being "the necessary complement to
his imaginative project, the grounding of an imagination so powerful
that it risks abstraction without her", 13 is "no more than what he
allows her to be." 14
 If she were to be more, she would acquire that
subjectivity and hence the capacity for self representation which
is the basis for creativity and speech, whilst depriving the male
poet the basis for his own.
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One can see now why Phillis's declaration of love is so devastating.
By asserting an emotion, Phillis asserts her own subjectivity and
identity, and its mere presence is incompatible with her role in
Cousin Phillis. More specifically, a female declaration of love
threatens one of the most potent ways in which men use women to ratify
their sense of self, or make that self meaningful. If we investigate
the issue of marriage in the text, we can see in it a microcosm of
the process by which men utilise women to anchor or stabilise their
sense of self. One of the most important characteristics which the
male characters of Cousin Phillis share is their sexual freedom;
all have or have had a choice of sexual partners. Paul moves from
an initials contemplation of Phillis to marriage with Margaret Ellison;
Holdsworth moves from Phillis to Lucille; Paul's father refers to
his first love, Molly (251); and Minister Holman, whilst not alluding
to a previous lover, can be said to have in his relationship with
his daughter an equivalent freedom in relationships which makes his
own wife "jealous of her own child, as a fitter companion for her
husband than she was herself."(249) In contrast, no similar freedom
is granted to women. Phillis's punishment is not for having too
many loves but for daring to have initiated one at all. 15
As a primary other, women must be denied such freedom in the
sexual market. Eagleton, quoting Culler, has pointed out that "[to]
say 'I love you' .	 is always at some level a quotation; in its
very moment of absolute, original value, the self stumbles across
nothing but other people's lines, finds itself handed a meticulously
detailed script". 16 But Cousin Phillis operates within an ideology
which, if it is to affirm a male sense of self, must deny this reading
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of the love declaration. Phillis's punishment in the text is for
revealing, in her statement of love, the fallacy which underlies
the 'pastoral contract'. Because man can have more than one potential
sexual partner, to say 'I love you' is indeed a quotation, if only
of himself. It is therefore acceptable that one man can tell another
of his desire for a woman - the statement carries with it no automatic
commitment. At the same time, if women are to remain the means by
which men ultimately 'make sense' or define themselves in marriage
in order that their lives of unhindered movement and progress can
continue (male movement made meaningful by female stasis), it is
vital that any female hearer of the 'quotation' be unable to recognise
it as such. Women must read men's avowals of love as statements
of individual intention and commitment. If they do not, the female
stasis upon which men depend for identity will disappear. In telling
Phillis of Holdsworth's declaration, Paul effectively shows his ignorance
of the first facts of avowals of love. Like the women in this society,
Paul reads Holdsworth's words of love as words of commitment and
intention, and so passes them on to Phillis in a gesture of sympathy.
Phillis, as she must, accepts them as authoritative, her subsequent
reclamation of health illustrating the centrality of male love in
her life. Had the text ended there, or pages later with the revelation
of Holdsworth's marriage in Canada, Cousin Phillis would be a relatively
uninteresting tale of love in a pastoral setting. But instead Phillis
speaks, and her words of love, uttered as a statement of commitment,
reveal the pastoral commitment - the agreement which outlines behaviour
between men and women - as the 'lie' it is. Neither Paul nor Holman
are at liberty to reveal the lack of implicit commitment which
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underpins all male declarations of love by railing against Holdsworth.
He cannot be accused of deception because, in male terms, he has
committed nothing of the sort. Paul's actions too cannot be blamed.
Though he betrays himself as untutored in the terms of the contract,
it is but a lesson he must learn.
Rather it is Phillis who must be 'punished' if the ideology
of womanhood as depicted in Cousin Phillis is to be upheld. Her
statement uncovers the 'quotation' element in male speech by forcing
the issue, and so threatens to release women from their static role
as primary others. Recognising now the freedom of movement that
men claim, she has the potential to break free. But more importantly,
Phillis' statement threatens male identity in a way which seems
irrecoverable. Hitherto, the 'pastoral contract' allowed men the
best of both worlds. An avowal of love can be a 'quotation', that
is an impersonal, non-committing, essentially meaningless statement,
until the individual has decided it will 'become' a meaningful, intentional
statement which binds him to his chosen hearer should he want to
be so situated.
One might at this point posit the woman's conventional right
of refusal as one way in which women can gain some control in the
'pastoral situation'. Yet despite this apparent option, I would
argue that such a 'right' carries with it no real power. Woman may
refuse, but as Munich points out with the story of Marcella from
Don Quixote, to do so is to risk being labelled 'cruel', 'unkind',
even unfeminine. 17 Marcella quite rightly asks those who deem her
cruel why "should she love a man simply because he loves her." 18 But
she misses the point. As a woman, her language, her refusal, has
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no eloquence, no meaning, to a male hearer. She is simply the 'other',
the object which allows man to make sense of himself. She has in
male eyes no subjectivity or identity by which to make her refusal
meaningful. One might also add in support of the impotence of the
female right to refuse, the contemporary views on female sexuality.
The New Female Instructor firmly states that "lave should by no means
begin on your part; it should proceed from the attachment of the
man" 19 - a sentiment clearly aligned with the Victorian view that
female sexuality is excited by, created by, male interest. 20
 In
such a context, a refusal is only ever a response to a statement,
never an initiating or 'creative' statement in itself. The power
of the Victorian woman to 'refuse' to accept or acknowledge that
which Victorian man has essentially 'given' her (a sexual sensibility)
is thus dramatically decreased. Hellerstein documents the comments
of a Parisian professor of the newly emerged science of obstetrics
and gynaecology which underscore the futility of saying 'no'. Marc
Colombat (1797-1851) articulates a widespread contemporary attitude
when he states,
Whereas before puberty she existed but for
herself alone, having reached this age, the
spring time of life, when all her charms
are in bloom, she now belongs to the entire
species which she is destined to perpetuate,
by bearing almost all the burden of reprod-
uction. 21
Besides providing yet another context in which to place the natural
images surrounding Phillis in the text, the extract shows the futility
and, pointedly, the self-ishness of such a 'communal' creature as
the sexually vital woman attempting to refuse an offer of marriage.
Belonging to the entire species, with no 'self' from which to speak,
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her 'no can resonate with little power. When one considers too
the 'relative' role of the Victorian woman as defined by Ellis,22
any vestigial power of the articulated refusal is completely eradicated.
As a creature whose life must revolve around the comfort and happiness
of others, the exercising of 'self' implicit in saying 'no' can
have no real impact.
Each female hearer is then effectively bound by a declaration
of love. The man thus has the option to choose the moment at which
his declaration becomes meaningful, and consolidate it with the
appropriate behaviour. He can in other words choose the time of
the 'fixing' of his sexual identity by choosing a female hearer to
make his utterance meaningful. 23 But Phillis's statement has unwitt-
ingly robbed man of that option by forcing into prominence the 'quotational'
nature of the male declaration. If speech is a quotation, however
can one individual 'fix' his sense of self, his 'individual' identity,
through that medium? He cannot of course, and so the revealer of
that disruptive notion must be punished.
One might wonder why, if Cousin Phillis constitutes such a threat
to a male conception of self, the story of Phillis and Holdsworth
should be told at all. The answer lies in its ending. Phillis falls
ill, only to recover obligingly saying that she intends to "go back
to the peace of the old days"(317). We have already seen what those
'old days' mean for women. Cousin Phillis posits a return to the
world of mobile male identity made meaningful by female stability
or stasis. But more importantly, the text betrays the biased
structure of such an ideology. Cousin Phillis is important because
it tells us that its story of pastoral love and innocence is, and
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can only be, a male story. It is Paul, who so clearly revealed his
ignorance of the facts of male speech, who records the harnessing
and eventual taming of the threat to male identity which Phillis's
story represents. Having learnt his language lesson, Paul illustrates
his competence in the correct presentation of the female image.
His choice of a pastoral setting, and his use of natural cyclical
images to describe Phillis, reveal how efficiently he has learnt
the necessity of presenting 'woman' as a unified series of male
perceptions if the fallacy of the female as primary other, which
makes his identity and his faculty of speech possible, is to be upheld.
Betty can urge Phillis's right to be recognised as a 'grown
woman', and can also insist that Phillis do something for herself
(316). But these suggestions of a potential for female 'selfhood'
are ultimately outweighed by Paul's control over his story. It is
he who chooses to end the text on Phillis's apparently uplifting
words, but it is also he who has the option of ending Phillis's story
before she is (if ever she could be) an independent subject. Though
Paul is writing from a perspective of some years, and though he is
careful to tell us what he has become (a married, prosperous business
man), he chooses to 'frame' or 'contain' Phillis by refusing the
reader access to what she becomes. Paul, like Homans's represent-
ational Romantic writer, uses language, his narrative skill, to
appropriate Phillis and so solidify his own identity. By making
Phillis identifiable with Nature, he objectifies her. Without identity,
without autonomy, she becomes in a sense his property, his to frame
and present in a manner which illustrates his accession to manhood.
Her 'otherness' becomes a means of making his subjectivity, his
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selfhood, powerful. Like Wordsworth's Mother Nature, Phillis is
only what Paul allows her to be. Choosing to affirm his control
over the phenomenon that is Phillis by focusing on her encounter
with love, Paul reveals the true status of what he terms the "one
small event"(247) on Hope Farm. The removal of Phillis's pinafore
may seem insignificant. But in an ideology which makes primary
others of sexually available women, that 'small' event, signalling
as it does Phillis's accession to sexual status, is not only the
main constricting event of Phillis's life but the primary consolidating
event in the life of any man who will attempt to 'fix' his identity
by her.
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Chapter Eight: Sylvia's Lovers (1863)
Sylvia's Lovers cannot be said to fall within the confines of
what Eagleton has identified as the "two characteristic Gaskellian
modes of proletarian grimness and bourgeois gentility". ' Yet
despite its apparent divergence from Gaskell's usual subject matter,
there is in Sylvia's Lovers a concern for language and its relation
to the individual which links it strongly with her preceeding novels.
The historical setting of Sylvia's Lovers has led to a concentration
of critical discussion on the issue of the individual versus an
apparently inevitable and impersonal historical process. But where
that concentration has often led to a discussion of the 'tragic'
elements in the text, 2
 the historical realism of the novel might
be more usefully approached as one manifestation of Gaskell's concern
with the individual and his/her placement within a surrounding
structure or pattern which is also embodied in her exploration of
the legal system and the institution of marriage. All three of these
areas can in turn be seen as methods by which Gaskell chooses to
explore the issue of the idividual's relation to, and construction
in, language.
It is perhaps best to begin with the presentation of the law
and the legal system for Sylvia's Lovers, like North and South,
contains two levels of discussion which, apparently converging into
a unified whole, in fact betray conflicting ideologies. Gaskell's
opening description of Monkshaven as a whaling community first
introduces the theme of the type of 'social contract' which binds
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this community together. 3
 The aristocracy of Monkshaven is not,
as in other towns, the local representatives of country families,
but the shipowners. More importantly, these shipowners do not
constitute an impenetrable elite. The lowest sailor "might rise
by daring and saving to be a shipowner himself." 4
 Indeed, the equality
which prevails upon the whaling ships seems to spill out into the
community itself, for the "common ventures and dangers, the universal
interest felt in one pursuit"(7) makes class distinction in Monkshaven
less apparent than it might be in other communities, and "bound the
inhabitants of that line of coast together with a strong tie"(7).
As might be expected in such a 'democratic' community, the
attitude towards government and law stresses the individual's right
to speak. Daniel, who is representative of the whaling cominunity,
states his definition of what a government is and should do quite
clearly. Representation to Daniel means the right to have his individual
thoughts spoken in Parliament by the representative he votes for.
The House hears "What I, Dannel Robson, think right, and what I,
Dannel Robson, wish to have done"(40). The conception of a government
which rules "for the good of the nation"(40) rather than an specific
individual is anathema to Daniel. He recognises only individuals:
"nation's nowheere."(41) Accordingly, the presence of the pressgangs
in Monkshaven proves unbearable to Daniel and the Monkshaven sailors
of his ilk. Having already lost one finger in determination to flout
a pressgang 'recruiting' for the war against America, Daniel rejects
the nation's present involvement in the Napoleonic wars as 'reason
enough' for the present impressment of Monkshaven sailors.
It is of course precisely this belief in the individual's right
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and ability to act as he sees fit that leads to Daniel's hanging.
But the complexities within which this episode takes place require
careful elucidation. If we examine closely the incidents which lead
up to the burning of the Randyvowse, we discover that what appears
to be the determined act of an individual is in fact a communal one.
From the first introduction of the pressgang in action, the text
presents a constantly shifting interplay of individual and community.
Sylvia and Molly, watching the first whaling ship of the year enter
the Monkshaven harbour, meet a good many individuals as they make
their way towards the harbour. From the gruff old sailor, to Margaret
Christison, to the mother holding aloft her baby to view his father's
ship, to an old blind man awaiting the return of his son, the passage
stresses the individualanxiety and impatience of those waiting the
arrival of the Resolution. As soon as the pressgang captures the
ship, however, these quite carefully delineated individuals merge
to form a "stormy multitude"(29), a "dense mass"(29) which can no
longer be separated into individuals. The many voices of the second
chapter unite into one "low, deep growl"(29). The women too
specifically form what is likened to "a Greek chorus"(29), some members
of which now look "scarce human . . . with lips . . . tightly drawn
back so as to show the teeth with the unconscious action of an enraged
wild animal"(29). What unites these people into a sharp simultaneous
cry	 of rage and despair is of course their shared attitude to
the pressgangs. Each of them share a sense of outrage at the enforced
service to the government which the pressgang represents.
Thus far the effect of the pressgang upon Monkshaven seems clear
and uncomplicated. To speak of individuals united against a common
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enemy carries with it no outward signs of complicated thinking.
But the pressgangs are not significant simply as unsavoury recruiters
for the Napoleonic wars. Gaskell clearly points out that the Admiralty
utilising this measure had "ample precedent for its use, and . .
common (if not statute) law to sanction its application"(5). The
pressgang then, in Monkshaven at least, has a larger significance.
It represents the law, or the legal system in its entirety. Indeed
a description of its structure stresses its legal status. The sea
coast is divided into "districts, under the charge of a captain in
the navy, who again delegated sub-districts to lieutenants; . • •
all ports were under supervision"(5 - emphasis mine). Those captured
by the pressgang find it difficult to "bring evidence of the nature
of their former occupations"(6) to release them from captivity, and
there is a careful absence of suitable listeners to such evidence
if they did.
As a representation of the law, the effect of the pressgangs
in Monkshaven and in particular Daniel's death which results from
his encounter with them, must assume a larger significance. Daniel's
encounter with the pressgang leads the reader directly to concerns
which structure the novel as a whole: the idea of communal meaning,
and the role of the individual. The chapters dealing with the attack
on the Randyvowse begin with the delineation of Robson as one
"possessed"(253) by the idea of revenge on the pressgangs. Nevertheless,
when the pressgang ring the Monkshaven fire bell to lure people to
a convenient spot for capture, Daniel's 'possession' is seen to be
shared by all his companions. Though he is the one to articulate
the idea of revenge, it is but "the thought that was surging up into
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the brain of every one there."(258) Such community of feeling is
not surprising; all of those present in the market-house where the
fire bell is kept have responded to a signal which has a colimmnal
meaning. The bell means that "neighbourly assistance"(256) is required
to quench a fire. When Gaskell speaks of the cynical betrayal by
the pressgangs of the Monkshaven community's "kindliest feelings"(256),
both definitions of 'kind' are operative.
The text is also careful to point out the degree to which Daniel's
formulation or definition of the forthcoming events differs from
those around him. What Daniel looks forward to as a "rough frolic
of which he was to be the leader"(258), assumes to many around him
"a deeper and more ferocious form than Daniel had thought of when
he made his proposal of a rescue."(258) Yet the discrepancy between
what Daniel considers to be the 'character' of the revenge and what
others make it is as instantly undermined as it is formed. He finds
himself a "laggard in planning"(259) that night's events, yet
nevertheless assumes "the lead"(259) when those events are acted
out. Though he finds the entry into the Randyvowse, his ages obliges
him to sit "inactive, while the strife and the action was going
on"(260). When the other rioters take him at his word to turn the
Randyvowse into a bonfire, Daniel is happy in his ignorance to assume
the responsibility for a fire which Simpson, left homeless as a result,
attributes to him. In other words, what begins as a chance remark
or chance discovery is soon appropriated by the crowd; and Daniel
is pleased, just as quickly, to re-appropriate the new event or definition
as his own. Daniel complacently states that "it's a great thing
for folk to have a chap for t'lead 'em wi' a head on his shouthers"(262),
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and it both "touched and flattered at the way in which those who
formed his 'world' looked upon him as a hero."(264) But though "his
name had been bruited abroad as one of those who had planned the
affair"(264), the reader is aware that whilst Daniel agrees with
what has been performed, he cannot be said to have 'initiated' the
events in the singular way that the terms 'leader' or 'hero' imply.
Daniel can make a 'proposal', but it is the reception of that proposal
which defines its content. Daniel has no real control over the content
of his language - it is a content constructed in community, between
speakers and hearers.
It is Daniel's misfortune however to believe in his own individual
efficacy to articulate and so 'initiate' the events of that night.
For if he knows that there were many Monkshaven people "who would
bless them and caress them for that night's deed"(259), the law
certainly is not interested in the communal definitions of the event
as something positive. And it is at this point that the larger
significance or function of the law in Sylvia's Lovers emerges.
The morning after the rebellion, Philip informs the Robsons that
the militia have been called to quell the rioting that had continued
far past Daniel's involvement, and that warrants for arrest are sure
to follow. Daniel is understandably made uneasy at the "new view
of his conduct presented to him"(273), though he declares he would
do it all again if necessary. His uneasiness is of course to the
point, for the law will not punish communities, it punishes individuals.
Daniel is to be made an example of what happens to those who oppose
the law of the pressgang. And this is the paradox which Sylvia's 
Lovers confronts: whereas the law might be said to represent the
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"common understanding by men of the advantages to be derived from
security and protection to property afforded by governments", 5 that
is to address man as a 'social' creature within a community, and
to express the shared definitions of what is defined as important
(lawful or unlawful), the law chooses to over-ride communal meaning
to punish the individual. In other words where the law, by its own
structure, points to the community as the source of meaning, it chooses
in its practice to overlook its own structure. The 'speaker' is
held responsible for the content of his language though that content
is not his sole construct. Daniel is arrested and hanged, but the
death of the individual cannot erase the 'meaning' of his act. The
rebellion remains "a distinctly popular movement"(283).
At the same time, one must be careful to note Daniel's continued
belief in his ability to define the meaning of his own actions.
He "retain[s] his pride in his achievements"(307), and when questioned
for his defence continues to berate the outrages of the pressgang.
In other words, Daniel stresses the individuality rather than the
communality of his definition of the pressgang's actions as "outrages"(308),
and refuses to countenance any other definition of that evening's
events. This continued belief in the individual as a 'site of meaning'
might seem perplexing in a novel which has thus far illustrated how
very 'communal' are Daniel's beliefs and definitions. But more
interesting is the way in which the text is itself uneasy and
inconsistent in its depiction of the law. On the one hand, Daniel's
death is seen as the inexorable result of the law's requirement that
an 'example' be made of those who rebelled against the pressgang.
Though acting in a communal rebellion, arising from communally held
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beliefs, the individual Daniel is hanged. At the same time however,
the text appears at pains to point out that, however lamentable,
there is indeed a "necessity for prompt and severe punishment of
rebellion against authority."(308) It is the term 'authority' which
puzzles for it suggests that the law against which Daniel has act
issues from an autonomous entity distinguishable from the community
or nation to which it refers, and so generates its own meanings in
isolation. It suggests in fact that meaning is not communal, but
'authoritative' in the sense that it comes from a specified 'site'
of meaning exterior to the community.
The text manages to convey conflicting ideas: that meaning
is communal and that meaning is sited in the individual or an authority.
Daniel is an 'example', that is both representative and singular,
both victim and identified offender. Choosing like the law to pin
the 'meaning' of language to a specific site, the individual speaker,
the text nevertheless asserts the individual's lack of control over
language, and can therefore both lament and see the necessity for
Daniel's death.
One must of course place the text's mirroring of the law's structure
in a larger context. For if the Monkshaven community defines the
pressgang attacks as 'outrages', the nation as a whole does not.
Southerners "took the oppression of press warrants more submissively"(7).
The Monkshaven community's definition of the pressgang can therefore
be seen in the light of a 'minority definition' - still the result
of community, but not the community of 'England' as a whole. What
the law in Sylvia's Lovers reflects is in fact the structure of
language with which the text is concerned. Just as language as a
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set of meanings or definitions is an existing structure into which
the individual must enter in order to communicate, so the law as
a system which sets out a series of definitions or meanings (what
is legal/illegal) pre-exists the individual who will be both governed
by it and express him/herself within it. Daniel's individual def-
inition of the pressgang, so clearly presented as a communal one,
is one which the 'larger' community, the nation which Daniel rejects,
has previously banished from its set of meanings as unbeneficial.
At the same time, it is a 'meaning' that the larger system itself
makes possible for it is the result of the same process of 'meaning-
made-in-community' upon which the law is based. Though the circum-
stances of individual opportunity for advancement do not exist in
the entirety of England as it does in Monkshaven, the process of
producing 'meanings' which are beneficial to the individuals within
that community is precisely the same as the process which yields
'meanings' of what is lawful, unlawful or beneficial for the nation
as a whole.
And it is precisely the relation of what is 'beneficial' to
what is 'meaningful' that unites the two apparently unrelated subject
interests in Sylvia's Lovers: Daniel and the pressgang, and Sylvia
and Philip's relationship. It is not coincidental that the character
or action of the pressgang brings together both strands of the text.
If we re-examine the reason for the Monkshaven definition of the
activities of the pressgang we see that it is directly related to
economic profit. Where Southerners might view enforced service in
the Navy as "adventurous employment"(7), the Monkshaven men had "the
chances of profit beyond their wages"(7) which the democratic system
273
operating on boardwhaling vessels made possible. The pressgangs
deprive them of an economic opportunity. Daniel himself adamantly
refuses the right of the pressgang to impress a man when "ten to
one his wages [were] all unpaid"(90). If the law is concerned primarily
with "the public, property-owning sphere of life", 6 the Monkshaven
rebellion is both lawful (as a protection of the Monkshaven community's
economic welfare) and unlawful as a threat to the larger public 'property'
that is England. Gaskell seems unable, in the overtly legal theme
of the text, to overcome the problems inherent in the individual's
relationship to meaning and columunity as expressed in law. Daniel's
death is lamented, and yet there appears to be no other option but
to punish the minority definition he represents when it threatens
the 'larger' community.
When we turn to the progress of the relationship between Sylvia
and Philip, the individual's relationship to meaning appears to undergo
a sudden shift. If however we keep in mind the way in which the
legal system embodied a process of definition which links 'meaning'
with what is economically beneficial to the community, this apparent
inconsistency in the text is revealed as a very subtle, indeed insidious,
consistency.
It is perhaps best to begin with Sylvia and the development
of her relationship to language. It is important to note that, from
the beginning of Sylvia's Lovers, Sylvia is depicted as an extremely
wilf,A individual. From the opening expedition to buy a cloak and
Sylvia's determination not to "yield[] to Philip in anything that
she could help"(27), her refusal to allow Philip to call her 'Sylvie'(25),
to her strong statements of hatred for Philip (383) and the man who
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gives evidence against her father (319;331), Sylvia is depicted as
a woman of passionate emotions and enduring convictions.
At the same time, one must note what appears to be an anomaly
in Sylvia's relationship to language. There is a sense in which
Sylvia, from the time of her betrothal to Kinraid, engages with language
as with an autonomous structure over which she can exert no control
once words are spoken. At a literal level the contractual nature
of language is clearly manifested in Sylvia's marriage to Philip.
As she herself points out to Kinraid, returned alive from the war
in France, she is "bound and tied"(383) by the marriage oath she
has sworn to Philip. Indeed she recognises the contractual nature
of language long before the marriage itself takes place. Considering
her forthcoming marriage to Philip, and unsure still if Kinraid
is indeed dead, Sylvia wishes that "she had not repeated the solemn
words by which she had promised herself to Philip"(326). Her wish
reveals her recognition of the binding nature of the marriage contract,
and a sense of the loss of self-definition which speaking words of
a legally binding nature entails. More interesting however, is the
sense of contract which adheres, in Sylvia's mind, to all her words,
not just those which have an overtly legal function in their utterance.
Having cursed Philip for his betrayal of both Kinraid and himself,
Sylvia is importuned by Hester to forgive him. She declares however
that she "daren't forgive Philip, even if [she] could; [she had taken]
a great oath again' him"(445). Even when Sylvia is more relenting
towards Philip, the "shadow of her vow"(490) against him renders
her unable to act in a manner opposite to that implied in her oath.
Indeed, she is unable even to contemplate how to respond to Philip
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in a way inconsistent with her vow, and as a result has recourse
to "the re-utterance of unforgiving words"(490) against him. Words
once spoken by Sylvia are lost to her. She can effect no alteration
in their meaning, despite her previously illustrated willfulness,
and seems fated to perpetuate the 'meanings' she can no longer control.
It would seem that Sylvia's relationship to language corresponds
closely to that of her father. There is in her initial oaths a very
strong sense of intention, of the individual's control over language
and meaning. When she discovers Philip's treachery towards her,
Sylvia's sense of control over what she says is paramount. Though
she cannot strip away the contractual element of her previous vows
to Philip and so agree with Kinraid that her "marriage is no marriage"(382),
she does "assume[] to herself the right of speech"(380) in order
to swear that she will never "live with [Philip] as his wife again."(383)
But once the original impetus of immediate 'intention' is gone, the
autonomous nature of language surrounds Sylvia, and she is like Daniel
embroiled in the results of definitions of her acts and words over
which she has no control.
Thus far Sylvia's Lovers would seem a text exploring the individual's
relationship to meaning in a consistent way. Both Daniel and Sylvia
demonstrate the ultimate helplessness of the individual to exert
influence over meanings s/he expresses despite an initial strength
or 'intention'. But Philip's relationship to language appears to
originate from a very different conception of the individual's role
or non-role within a linguistic structure than that which shapes
both Sylvia's and Daniel's predicament. Importantly however, this
new conception can be found only at a sub-textual level in the narrative,
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and its divergence from the dominant ideological conception of language
is perhaps best noted if the way in which Philip's relationship to
language overtly conforms to the dominant conception is first illustrated.
One should note that despite Philip's evident awareness of his
place within a community [he both argues that the pressgangs are
necessary to force those abstaining from contributing to the war
against France to contribute their share (40) and conforms to 'local'
meanings when he connives at smuggling], there is one area in which
he essays to control or shape at an individual level. That area
is Sylvia, what she is and should be. From his first interference
in the colour of Sylvia's cloak and his desire to name her 'Sylviel,
Philip consistently attempts to refashion and so define what Sylvia
is. Though she is the "only woman in the world"(128) for Philip,
the individual who figures prominently in all his future plans (130;166),
he seems curiously ill at ease with what Sylvia appears to be, and
is intent on reshaping her. Where "others only admired, [Philip
hoped] to appropriate"(134). At first Philip's efforts to redefine
are confined to those ones which sought to make Sylvia his 'wife'.
Anything that Sylvia might do or say until that definition is effected
is deemed positive in Philip's eyes if it suggests the possibility
that she will become his wife. As long as Sylvia "spoke graciously
to him"(190), as long as she does not act in a manner which intimates
the impossibility of his ever re-defining her as 'wife', Philip is
happy. His desire for Sylvia is such that it seems as if "it must
compel all things to his wish in the end"(161). He translates change
in Sylvia, whenever he possibly can, as change which will effect
his goal.
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One might expect that once engaged or married, Philip's intent
to re-define Sylvia would wane, having achieved its objective. Indeed
this seems initially to be the case. Where once he was attracted
to Sylvia's "liveliness and piquancy"(270), the engaged Philip now
"dote[s] on her languor, and thought her silence more sweet than
words"(270). For Philip the change in Sylvia, the result the redder
knows to be of her belief in Kinraid's death, can still be defined
in terms of himself. Having achieved his aim in contracting Sylvia
to be his wife, all change in Sylvia simply makes her more suitable
than ever to perform that function. This satisfaction however does
not last long. Philip soon discovers that Sylvia is "so unchanged
by her new position towards him"(327) as not to fit his definition
of a wife-to-be. Though "quiet and gentle"(327), Sylvia is "no shyer,
no brighter, no coyer, no happier, than she had been for months
before"(327). Where his eyes "beam[] out love at her approach"(327),
Sylvia neither "blush[es] nor smil[es]"(327); where Philip "took
delight in whispers . . . [Sylvia] always spoke to him in her usual
tone of voice"(335). Even when married, Philip's dissatisfaction
with what Sylvia has become in marriage is clearly conveyed. The
"old burst of impatience, the old pettishness"(342) which had been
attributes of the former Sylvia are now lamented. Her passiveness,
her docility, all contradict what Philip now wants Sylvia to be.
He wants her to "have a will of her own"(342) that he might gratify
the pleasures it specified, but Sylvia remains as langurous and
silent as he once wanted her to become.
In this respect, Philip's lack of control, lack of power to
define, accords with the dominant image of the relationship between
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the individual and 'meaning'. Able like Sylvia to influence events
up to a certain point, Philip is ultimately ineffectual in initiating
change. Sylvia becomes his wife, but not the wife he intended her
to be. This impulse to define and its inevitable failure is more
specifically illustrated in the scene in which Philip witnesses Kinraid's
kidnapping by the pressgang. Whereas Philip's relationship with
Sylvia is an attempt to 'redefine' a personality, here Philip tackles
language itself. The scene begins with Philip's realisation of the
forthcoming ambush of Kinraid by the pressgang, and his decision
to conceal his presence rather than attempt to warn Kinraid. Immediately
the scene is placed in the context of the individual and his/her
relationship to language and meaning. Philip as "an inhabitant of
Monkshaven at that day, well understood the betokening signs"(215),
of the pressgang. But rather than act on the Monkshaven 'reading'
of the sign by shouting 'ambush', Philip attempts to "deafen as well
as to blind himself, that he might neither hear nor see anything"(215).
Unable to redefine the meaning of the 'betokening signs', Philip
chooses to ignore them.
Having thus initially eluded acting on a shared meaning however,
Philip is soon faced with another dilemma in language. Kinraid,
catching sight of Philip, calls to him to tell Sylvia that he is a
witness, and most importantly, to remind her "not [to] forget the
great oath [they] took together this morning; [for] she's as much
[his] wife as if [they had] gone to church"(220). Kinraid's request
causes a great upheaval in Philip's conscience yet he manages to
quell it because of one vital event. Though "almost relenting into
pity for the man captured before his eyes"(219), Philip spots the
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ribbon which Sylvia has given to Kinraid as a love-token, and recognises
it as one he had himself presented to her in the same light. The
ribbon is important for in seeing it Philip must recognise two things:
that not only does Sylvia regard herself as Kinraid's betrothed,
but that Philip's powers to 'shape' Sylvia into the wife he considers
her to be are impotent. This latter consideration is reinforced
by the great surge of anger that results from the ribald jesting
about Sylvia that issues from the pressgang. For Philip it is Kinraid
who has "exposed the idea of Sylvia to be the subject of ribald
whispers"(220 - emphasis mine), who has affronted Philip's conception
of what Sylvia is and should be.
As a result of Kinraid's 'trespass' on the idea of Sylvia, Philip
decides to withhold the crucial message Kinraid sends her. But
interestingly that decision is the outcome of a determined re-definition
of language. If Kinraid has broken the image of Sylvia that Philip
has constructed, Philip's response to such iconoclasm is to redefine
the promise by which Kinraid has enjoined him to inform Sylvia of
his imprisonment. Philip carefully ponders exactly what it is he
had said to Kinraid, "how much of a promise he had made to deliver
those last passionate words"(221). He "could not recollect how
much, how little he had said"(221), and feels sure that Kinraid had
not heard any response he had made. On the basis of these 'facts',
Philip considers the definition of 'promise'. His first definition
that a "promise given is a fetter to the giver"(221) is one that
we can assume accords with the 'conuunal' definition of the word.
To promise is to assure to do some act or give some service or goods
to the receiver of the promise. It is a specifically contractual
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term of language, and as such one must suggest that it is not within
the power of one of the individuals to alter the agreed upon terms.
Kinraid calls upon Philip to act in accordance with the shared meaning
of the word. But Philip contrives, despite the existence of a shared
meaning, to alter the definition to suit his purposes. His definition,
"a promise is not given when it has not been received"(221) is an
attempt to remove the contractual element of a term which is inherently
contractual. The onus of the term is now not on both speaker and
listener, but now solely on the hearer of the promise, and denies
the implicit mutuality of the term.
Philip repeats this act of sophistry concerning language and
the 'source' of meaning on more than one occasion. Having decided
to conceal the content of Kinraid's message to Sylvia, Philip must
still decide whether to relay the fact of Kinraid's capture. Able
to replace the meaning of Kinraid's words as "grains of gold"(225),
which both Sylvia and Kinraid would attribute to them, with his own
definition of them as "lighter than dust"(224), Philip is nevertheless
unsure if Kinraid's impressment should be relayed; not to Sylvia
specifically, but to her father and the Monkshaven community. What
arrests him is that same intrusion on the 'idea of Sylvia' which
halted his pity for Kinraid . Hearing sailors in the inn where he
sits writing, speak of Kinraid and his prowess amongst women, Philip
adds to their list of sexual conquests the name of Sylvia. In doing
so he yet again attributes to Kinraid a definition of 'sexual conquest'
that contravenes his own, and so allows himself to remain silent
on Kinraid's disappearance. In a similar way, Philip redefines the
word 'dead' in order to validate, at least to himself, his silence.
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Not only does he take it upon himself "to decide that, with such
a man as the specksioneer, absence was equivalent to faithless
forgetfulness"(230), that 'forgetfulness' is in turn redefined as
death. Kinraid may have been killed in war or at sea, but "even
if not, he was as good as dead to her; so that the word 'dead' might
be used in all honesty certainty, as in one of its meanings Kinraid
was dead for sure."(329) This particular redefinition shows the
subtlety of Philip's approach. If meaning is colinunal, then in one
sense Kinraid is indeed dead: Sylvia, Daniel, and the Monkshaven
community believe him to be so. But of course, whilst Philip is
at one level exploiting the communal basis of meaning for his own
purposes, he does realise that the meaning of 'dead' upon which Sylvia
Daniel, and Monkshaven are operating is entirely different from his
own. Kinraid is "as good as dead to her"(329) only if that 'her'
corresponds to the 'idea of Sylvia' which Philip embraces. To such
a Sylvia, the bride and wife of Philip's conception, Kinraid is dead
because she shares Philip's definitions.
In terms of the novel's overt exploration of the relationship
of the individual to language, Philip's attempts to assert control
over the 'meaning' of language is certain to fail. And, at the level
of narrative, those attempts do. Kinraid is not after all dead;
and he returns to claim Sylvia as his wife. Philip's belief in the
"terrible earnest[ness]"(251) of Kinraid's avowal of love is seen
to be rooted in actuality (377-78). As the only individual who
consciously denies the communality of meaning, Philip's 'punishment'
in the text is far more severe than that of Daniel whose death is
depicted equivocally. Suddenly acutely sensitive to the communal
definition of his behaviour as treachery against love (386), and
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unwilling to encounter the "popular indignation"(386 - emphasis mine)
that would result, Philip determines to exile himself. His subsequent
disfigurement, and return to Monkshaven as Widow Dobson's unknown
lodger, is his 'punishment'. Not until he becomes "too indifferent
to life and the world to have a will"(454), and recognises that supreme
'authority' lies in God not himself, does Philip die peaceably.
His death however is not as straightforward as it might seem.
The text strives to make clear in the chapter "A Fable at Fault"
that Philip, unlike Sir Guy of Warwick, cannot expect to win back
Sylvia's love after his betrayal. But if on the surface Philip seems
in a position of powerlessness in comparison to Sir Guy, one can
see that at a deeper level Philip is in control of the 'story' of
his life in a way not dissimilar to that of Sir Guy. The fable is
an interesting illustration of the individual's control over meaning.
In the brief outline sketched in Sylvia's Lovers one might well ask
why Sir Guy waited so long before giving the "secret sign"(465) that
brings his long-ignorant wife Phillis rushing to his side. Having
no apparent reason to maintain his anonymity (unlike Philip he appears
not to have betrayed his wife in any way), the dominant impression
he creates is of a man in control of the 'meaning' of his life, a
man who determines how he shall be defined: as 'hermit', 'husband'
or 'earl'. Philip in contrast seems to have relinquished any claim
to 'self' at all, and certainly any attempt to control the definition
of his life. We are told that he returns to Monkshaven to find "his
Phillis"(467) - the term is meant to underline the futility of Philip
ever finding in Sylvia the 'wife' he wished her. He remains, in
Monkshaven, unknown and seemingly intent on maintaining his anonymity.
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But at this point the stories of Guy and Philip, far from being
sharply differentiated, begin to converge. Though Philip has no
'secret sign' by which to summon Sylvia, we are told that he requests
Sylvia's presence as he lies dying from an internal injury sustained
in rescuing their child. It is as 'father' to her child that Philip
can request Sylvia's attention. This in itself would seem scant
reason to assert that Philip has reclaimed 'control' over his life.
But if we examine the text closely we see that, despite the apparent
inefficacy of his previous attempts to exert individual control over
language by willed re-definition, Philip's definition of the event
that led to his exilement has become the accepted 'meaning' of that
event. Where Philip determined that Kinraid was 'as good as dead'
to Sylvia because of inconstancy Philip attributed to him, Kinraid
has become so (496). Now remarried Kinraid presents himself as an
unworthy, fickle lover (though Coulson, in a similar situation, is
never presented in this light). Kinraid's "old, passionate love"(451)
has "faded away and vanished utterly"(451), has become as dead as
Philip defined it to be. But most importantly, it is Sylvia who
accepts this definition, and now seeing that Philip "would not have
acted so"(437), recognises the "real nature of [his] love"(437).
As a result Sylvia becomes "wife"(500) - Philip is ultimately success-
ful in aligning Sylvia with the 'idea' of her he has conceived all
along. Sylvia is "his Phillis"(467), the generic woman as wife.
The apparent ascendence of an individual's meaning is certainly
disconcerting in a novel whose entire thrust until this point has
been the individual's impotent relationship to meaning. How is it
that Philip successfully asserts a personal definition when both
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Daniel and Sylvia illustrate that language is a system of meaning
over which the individual has no influence? The answer must lioz
in the definition of what Sylvia has become: Philip claims her as
"Nly wife"(500- emphasis mine) before he claims her as 'Sylvie', and
that emphasis on possession is perhaps the key to the text's apparent
inconsistency. The term wife has of course a legal as well as social
definition. In both Gaskell's day and the period in which SyIvia's 
Lovers is set, a wife was legally the property and possession of
her husband. If we compare Daniel's encounter with language as embodied
in law, and Philip's, then what one must note is the similarity of
their situations. Daniel is hanged as a representative of a community
whose 'meaning' of justice is based on what is economically beneficial.
As such, it contradicts the larger definition of what is beneficial
to the nation or community as a whole. Philip's attempts to define
Sylvia are similarly concerned with what is 'beneficial' in a wife.
But unlike Daniel's conception of justice, Philip's definition of
wife does not threaten nor conflict with a larger one. Though it
would appear that Philip's individual attempt to engender meaning
has been successful, it is simply the case that he expresses, does
not originate, a definition of woman as wife and property that is
communally produced. Where meanings of what is economically beneficial,
whilst always being communally produced, alter according to the differing
economic opportunities of communities (Monkshaven versus the south
of England), meanings of what is sexually beneficial are consistent.
What Philip's equivocal success ultimately illustrates is the maleness
of the community, and so the male bias of what is defined as beneficial
in both economic and sexual terms.
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As simply an articulator of the male, 'communal' definition
of - woman as wife, one might wonder why Philip is 'punished'
at all. But again the definition of woman as 'property' answers
the query. Philip's punishment is not for attempting to make Sylvia
into the wife he requires, but for attempting to do so when he knows
that she has already been defined as 'wife' by another man. Philip's
decision to conceal the cause of Kinraid's disappearance allows Sylvia
to consider the contract or oath she has taken to be Kinraid's wife
to be no longer applicable. Philip however consciously flouts the
agreed upon meaning of such a contract. Like Kinraid, Philip understands
the betrothal oath between Sylvia and Kinraid makes them man and
wife "as if [they had] gone to church"(220). But he allows himself
to over-ride that definition in order to claim Sylvia as his own.
Philip can therefore be both punished for violating the meaning that
Kinraid and Sylvia's oath constituted, and rewarded with Sylvia as
his wife. Philip is guilty, not of attempting a new definition of
woman as property, but of failing to observe the etiquette or terms
of agreement that surround that definition.
This latter context also perhaps elucidates the Christian tableau
which ends the novel. At one level the ending is explicable in terms
of the theme of forgiveness that runs through the novel. As Sanders says
in his introduction to the text, Sylvia finds that "she cannot live
on vengeful passion alone". 7 That ‘Viafulness which allows Sylvia
to assert that "there's some things as I know I niver forgive"(333),
that confidence in her own definitions of acts and events as forgive-
able or not, loses its power. What were once strong words of Sylvia's
intent become words she must regret (495). But perhaps we can also
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view the 'Christian' element in Sylvia's Lovers as another language
system with which the individual must engage him/herself. Both Sylvia
and Philip comment on their 'punishment' in terms of their efforts
to exert control over meaning. Sylvia laments that "Lord God Almighty
has ta'en [her] at [her] word"(496), or forced her to live out the
consequences of her language. Philip too realises that his judgement
of Kinraid as fickle and unworthy was wrong (496). With their recog-
nition of individual impotence in such matters, both are 'forgiven'.
We must note however that for all of Philip's newfound humility,
Sylvia is still his wife, his definition of her is sustained. The
temptation to stress that marriage is the prime point at which law
and religion collude in the translation of woman into male property
becomes strong. Philip can perhaps die a 'christian' death not only
because he has learnt the lesson of humility, but because he has
never transgressed any of its laws in the first place. Though he
has made Sylvia his "Idol"(495), and feels that "If [he] could live
[his] life o'er again [he] would love [his] God more, and [Sylvia]
less"(495), his desire to appropriate Sylvia can only be labelled
an extreme manifestation of the socially and religiously legitimate
attitude towards woman.
Finally the communal basis of meaning is reasserted by the
historical structure of the novel itself. In a novel which places
the individual moment within the structure of past time, the supremacy
of overall structure or meaning is maintained. More specifically,
we must note that despite the privileging of the narrator's viewpoint
of the story of Sylvia's lovers, what persists in the reader's mind
is not a tale of forgiveness at all. Though the individual can see
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Sylvia and Philip's predicament in those terms, the "popular feeling"(503),
the "tradition"(502) or definition of Sylvia and Philip's story that
lives on is one of a wife who lived in "hard-hearted plenty"(502)
whilst her husband died of starvation. The narrator asserts the
validity of the tale just told, and explains away the tradition as
the result of "ignorance of the real facts"(502). But despite such
assertions, the narrator's relationship to the text mimics the relationship
of the individual to language: positing the narrative voice as the
'site of meaning', the narrator encounters communally-produced meanings
over which s/he has no control.
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Chapter Nine: Wives and Daughters (1865)
At the close of Wives and Daughters Mt Gibson is seen sadly
to reflect "Lover versus father . . . Lover wins." 1 The reflection
is one which any father in any number of novels might make. But
in a novel whose hero, or lover, is a character clearly modelled
on Darwin, 2 Mr Gibson's statement resounds with rather more than
the usual significance. The impact of Darwin's theory of evolution,
and in particular his conception of 'sexual selection' has been briefly
dealt with in other works on the novel. 3 But the interaction and
resulting complication of evolutionism with the concepts of the unified
self and the self as a site of meaning which has structured Gaskell's
previous novels, is an area which yet requires elucidation.
In the years 1864-66 which saw the serial publication of Wives 
and Daughters there raged a controversy on evolutionism and its
effect on the emerging social sciences which Rosalind Coward, in
Patriarchal Precedents, has laid out in detail. Though the pere-
grinations of the debate are far too entangled to summarise here,
the debate itself centred on the evolution or non-evolution of familial
forms, and the relationship of those familial models to models of
the state, and indeed social development in general. 4 The debate
arose with the publication of Maine's Ancient Law (1861), whose theory
that a complex and artificial family model - the patriarchal family -
was the fundamental and universal model of family history, was deemed
contrary to the prevailing atmosphere of evolutionism. Where Maine
urged the notion of a primary, complex and artificial form of the
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family at the origin of the human family, "Nature seemed to insist
that the complex emerged from the simple". 5 In particular, it was
the way in which marital institutions organised sexuality and repro-
duction which became the area of speculation in the debate on man's
evolution from animal to human. 6
Such a debate might seem far removed from Gaskell's novel.
But in fact what the debate provides is both a context and a possible
'solution' to the problems of women which Gaskell had been encountering
in her novels. Where previous heroines are seen to be unable to
reconcile a sense of 'self' with social expectations of the 'female',
Gaskell's new heroine might benefit from the contemporary belief
in evolutionism. 7 Where the previous sexual and social institution
of marriage constrained and limited women, Gaskell envisaged a new,
evolved institution of marriage which would do no such thing, which
would in fact call for a new model of womanhood as embodied in Molly.
The 'old' institution of marriage, and the type of women it
both formed and demanded, is clearly represented in Wives and Daughters 
in the characters of Clare/Mrs Gibson and Cynthia Kirkpatrick. Clare
is stamped from the moment of her introduction by the "running flow
of easy talk"(51) that issues from her. Though on comic level she
appears to function primarily as the unconscious butt of many jokes,
the connection between the type of speaker she is and the 'career'
of marriage open to women is the focus for Gaskell's exploration
of women and language. Clare's speech is notable for two things:
its economic basis, and its fluid adaptability. Clare overtly claims
a greater liking for eldest sons (218) and views dying patients primarily
in terms of prospective legacies (209). But more importantly, Clare's
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speech is adaptable. She is liked at Towers Park not merely
because she has a pleasant reading voice, but because she possesses
the skill of being "ready to talk, when a trickle of conversation
was required . . . willing to listen . . . [and able to make] exactly
the remarks which are expected from an agreeable listener"(130). 8
It is Clare's voice that ultimately compels Mr Gibson to propose
marriage. Her "voice was so soft, her accent so pleasant"(138) that
Gibson can imagine her as a "wife for himself"(139). Once the proposal
is made, the issue of a wife's speech or language is further high-
lighted. Mr Gibson, leaving Tower park a newly engaged man, ponders
the unsatisfactory nature of his recent (first) conversation with
his wife-to-be. Expressing the hope that he and his fiancee will
"shake down into uniformity before long"(143), and castigating himself
for thinking that their "thoughts should run in the same groove all
at once"(143), Gibson is soon remonstrating with himself on the issue:
"It would be very flat and stagnant to have only an echo of one's
own opinions from one's wife"(143). The ability of female speech
to converge with or reflect male conversation is however precisely
what is at the centre of Gibson's marital tribulations, indeed at
the centre of Wives and Daughters itself. What is at first a pleasing
skill of easy talk is soon presented as a deterioration of language
use into one which renders words "ready-made clothes [which] never
fit[] individual thoughts."(349)
If we examine closely those aspects of Mrs Gibson's speech which
are most ridiculed and criticised we see that they are closely
connected with the notion of the 'source' of language. If Mrs Gibson's
language never seems to arise from an 'individual' source, it seems
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the aim of the other characters in the text to attempt to discern
the 'locus' of meaning of her words for her. Initially this aim
manifests itself in other characters' desire to keep Mrs Gibson to
the point in conversation. When Molly and Mrs Gibson have their
first talk as mother and daughter, Molly's first request to hear
some news about Cynthia Kirkpatrick is met by Mrs Gibson's comments
on her own name Hyacinth and what a gentleman in the 53rd regiment
thought of it (162). Not until Molly reiterates her question does
Cynthia become the topic of conversation. Even then one must note
that Molly's very direct questions, "When will she come? . . . When
will she leave school? . . . she is to come to the wedding, isn't
she?"(163), are not met with correspondingly direct answers.
But more pertinently, Mrs Gibson's language is seen to have
no discernible 'source'. When she first meets Osborne Hamley, her
conversation is seen not to originate in experience, or direct personal
observation. Her conversational skills mean that Mrs Gibson can
arrange her words "so as to make it appear as if the opinions that
were in reality quotations, were formed by herself"(217). But what
is most interesting here is that such 'manipulation' of language
manifests itself grammatically. Whilst nothing so overt as a complete
absence of the first-person pronoun occurs, one must note the obscurity
of the subject-reference in Mrs. Gibson's speech. When talking to
Osborne about opera, Mrs Gibson neatly asks questions which place
the onus on the hearer to respond in a way which ascertains the hearer's
direct 'experience' of the topic in question, not her own. She asks
Osborne, "Did you observe her constant trick of heaving her shoulders
and clasping her hands together before she took a high note?"(217) -
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an interrogative form that implies the 'I' of the speaker, but which
does not actually articulate it. Similarly, in her earlier conver-
sation with Molly, Mrs Gibson's answers are curiously non-attributable.
She speaks of what "People used to say,"(162), what "people say"(163),
and what Molly's father's opinions on a topic are, but rarely responds
to a question with "I think that . . . " Even comments on events
she has experienced directly share this characteristic. Her comments
on the Hollingford charity ball are such that "[a]nybody might have
used them"(349).
The result in Wives and Daughters of such linguistic tactics
is non-communication. If Mrs Gibson's language lacks a discernible
source, she also begins many conversations without providing her
listeners with a clear reference point or referent for her comments.
Receiving an invitation from the London Kirkpatricks for Cynthia,
Mrs Gibson's aggrieved comments on her exclusion are unintelligible,
"no one knew to what she was referring"(468), and so guarantee that
no exchange or communication takes place. Conversations with Mrs
Gibson are characterised by this absence of the expected progression
from comment to response. Indeed so typical are the "long inconsequential
arguments"(260) that result from Mrs Gibson's style of conversation,
Mr Gibson's 'defence' must perforce lie in silence.
Given that Wives and Daughters outlines the economic origin
of this type of discourse, Mrs Gibson's status in the text is a source
of contradiction. Her position at the Towers, where Mrs Gibson is
"unwilling to [speak] any words of her own until Lady Cumnor had
spoken and given the cue"(165), has guaranteed in the past that her
language should convey a sense of an absence of 'source'. The dependent
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position which requires a ready and flexible listener and speaker
manifests itself linguistically in a correspondingly flexible
'perspective' or site of meaning. If it is "only by adopting the
position of the subject within language that the individual is able
to produce meaning", 9
 Mrs Gibson's apparent lack of a site of meaning
comes as no surprise. When 'identity' is a matrix of subject positions, 10
Clare/Kirkpatrick/Gibson can have no such source. Unable to adopt
any stable position of subject because economic dependence necessitates
flexibility and a constantly shifting perspective, Mrs Gibson becomes
unintelligible and ultimately incommunicative.
When such obvious economic dependence is replaced by marriage
for Mrs Gibson, it would seem that her speech is expected to undergo
radical transformation. Though the text recognises the economic role
of marriage [it brings "such a wonderful relief . . . that [Mrs Gibson]
need not struggle any more for a livelihood"(140)], it does not
recognise that Clare has simply exchanged one form of economic depend-
ence for another. Accordingly, whilst her particular linguistic
skills do not change, Mrs Gibson becomes the object of severe linguistic
judgment. Whilst Gibson's ability to catch the "reflection of [Mr
Gibson's] strong wish . . . [and] fanc[y] it was her own"(174) is
nothing more than an example of the linguistic slipperiness that
results from economic dependence, she is castigated severely as a
"superficial and flimsy character"(175). Gone is the careful and
sympathetic account of the economic determinants and "former subjection
to the will of others"(175) which lie behind Clare's language. In
its place is a moral censure from the narrative voice as well as
other characters which assumes the individual's ability to transcend
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such economic and social realities.
As a result, the search for Mrs Gibson's locus of meaning becomes
a central issue in a text which has already outlined it as an imposs-
ibility. In the major confrontation between Mr and Mrs Gibson, it
is the search for a centre of consciousness, meaning and motive that
is highlighted. When Mr Gibson discovers his wife's awareness of
the confidential fact of Osborne's ill-health, he determines to discover
the source of her information. His four direct questions, "who told
. . ."(426) are each met with diversionary tactics from his wife.
Mrs Gibson is of course unwilling to divulge her culpability, but
one must note the manner in which her responses are overwhelmingly
characterised by a lack of self-referents. As in her earlier
conversation with Osborne, Mrs Gibson's remarks throw the onus on
her partner in conversation. She asks first, "Why? can you deny it?
Is it not the truth?"(426). Her final disclosure, "if you will know,
• •	 it was you yourself"(426), reveals the extent to which Mrs
Gibson is unable to posit herself as a subject. The reader knows
that Mrs Gibson was active in obtaining the information on Osborne
once she stumbled across the conversation her husband was having
with the consultant. Mr Gibson's question, "Who told . . .", is
framed to discover a 'subject' and should therefore elicit an answer
which reflects activity/involvement grammatically, eg. "I overheard. . ."
Mrs Gibson's passive answer is immediately rejected by Mt Gibson,
"I never spoke to you on the subject"(426), and he demands that his
wife make herself clear. Nevertheless, Mrs Gibson remains unable
to articulate herself as 'subject', and it is up to her husband to
deduct her 'position', which he quickly does.
Once Mrs Gibson has been forcibly posited as a subject, her
ordeal is not over. Mr Gibson continues questioning in an attempt
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to locate motive, and implicitly the centre of consciousness and
meaning, the individual that lies behind both the initial act and
her present language. Having determined 'outcome' [that Mrs Gibson
overheard a confidential conversation and made sure she understood
its significance with the help of a medical dictionary (427)], he
attempts to deduce 'cause' or motive. He soon determines that Mrs
Gibson's motive was economic. Understanding what the possible demise
of the heir to the Hamley estate might mean, she alters her behaviour
to the proximate heir Roger. Mr Gibson demands confirmation of this
motive three times. His efforts finally yield a sulky, tentative
affirmation. Mrs Gibson's "I suppose I have"(428) is not the declarative
statement that Mr Gibson's direct questioning demands, but it is
as close as Mrs Gibson can came to articulating such a remark. One
must note how rapidly Mrs Gibson resumes her mantle of self-deference
at the close of this interrogation. Whereas defence required her
to posit herself as concerned mother to a potentially love-sick daughter,
her need to reflect Mr Gibson's wishes in her speech soon leads to
her denigration of any possible attachments her daughter may have.
Mr Gibson may note the contradictions in his wife's speech (431),
but her concern is to tell him what he seems to want to hear, no
matter how many of her words she must retract.
In due course, the 'motive' is a part of the reflection Mrs
Gibson bounces back to her husband. Mr Gibson's request that she
lunch with Squire Hamley is rejected in a manner both tentative PI
am not sure . . ."(441)] and unpredictable as befits a speaker such
as Mrs Gibson. But she has learnt the "hard necessity . . . of having
to find a reason for her saying"(441) it, and duly announces her
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'motive' once Mr Gibson requests an explanation. Of course, she
eventually acquiesces to his desire, but one must note that it is
not until she discerns it as her husband's proper desire that she
can do so (441). Mr Gibson's first 'request' is formed as a statement,
not an overt expression of his wants, and so could not be initially
responded to, or reflected, in the manner Mrs Gibson eventually does.
Cynthia Kirkpatrick provides a less comic illustration of the
connection between economic dependence and linguistic 'duplicity'
or flexibility. Though Cynthia is never portrayed in precisely the
same comic terms as her mother, saying awkward things and then "having
said it, [feeling] . . . bound to stick to it for awhile"(441), the
same sense of linguistic slipperiness adheres to her. She is intro-
duced as a character with "such charm about her, [that] one forgets
what she herself is in the halo that surrounds her"(191). It is
important that it is Preston who makes this remark for, as with her
mother, it is the need to appear charming to men that dictates Cynthia's
linguistic duplicity. Her charm has its source in a "most exquisite
power of adaptation to varying people and still more various moods;
'being all things to all men.'"(254-5) On an avert level, this ability
is presented as simply a part of Cynthia's individual character:
her nature is "to attract everyone of those she was thrown amongst"(261)
be they the Miss Brownings or the heir to a vast estate. But Cynthia
herself hints at a time of neglect, when she was left alone, as the
source of her character, and the reader recognises her reference
to her initial entanglement with Preston. The tale of that encounter
is a literal illustration of the economic basis of female linguistic
flexibility. "Money matters are at the root of it all. Horrid
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Poverty"(456)1, and indeed it is money that Preston lends Cynthia
in exchange for a promise of marriage.
In one sense the incident seems simply a straightforward illustration
of one woman's particular encounter with one man. But if we look
back on the episode what we note is that Preston's loan is an overt
metaphor for the female predicament. Cynthia notes that other 'people'
find her attractive when she appears in her borrowed finery for the
first time. But in fact as Cynthia continues, the term 'people'
quickly alters to that of her dancing 'partners' or men. Cynthia's
power over these men is of course the power to attract. Preston's
role makes clear that this power is used to search out, and ultimately
exchange for, the economic security which the man in this society
can bring. Note how Cynthia's power is seen to wane in direct proportion
to her awareness of "how awkward it was to be in [Preston's] debt."(520)
But if Cynthia "like[s] to be liked"(453), and acts as a reflecting
surface of others' opinion in order to be so, she is unable to cope
when a negative reflection shines back at her. Preston's remark
that "one forgets what she herself is in the halo that surrounds
her"(191), establishes the importance of the nature of the reflected
image that is built around Cynthia. If the sum total of others'
opinion amounts not to a halo but raylessness, Cynthia is unable
to function. Her declaration that she "cannot live with persons
who don't think well of [her]"(516) is not a melodramatic gesture,
but the inevitable result of a system which forces women to define
themselves through the economic security represented by men. When
Gaskell remarks upon the boundaries of Cynthia's personality, "where
her reserve began, and her real self was shrouded in mystery"(461),
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the term 'shroud' is doubly significant. If Cynthia cannot "submit
to [anyone] thinking less well of [her] than he has done - however
foolish his judgement may have been"(600), it is quite literally
because she 'cannot live' in such circumstances. Her 'real self'
is not so much shrouded in mystery as non-existent unless a positive
image is reflected back to her from male eyes.
But like her mother, Cynthia's presentation in Wives and Daughters 
is contradictory. On the one hand she is presented as the product
of economic circumstance. The "daily pressure and plaint of poverty"(520)
are sympathetically cited as the economic determinants of her social
character. But once Cynthia is engaged to Roger Hamley, the results
of such determinants appear to be undermined. As an engaged woman,
Cynthia's mirror-like personality is seen in terms of moral judgments
not economic realities. When Mr Coxe makes his return to Hollingford
to woo Molly, his first object of affection is soon replaced by Cynthia.
Her "unspoken deference"(448), her "soft attractive ways"(448) ; attract
Coxe as they reveal her to be "much easier of access"(448) than Molly.
Coxe's subsequent request for Cynthia's hand in marriage baffles
Gibson who expects his own daughter to be claimed, and provides a
moment of comic relief in the text. But one must note the manner
in which Coxe's 'inconstancy' in love is seen sympathetically as
a mark of "simplicity, . . . unworldliness, [and] . . . the strength
of [his] feelings"(450). In contrast, Cynthia, who has simply been
defined as an object of affection, is accused of thoughtlessness
(453) - not a serious accusation, but still more severe than one
might expect in a text that has already outlined the reasons behind
Cynthia's, and other women's, need to be admired.
300
The assessment of Cynthia's involvement with Preston is similarly
problematic. That involvement is seen as the result of economic
hardship and is presented initially in a sympathetic light. From
a regrettable entanglement in which a young girl misguidedly involves
herself, however, the affair becomes 'proof' of Cynthia's flirting,
jilting nature, the "flaw which she herself had made"(602). Though
extenuating circumstances are granted as possible mitigating factors,
Cynthia is judged to be 'at fault', as someone who has determinedly
acted deceitfully (602). The moral terms are hard to reconcile with
the carefully outlined social and economic circumstances that initially
'explained' Cynthia's character. But one must note that, like her
mother before her, the moral condemnation of Cynthia coincides with
her engaged status. Mt Gibson himself emphasizes Roger Hamley's
right to an explanation of Cynthia's conduct. The "full truth"(597)
is necessary in order that Roger may 'protect' Cynthia, to which
he has a "legal right"(597) once married. In the meantime, Mr Gibson
claims that right as Cynthia's legal guardian.
At this point one recalls a detail in the confrontation between
Mr and Mrs Gibson over Osborne Hamley that may explain the contradictions
in both Mrs Gibson's and Cynthia's presentation in the text. Mr
Gibson points out the difficulties which his wife's behaviour could
bring him. As man and wife they are "one in all . . . respects"(429).
Mrs Gibson cannot "do a dishonourable act without [her husband] being
inculpated in the disgrace"(429). The legal status of man and wife
as one person perhaps explains the discordant expectations of women
in the text, and the manner in which these expectations alter through
time. The text carefully outlines the economic dependence that women
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have on employers or families, and notes the linguistic flexibility
and mirror-like character that results from the need to please in
order to gain and retain economic security. At the same time, marriage
is not recognised as a form of economic dependence that similarly
requires linguistic flexibility. As a result not only are women's
linguistic skills now subject to moral censure, the device against
which their language and action is measured is that of the man.
As simply a part of the men to whom they are married, women are expected
to speak as their men do, as autonomous subjects. What is unprof-
essionable and dishonourable for a doctor is similarly so for the
doctor's wife. 11
For Cynthia, now engaged to Roger, her mirror-like language
can no longer be 'explained' or sympathetically presented. It is
now subject to precisely the same rules or methods of assessment
by which male language is judged. Cynthia herself recognises that
the standard by which Roger is judged and judges "wasn't made for
[her]"(601), and her unwillingness to be so assessed leads Mr Gibson
to accept the need for their engagement to be broken.
What all of this means is that women are suddenly transformed
from being economically and socially 'determined' speakers to ones
which are judged as if they are 'determining' - speakers who are
in 'control' of their language and actions and therefore subject
to moral assessment. Mrs Gibson is suddenly interrogated for motivation
when her language/actions are not within her control; Cynthia becomes
a jilt, a moral assessment applicable only to the active controller
of behaviour and language.
At the same time the text makes clear that the very act of marriage
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which effects this transformation in the assessment of female speakers
is itself based on the concept of the 'determined' not 'determining'
woman. Mrs Gibson, speaking of the possibility of resurrecting Cynthia's
engagement to Roger, deplores Molly's suggestion that Cynthia request
to be re-engaged. Such an act is forbidden, for Cynthia "must wait
until he proposes again"(618). Mrs Gibson's ideas on the etiquette
of engagement is an accurate articulation of the prevailing sexual
convention which dictates that a woman does not speak her love until
spoken to. She is the 'selected party' in the engagement process,
not the 'selector' though she may exercise the right of refusa1.12
For such a 'selected'individual to acquire suddenly the ability to
'select', and the autonomy both behavioural and linguistic that is
implicit in that ability, is a contradiction which the text never
fully considers. Indeed it is at the root of the contradictory
status of the major female character in the text, Molly.
It is important to note from the outset that Molly is presented
as a 'different' female speaker. She is a girl with a sure sense
of self, who speaks with what can be termed 'linguistic integrity'.
This integrity manifests itself as a 'literalness' in language, a
characteristic that Molly shares with her father in precisely the
same way that wives and fiancees are expected to share their husbands'/
fiances' linguistic skills. The effect of this shared literalness
is a similarly shared inability to understand the linguistic flexibility
utilised by women. When Cynthia and Mrs Gibson exasperate Mr Gibson
by the manner in which they both refuse and accept Squire Hamley's
invitation to lunch, Molly's pleading attempts to persuade them to
accept the invitation indicate that, like her father, she accepts
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their prevaricating "literally"(442). Indeed from the early part
of Wives and Daughters, Molly's literalness in language is illustrated.
When Lord Cumnor 'promises' that Molly should attend the Tower gala,
she takes his absent-minded words quite seriously - the fact that
he had "asked [her] twice over"(40) serving to make Lord Cumnor's
'promise' almost imperative. The Squire's ruminations on Mr Gibson's
possible marriage prospects elicit the same literal interpretation
from Molly. Breathlessly she asks if her father had expressed any
preference only to be admonished for taking "words so seriously"(105).
In the same way, Mrs Gibson's reference to Cynthia as 'poor dear'
makes Molly "afraid lest she might be ill"(251).
It is only with her father that Molly's literalness does not
cause such misunderstandings. "[T]he power she possesse[s] of fully
understanding the exact value of both his words and his silence"(121)
is based on their shared linguistic 'integrity' or literalness, passed
from father to daughter during their many periods of "the most delightful
intercourse together"(63).
What this linguistic integrity ultimately indicates in Molly
is a sense of self. Her language in the opening scenes of Wives 
and Daughters embodies this 'self' clearly. Though her escapade
at the Towers fete suggests a shy child, the overriding impression
in these early pages is of Molly's strong sense of individuality.
In particular her reaction to her father's forthcoming marriage
illustrates her stress on individuality. Urged to consider other
people's happiness before her own, Molly acquiesces but declares,
"It will be very dull when I shall have killed myself"(170). Her
language at this time is dominated by references to herself, not
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merely in the over use of the first-person pronoun ["I don't think
it would be nice at all . . . I will like you . . . I will try hard
to love you"(165); "I like roughness"(154); "I mean to try and
remember"(154); "I would rather not - because I think that I ought
not . . . "(199)], but in declarations of her feelings and preferences.
Such language denotes a self sure of its likes and dislikes, its
boundaries and definitions. It is a language that may be termed
'expressive', that is coming from a localised source, the self.
Molly's "straightforward manner"(166) or outspokenness is a quality
noted by Lady Cumnor and Clare alike, and displayed in her conversation.
When Lady Cumnor begins to interrogate Molly, asking a "string of
very straightforward questions"(166), one notes that unlike her step-
mother Molly answers directly. Each question is answered, not evaded,
with a surety of opinion that leads Lady Cumnor to recognise that,
for Molly, it is "a matter of course that every one should know their
own affairs best."(166) Molly's language is an expression of her
self, her likes, dislikes and motives, and she as yet believes all
language to be a similar expression of other speakers' selves. This
type of language has already been identified as the standard by which
Mt Gibson judges both his own and his wife's speech. Indeed it is
identified as a peculiarly 'male' conception of language. The squire's
speech is likened to a "transparent medium through which the current
might be seen"(303), and Lord Hollingford's language, as illustrated
in a "manly, feeling, sensible leter"(410), is clearly presented
as 'expressive'. It is a language associated with truthfulness and
honesty, assessed in moral terms and deemed to be morally worthy.1 3
It is important to note however that whilst Molly's language
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differs in its directness and quality of 'expression' from the mirror-
language of other women, her source of identity does not. Though
her fears of estrangement when she is mistakenly left behind at the
Cumnor's gala can be seen simply as a young girl's understandable
reaction to being left amongst strangers, Molly's imaging of her
experience suggests a deeper significance. Feeling like "a lighted
candle when they're putting the extinguisher on it"(58), feeling
in other words on the edge of extinction, Molly's relief at her father's
return manifests itself in a strong desire for some hidden method
of constant contact. A chain that could be pulled between the two
guarantees that they "could never lose each other"(58). The image
is a measure of Molly's deep attachment. But, coupled with the image
of the extinguished candle, it suggests that Molly's father is quite
literally the source or centre of her identity. Amongst those she
does not know, Molly is on the verge of losing her sense of self,
feeling more inanimate than animate.
Interestingly, Gibson seems initially anxious to guarantee his
place in Molly's eyes, wanting to "keep her a child"(65). But there
comes a point when Molly is seventeen that Gibson's definition of
his daughter as a child is rudely interrupted by the amorous attentions
of his student for Molly. Gibson is "startled at discovering that
his little one was growing fast into a woman and already the passive
object of some of the strong interests that affect a woman's life"(87).
But most interestingly, once Gibson determines that he could not
"guard [Molly] as he would have wished"(87), once he accepts that
"people considetherl a young woman now" (91), Gibson seems prepared
to give up his role as Molly's anchor of self in preference for that
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"[k]ind of tender supervision which . . . all girls of that age require"(135).
From this point in the text, the reader encounters difficulties
in Molly's presentation. On the one hand, she is presented as an
'expressive' speaker, with a sure sense of self that allows her to
be so. Her father's marriage however catapults Molly into that region
of 'self-lessness' which her sense of loss at the opening gala prefigures.
For if Molly's separation from her father at that point made her
feel inanimate, his marriage makes her feel that the "piece of solid
ground"(145) on which her existence is rooted has been removed from
beneath her. "[D]rifting out to the infinite sea alone"(145), Molly
is quite literally "not [her]self"(146) for her source of identity
is gone. And it is here that the text must encounter its own contra-
dictions. For if Molly's status is no longer that of daughter, she
is about to become, as the plot and the very title of the novel prescribe,
a wife. The movement from daughter to wife however is fraught with
difficulties. It necessitates a movement from 'expressive' speaker
to 'reflective' speaker - a movement from one in control in language
to one whose speech is determined by social and economic factors.
We have already seen the paradoxical way in which the 'sexually-selected'
female reflects this status in her language and is morally condemned
for doing so. Sexual selection presumes a passive, socially and
economically 'determined' woman of linguistic flexibility. The text
however paradoxically judges such women in moral terms which themselves
presume a free-will, determining woman who, by implication, would
not be 'sexually selected'. The difficulty in Wives and Daughters 
is how to make Molly a 'wife', that is sexually selected, whilst
retaining that very linguistic skill which both sets her apart morally
from the other women in the text by defining her as a 'determining'
speaker and excludes her from sexual selection.
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An uneasy compromise is the result of these mutually exclusive
aims. If we examine closely Molly's 'progression' in the text, what
we note is that her ability to be an 'expressive' speaker is subtly
altered to be an ability confined to speaking 'expressively' on others'
behalf. For her own self, once Molly is posited as a sexual entity,
a nubile woman, 'expressive' language disappears, replaced not by
linguistic duplicity, but silence. Molly's acquired sexual status
is a measure of her similarity to the other women in the text. Once
her father is placed 'out of bounds' as a source of identity, Molly
quickly transfers that role on to Roger Hamley. It is now he who
provides the "stable guides to her conduct"(181), to whose opinion
and authority she now looks in place of her father. Roger's engage-
ment to Cynthia however soon hurls Molly once more into the nebulous
region of 'self-lessness' first experienced at the time of her father's
marriage. Hearing the engagement announced, Molly can comprehend
nothing but that "she was being carried on in earth's diurnal course
. . . with as little volition on her part as if she were dead."(417-
8).
One must note however that Molly's initial response to her
suspicions of Roger's attachment to Cynthia is rather different.
She "would have been willing to cut off her right hand, if need were,
to forward his attachment to Cynthia, and the self-sacrifice would
have added a strange zest to a happy crisis"(390). Self-sacrifice
is not a side of Molly's character hitherto revealed, but this entire
passage points to the split in Molly that is the result of the text's
dual aims for her. On the one hand, one registers the 'self-sacrifice'
as the result of Molly's newly-acquired sexual status. Whilst Roger's
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attraction to Cynthia is a "sore pain and bewilderment to Molly's
heart"(389), the sexual convention to which Molly is subjected dictates
that she is unable to act upon that pain. As a sexually selected
woman, in this instance not selected, Molly must view Roger's choice
of Cynthia as "the most natural thing in the world"(389). On the
other hand, there is an element of Molly's 'old self' in her response
to what appears to be a 'plot' to ensure that Cynthia's selection
takes place. Molly views Cynthia as a "conscious if passive bait"(390)
in a plot which Molly herself would have resisted (391). But the
temptation to view Molly as a self-determining individual refusing
to participate passively in her sexual selection must be resisted.
For Molly's display of determination here is more the result of her
dislike of seeing Roger 'entrapped', that is deprived of his free-
will and choice, than an inclination to exercise free-will on her
own behalf.
Indeed if we look carefully at Wives and Daughters we note that
once Mr Gibson abdicates his role as source of identity for his daughter,
all of Molly's 'expressive', seemingly self-determining, statements
are on behalf of others. When Roger advised that "[o]ne has always
to try to think more of others than of oneself"(152), he articulates
precisely what will be the new source or site of Molly's language:
other people. All of Molly's most apparently 'expressive' acts,
her instant decision to stay with Squire Hamley when Osborne dies
(605), her championship of Cynthia against Preston (524) and in defiance
of her father (568), her decision to keep Osborne's marriage secret
(247), are all performed on behalf of others. But where other female
characters, whose source of identity is also others, reflect their
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construction in duplicitous decentred speech, Molly at these overt
moments of 'determination' retains her linguistic integrity. One
must note the way in which the 'expressiveness' so often takes the
form of a 'promise' - to Osborne and Cynthia for example. The promise
as a linguistic construction exactly embodies the contradictory status
that Molly has assumed. On the one hand the 'promise' is presented
as a linguistic arrangement by which two people 'contract' themselves.
Such a linguistic contract assumes two 'expressive' speakers - ones
who can be 'true to their word' because language is the medium through
which they convey their 'own' meanings. It is in this light that
Osborne extracts a promise of silence from Molly upon her discovery
of his marriage. Molly considers herself bound by her promise as
its contractu.al . nature implies, and Osborne seems satisfied by Roger's
testimony to her character that he may rely upon it. Other characters
in the novel identified as 'expressive speakers' also enter promises
as into contracts. Mr Gibson has "bound [him]self by a promise" (433)
to Squire Hamley to reveal if any romantic entanglements should develop
between their respective offspring. This contract is so strong that
it overrides any other individual's wishes, as Cynthia learns. Roger
too is identified as "one to respect a promise"(433). Not only is
his contract to conduct a scientific investigation viewed quite literally
as a promise (687), but Roger "like[s] to feel bound"(419) by such
contracts. Preston too views a promise as a contract "which it requires
the consent of two people to break"(530).
On the other hand, however, the 'promise' is a linguistic contract
which paradoxically cannot be defined or determined by the speaker
who expresses it. A promise is indeed spoken by one individual,
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and accepted as a declarative statement of intent, a speciman of
a speaker's 'expressive' language. But as speech-act theory reminds
us, the final assessment of that 'promise' does not lie solely with
the speaker. As a contract, the promise embodies the manner in which
'meaning' is not sited in the individual speaker, but between speakers.
It is a matter of community or consensus over which the individual
cannot have sole control. Though premised on the conception of language
as residing in the individual, the promise embodies the reciprocity
of language, and it is verified as felicitous or infelicitous outside
of the speaker who articulates it.
The promise of marriage that Cynthia gives to Preston is a clear
illustration of this contradictory nature. Preston's hold over Cynthia
is based on his possession of letters which contain her "reiterated
promises of marriage"(531). The reader already knows the economic
context in which these promises were made, and Cynthia herself regards
them as the result of "strong wills mesmerizing weaker ones into
submission"(455). Indeed it is on the grounds of Cynthia's competency
as a speaker of promises that Molly defends her. As a girl of only
sixteen, Cynthia is seen as an inappropriate speaker. Nevertheless,
though the text would itself assess Cynthia as an inappropriate speaker
because of her 'reflective' language, she is unable to nullify the
contract by a simple negation of her promise. Though Cynthia may
claim she is 'free', and engage herself to Roger to 'prove' it, she
is unable to disengage herself from Preston. Nor is he able to force
Cynthia to act in such a way as to make her promise 'felicitous'.
They are locked in a double-bind which neither can break. It would
seem that the promise is an autonomous entity (in this instance,
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literally 'concrete' in the form of a letter) over which, in the
absence of a consensus on its meaning, neither individual has control.
For Cynthia, the only means of nullifying the 'promise' is to negotiate
its return and literally destroy it by burning the letters (538).
For Preston, only the enforced relinquishment of the promise in its
concrete form can be defined as a nullification of the contract.
Without the letters, he has no 'promise' with which to assert control
over Cynthia. Importantly neither the loss nor the return of the
promise is effected by either of the individuals involved in the
contract, but is negotiated by a third party, Molly.
As a construct which paradoxically assumes an 'expressive' speaker
in control of language yet which is ultimately an illustration of
the consensual, autonomous nature of language, the promise is an
ironically appropriate linguistic structure for a speaker like Molly,
balancing uneasilybetween'expressive' language on others behalf
and the contemporary convention of the sexually selected, and therefore
linguistically reflective, woman. More appropriate however is the
kind of 'promise' Molly consistently articulates: a promise to repress
through silence sexual issues. The type of promise is important
for it discloses the correlation between 'declarative', expressive
language and sexual silence which structures Wives and Daughters.
One must note that Molly's 'expressive' language is most often based
on a definition of herself as non-sexual. When the Miss Brownings
insinuate that Molly and Roger's shared interest in bees masks a
romantic involvement, Molly declares "I can't help seeing what you
fancy . . . but it is very wrong . . . I won't speak another word
. . . if it puts such silly notions into your head."(184) For if
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others view Molly as a possible lover, her romantic notions are still
characterised by a girlish dwelling on troubadours and knights, and
an unreadiness to give a "personal form and name to the hero that
was to be"(182). An inability to 'speak' her sexual feelings is
the corner stone of Molly's status as an 'expressive' speaker. Similarly,
it is her "perfect innocence"(509), "courageous innocence"(529),
and her lack of awareness that she is a young woman that allows her
to meet so effectively with Preston. Her ability to interrupt him,
decide whether or not to answer his questions and finally to stop
his speech outright (532), illustrates that her assumption of asexuality
and her use of expressive, declarative language, is at least momentarily
as effective as if she were indeed "pure angel"(533). In the same
way, the "truth . . . [of] tone . . . [and] true expression"(568)
that wins Molly her father's trust when he first hears of the meeting
with Preston is linked very clearly with Molly's childish, non-sexual
status in both her own and her father's eyes. Her father's initial
treatment of her causes Molly to perform a "childish gesture"(567) -
and it is a measure of the success with which Molly's childish, non-
sexual and therefore 'expressive' status is conveyed to her father,
that by the end of their interview he accepts the 'truth' of her
explanation of her conduct and calls her "child"(569).
The ability to suppress sexuality and so retain the force of
an expressive speaker is however only a transient power. For if
she and occasionally others like Preston succumb to this definition
of Molly, the plot necessitates that Molly be sexually selected,
a determined not determining individual after all. If Molly engages
with Preston at the level of 'pure angel', it is the communal,
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consensual definition of a meeting between man and woman as necessarily
a sign of courtship or sexual intrigue that triumphs. Molly, the
"simple innocent girl"(557) is soon the "unconscious black sheep
of the town"(557).
But what is most interesting is the effect Molly's awareness
of this public definition of herself as a sexual creature has on
her speech. Hitherto Molly has avoided the area of sexuality by
being expressive on others' behalf. Such a use of language allows
her to articulate sexuality after a fashion. If Cynthia does not
appreciate Roger Hamley as Molly feels she should, she is able with
a great deal of "courage to force herself to say"(454) so on his
behalf, whilst simultaneously shrinking from what amounts to an
articulation of sexual preference.
But once Molly is consciously aware of what she has hitherto
suppressed, once her public definition as a nubile woman is made
clear. (681), Molly's expressive language effectively disappears
from the text. From the moment of this recognition, Molly's "simplicity
of . . . intercourse [is] spoilt"(683), her "perfect freedom is gone"(683).
In accordance with the sexual convention at the heart of the text,
Molly cannot be expressive on the very issue which threatens her
expressivity: her sexuality. Accordingly her speech to Roger, now
identified as the likely 'selector' of Molly by Mrs Goodenough, is
marked by a "restraint [in] her manner"(690) and a constant checking
of "her old naturalness"(685).
The retreat into silence and passivity on the issue of sexuality
perpetuates the superficial differentiation of Molly from the other
women in the text. Though sexually selected, Molly never deteriorates
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into the reflective language which characterises both her step-mother
and sister. Such silence importantly allows Molly to avoid moral
censure as a duplicitous, decentred speaker. The text has however
already posited the inevitability of such duplicity in Molly's speech.
Challenged with the notion that she might care for Roger herself,
Molly is said to speak "the truth as she believed it, though not
the real actual truth"(422). The issue of the site of meaning, the
site of 'truth', is one which has troubled previous Gaskell novels,
most notably North and South. In that novel too the correlation
between what is overtly termed 'meaningful' or the 'real truth' and
a male-centred definition of what is beneficial and therefore true
is posited at a deep level. Wives and Daughters appears to be an
advance on North and South in its foregrounding of the issue of 'types'
of speakers. But if the linguistic consequences of the education
of women to be wives is an issue in Wives and Daughters, the correlation
between what is deemed truthful and what is economically expedient
from a male point of view is not. If the gentlemen who sponsor Roger's
expedition are "most of them gentlemen of property, and saw the full
importance of proving the marriage of an eldest son, and installing
his child as the natural heir to a long-descended estate"(644), the
text would appear to concur in what is termed 'important'. Roger
returns to 'prove' his nephew's right to Hamley House, to establish
a 'truth'. His efforts to put things to "rights"(645) - the conver-
gence of the moral and legal connotations of the term is vital -
are ones wholeheaitedly approved by Mr Gibson, Molly and the text.
Only such an unquestioned economic landscape can explain the
appearance of a 'gap' between 'truth' as the individual expressive
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speaker sees it and the 'real' truth in a novel which is premised
on the siting of meaning or truth in the individual. As an expressive
speaker, Molly cannot be seen to lie when she does speak, whilst
her sexually selected status, which guarantees the 'rightness' of
primogentive practice, necessitates that she cannot be in control
of her language, able to 'choose' a sexual partner, as only a determining
speaker can, and so dictates her passive silence. 14
Due to the incompleteness of Wives and Daughters it is of course
difficult to determine what, if any, solution to Molly's predicament
Gaskell might have contrived. Rosalind Coward points out that the
Victorian interest in evolutionism was "a mode of evolutionary speculation
in which the end-points were fixed." 15 Gaskell shares this conviction,
for her unquestioned acceptance of the economical status quo leaves
her unable to imagine a disruption of the daughter-to-wife process
which defines women. At one level, her choice of Roger Hamley as
Molly's prospective husband is an attempt to envisage marriage in
an uneconomic setting. Coral Lansbury has charted the 'economic
landscape' of Wives and Daughters and notes that only Roger sees
landscape differently: "Nature existed in its own right for Roger
Hamley and he saw it without the acquisitive and predatory gaze of
country folk." 16 But if evolutionism provides the basis for an uneconomic
view of nature, sexual selection as Gaskell envisages it does not
allow women to see or be seen in the same way. Molly is still both
the 'object' of selection by men, and dependent upon such selection
for her economic security [Roger and Mr Gibson discuss the issue
of Molly's maintenance as soon as Roger makes his attentions knows(700)].
If Roger sees landscape from those around him, as a natural scientist
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he is still in the business of 'naming' what he sees, a form of
appropriation well attested to by Mrs Gibson's almost bewildering
changes in appellation.
In a novel that so painstakingly illustrates the merits of
'communication' and the potential for women to be 'expressive' speakers,
it is disappointing that Molly and Roger's mutual regard is not voiced,
not spoken, but represented by the giving of a rose (691). Disappointing
but inevitable, for Wives and Daughters retains its incongruities
until the very end. Molly remains intent on defining her "glowing"(702)
response to Roger's gesture of farewell as a sign of the sweetness
of friendship in a way that the reader must recognise as 'truth'
only to the sexually silenced Molly. Nevertheless one must assess
Wives and Daughters in terms of Gaskell's previous texts in order
to ascertain its strength. Molly's definition of her response to
Roger, however much it may undermine the novel's conception of truth
and its relationship to the individual speaker, does differentiate
her from preceding Gaskell heroines. If Molly is ultimately unable
to balance linguistic expression with female sexual status, her
ability to speak such partial truths as sisterly love for men does
17
save her from that sexual shame 	 which has completely silenced,
or driven mad, the women like Ruth, Margaret Hale and Cousin Phillis,
who came before.
Notes
'Elizabeth Gaskell, Wives and Daughters, (Harmondsworth: Penguin
Books Ltd., 1969), 701. Subsequent references are to this edition
and appear in the text.
2J.A.V. Chapple and Arthur Pollard, eds., The Letters of Mrs 
Gaskell, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1966), Letter
550.
3See Patsy Stoneman, Elizabeth Gaskell, (Brighton: The Harvester
Press Ltd., 1987) and Coral Lansbury, Elizabeth Gaskell: The Novel 
of Social Crisis, (London: Elek Books Limited, 1975).
4Rosalind Coward, Patriarchal Precedents: Sexuality and Social 
Relations, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983), 17-19.
5Ibid., 29.
6Ibid., 46.
7See Walter E. Houghton, The Victorian Frame of Mind, 1830-1870,
(London: Yale University Press, 1957) for a general discussion of
the reception of Darwin's theories.
8Clare is of course conforming to Mrs Ellis's ideal of a woman's
role in conversation. See Sarah Ellis (nee Stickney), The Women 
of England, (London: Fisher, Son and Co., 1839), 196-7.
9Catherine Belsey, Critical Practice, (London: Methuen and
Co. Ltd., 1980), 59.
1 °Ibid., 61.
"Mrs Gibson's actions in the Osborne affair ironically articulate
the legal and social construct of women. If Mt Gibson is indeed
his wife's 'site of meaning', the 'subject' from which she speaks,
then both her actions (eavesdropping) and her subsequent evasive
behaviour are ironically appropriate and predictable.
12
Mts Gibson's engagement etiquette is in complete accord with
the concept of sexual selection outlined in Darwin's The Descent 
of Man (1871). Gillian Beer, in "Beyond Determinism: George Eliot
and Virginia Woolf," Women Writing and Writing about Women, Mary
Jacobus, ed., (London: Croom Helm Ltd., 1977), 85, points out:
Darwin assumes that among humans as opposed to other
spccies, it is always the men who do the selecting.
317
318
The implication of his argument is that women's
characteristics will be determined by their
acceptability to men.
Interestingly, Darwin also focuses on the female voice as an early
sexually-selected female attribute, though his emphasis is on tone
or sweetness rather than on content.
' 3 itI  s of course a language which manifests the Unitarian emphasis
on 'bearing witness' or expressing 'truth' from a specified site:
the witness. The exception to the direct correlation between male
gender and expressive speaking (aside from Molly) is Osborne Hanley.
Osborne's "graceful antics of language"(203) and "surface-talk"(272)
align him with Mrs Gibson and Cynthia as a type of reflective speaker.
But though his social status seems to undermine the economic determinants
which are posited as the cause of reflective speech, in many ways
his position as heir to the Hamley estate deprive him of the status
of a determining speaker. Just like the women in the text, Osborne
does not exercise full control in the selection of his future wife.
As his father frequently points out, Osborne's wife must bring money
to the impoverished Hamley estate. Of course Osborne does select
his wife, but one must note that he is subsequently unable to enjoy
economic security because of that choice.
14wiWith the split in Molly's speaking status, Gaskell avoids
confronting a contemporary issue: the impact of evolutionary determinism
on morality. As Houghton, quoting Carlyle, outlines, Darwin's theory
was considered horrific "because if man were no more than a developed
animal, conscience and intellect were 'but the developments of the
functions of animals'"(70). But of course the split itself, as argued
in this chapter, points to the correlation between what is 'right'
and 'true' and what is economically expedient from a male point of
view - the fear that the "moral sentiments were simply a disguised
form of selfishness, and the moral life had no moral purpose"(70)
is seen to be prescient.
15Coward, 49.
16Lansbury, 194.
17Stoneman, 197.
Conclusion
The 'realist' genre in which all of the preceding texts are
traditionally placed itself requires explication. What follows is
neither a defence of realism nor an exhortation for its wholesale
rejection. Rather it is an attempt first to posit why the writing
of realist novels might have appeared salutory to Gaskell, and secondly
to 'salvage' realism for the modern, particularly feminist, reader.
Realism's appeal for Gaskell is quite straightforward when one
recalls her Unitarianism. Its belief in the 'reality' of the evidence
or information provided by one's 'God-given' senses precludes the
possibility of a phenomenological account of the self. Accordingly,
the concept of the unified, autonomous individual is one which preceding
chapters reveal as pervading her navels in accepted 'realist' fashion.
At the same time, Unitarian interest in social conditions shows that
Unitarianism operated within a structure which posited that the autonomous
individual was not completely free-willed, but was affected by specific
social conditions. Economic condition 'x' or 'y' could 'explain'
certain aspects of the individual 'z'. The result of this combination
was a religion which was both 'idealist' in that it attributed a
soul or essence to the individual, and 'progressive' in that it
recognised the possibility for improvement or deterioration in the
individual according to the impact of specific conditions on actions.
The 'individual' was seen paradoxically as both 'static and 'kinetic'.
Unitarianism itself mimics this combinatory structure. On the
one hand, one recalls the infinite expandability of a religion which,
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declining to dictate the terms of belief of its followers, had no
overt manifesto. Each individual was exhorted only to consider ration-
ally and truthfully his/her beliefs, and act accordingly. The notion
of 'bearing witness' stresses the role of the individual, the issue
of perspective and its relation to belief, that characterised Unitar-
ianism. It is presented as an 'umbrella' organisation, continually
expanding. But, just as the individual was seen to be potentially
perfect or God-like in his/her attainments, Unitarians posited a
point (perfectibility) at which its 'umbrella-like' structure expanded
to embrace all the multiplicity of view points imaginable. Expansion
becomes at some abstract but possible point static because all encomp-
assing.
Realism for Gaskell can be seen to operate in a similar fashion.
With her first novel, the accepted boundaries of what is deemed
'appropriate' for fiction are widened to include the social 'realities'
of the Manchester working classes. Conditions 'x' and 'y' (damp-
ridden cellars; infant mortality) are seen to affect the individual
'z' (John Barton) and so 'explain' or posit the truth, the reality,
of the individual's beliefs and actions. What is 'real' is seen
to be a product of perspective: John Barton must 'bear witness'
to the 'truth' of the life he sees and lives by becoming a Chartist;
Elizabeth Gaskell must bear witness to the 'truth' of the living
conditions with which as a Unitarian minister's wife in Manchester
she had contact. In the course of that witnessing, as novel succeeds
novel, Gaskell expands the boundaries of what is deemed 'real' to
include the hitherto unspoken issues of women and their place in
contemporary society.
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The above discussion of course presumes a conscious intent on
Gaskell's part in the expansion of the term 'realism' which parallels
the input, or will, which Unitarianism imputed to the individual
in his/her progression to perfectibility. It colludes with the premise
of the autonomous, willing individual which is part of the ideology
upon which realism rests. Such premises have been rightly focused
upon by modern theorists and readers alike as the means not only
by which individuals and groups marginalised by or excluded from
what is defined as real and meaningful are kept in their positions,
but the means by which the working of ideology itself is obscured.
The ideology of 'realism', of liberal rational humanism, works to
present the "position of the subject as fixed and unchangeable";' it
is the voice of the status quo.
But though the 'aims' of the realist genre must be seen as,
in Barthes's terms, to mystify, "to endow historical or cultural
phenomena with all the appearance of natural ones", 2 Gaskell's use
of that genre is open to a more positive evaluation. To articulate
a claim for women's place as autonomous individuals within the liberal
humanist ideology is no mean achievement when the ideology itself
precludes women. Gaskell's ability to do so, no matter how the deep
structures of 'realism' undermine themselves, is itself a 'demysti-
fication' of the system that excludes women. Liberal humanism and
realism have shown themselves to be appropriable precisely because
they are 'ideologies' which, though dominant, are not immutable.
The demystification of realism consists of course of more than
the appropriation of an integrate, speaking subject-position for
women. If we consider realism within the context of the feminist
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concern in autobiography other potential approaches or assessments
of realism emerge. On one level, as Toni Moi points out, autobiography
concurs with "the basic feminist contention that no criticism is
'value-free', that we all speak from a specific position shaped by
cultural, social, political and personal factors." 3 Writers such
as Cora Kaplan in Sea Changes, 4 Jane Miller in Women Writing About 
Men, 5 and Rachel Brownstein in Becoming a Heroine, 6 to name but
a few, have presented their work with autobiographical introductions
and codas, have outlined some of the 'factors' that have shaped what
Kaplan terms 'the-place-from-which-one-writes.' 7 Realism as represented
by Gaskell's texts can be seen as a type of social autobiography -
the autobiography of the culture, society. which it describes.
But on another level, an autobiography/realism parallel necessitates
that 'realism' be assessed as a 'measurer' of the place from it is
written. If "the prejudices one is able to formulate consciously
are precisely for that reason likely to be the least important ones", 8
what realism can 'consciously' articulate about itself is necessarDi
limited. Based solidly on the self's ability to consciously and
willfully explain the world around it, realism attempts to confirm
itself as 'truth', but is confirmedinstead as illusion par excellence 
by the interrogative reader. The ideology of realism is 'real' only
in so far as it is dominant, "in that it is the way in which people
really live their relationship to the social relations which govern
their conditions of existence" 9 in the liberal humanist tradition
that prevails in Western thought. But, unmasked as simply one of
the multiple factors (gender/economic class) which intersect, as
on a graph, to form the autonomous self of liberal humanism, realism
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is decentred. Bereft of its definition as 'all-explaining', as 'truth',
and relegated to a position as co-ordinate on the axis of the construct
'self', realism and the realist novel demand to be read by feminists
as interrogative, contradictory texts which expose the shifting basis
of the conception of 'self' which excludes women, not rejected as
confirmatory articulations of the autonomous implicitly male self.
Notes
'Catherine Belsey, Critical Practice, (London: Methuen & Co.
Ltd., 1980), 90.
2Jo1 Sturrock, "Roland Barthes," in Structuralism and Since: 
From Levi-Strauss to Derrida, John Sturrock, ed., (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1979), 50.
3Torii Moi, Sexual/Textual Politics, (London: Methuen & Co.
Ltd., 1985), 43. See also Liz Stanley and Sue Wise, "'Back into
the personal' or: our attempt to construct 'feminist research',"
in Theories of Women's Studies, Gloria Bowles and Renate Duelli Kleen,
eds., (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983) for their discussion
of ethnomethodology which posits the individual's role in the
construction of 'social processes'.
4Cora Kaplan, Sea Changes, (London: Verso, 1986).
5Jane Miller, Women Writing About Men, (London: Virago Press
Limited, 1986).
6Rachel M. Brownstein, Becoming a Heroine, (Harmondsworth:
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